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ABSTRACT
The p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  scudy  was t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  m a rk e t in g  
s c h o l a r  and p r a c t i t i o n e r  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
c o n t r o l  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s .  F i r s t ,  a c o n c e p tu a l  model which 
e x p l a i n s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e s  betw een 
f i r m s  on d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  was d e v e lo p e d .  
Second, a m ethodo logy  was p ro p o sed  f o r  e m p i r i c a l l y  exam in ing  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h y p o th e s iz e d  in  t h e  p ro p o sed  model o f  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l .  
F i n a l l y ,  in d e p e n d e n t  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  were su rv ey ed  t o  examine th e  
m ethodo logy  and to  v e r i f y  th e  middleman p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n c e p tu a l  
model o f  c o n t r o l .
C o n tro l  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  r e s u l t s  from a complex 
p r o c e s s  o f  member i n t e r a c t i o n .  The l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by 
one f i r m  o v e r  s p e c i f i c  m a rk e t in g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a n o t h e r  f i rm  on a 
d i f f e r e n t  ch an n e l  l e v e l  i s  d e te rm in e d  by th e  f o r m e r ' s  power ( p o te n ­
t i a l  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e )  as  w e l l  a s  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  th e  
l a t t e r .  The l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  t h a t  i s  a c h ie v e d  i s  a l s o  d e p e n d e n t  
upon th e  c o n t r o l l e d  f i r m ' s  t o l e r a n c e  o r  w i l l i n g  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  
c o n t r o l l i n g  f i r m ' s  i n f l u e n c e .  L e v e ls  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r fo rm a n c e  
and key  e x e c u t iv e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  a r e  b o th  a f f e c t e d  by th e  amount o f  
c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  in  e n t e r p r i s e  ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Key e x e c u t iv e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r f o r ­
mance a r e  two in t e r d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s ,  how ever.  F i n a l l y ,  th e
x i i
c o n t r o l l e d  f i r m ' s  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  o t h e r  c o n t r o l  i s  a f f e c t e d  by th e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  i t s  key  e x e c u t iv e s  w i th  and th e  f i r m ' s  p e rfo rm an ce  
t h a t  r e s u l t s  from i t s  e n t e r p r i s e  channe l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
The model o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  upon w hich t h i s  s tu d y  was 
based  i s  d y a d ic  and c o n s i s t s  o f  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s  f o r  
each  ch an n e l member. I t  i s  an e x t e n s io n  o f  th e  work o f  P r o f e s s o r  
L o u is  P. B u c k l in .  A p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e s  a ch an n e l  mem ber's  
p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  th e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  would a c c r u e  to  him a t  each o f  
s e v e r a l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e ;  e . g . ,  
r e s a l e  p r i c i n g .  A t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e s  t h e  maximum l e v e l  o f  
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i r m  in  th e  c h a n n e l  t o  which a channe l 
member w i l l i n g l y  a c c e d e s  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  p a y o f f .  The i n t e r s e c t i o n  
o f  each  m em ber's  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n e s  th e  maximum 
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t h a t  can be a c h ie v e d  by th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  
f i r m .
The model was t e s t e d  among a  g roup  o f  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  in  
s o u th  L o u i s i a n a  who s o ld  a w e l l  known, n a t i o n a l  b rand  o f  c a r p e t  and 
were s u p p l i e d  by a  common in d e p e n d e n t  c a r p e t  and ru g  d i s t r i b u t o r .
A s i n g l e  ch an n e l  i s s u e ,  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l ,  was exam ined . The 
d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  d id  n o t ,  on th e  a v e ra g e ,  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  
would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  i f  t h e  c a r p e t  d i s t r i b u t o r  ad o p ted  a 
more r e s t r i c t i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  p o l i c y .  However, t h e r e  w ere s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  among i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r ' s  a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s .  
T h is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  d e a l e r s  had p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  o t h e r  c l a s s e s  o f
x i i i
d e a le r s .
M easures were a l s o  o b ta in e d  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard 
h y p o t h e t i c a l  e n t e r p r i s e  ch an n e l  s i t u a t i o n s .  For each  s i t u a t i o n  th e  
d e a l e r s  were asked  to  a s su n e  t h a t i  ( 1 . )  t h e  s u p p l i e r  ad o p ted  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  ( f i v e  p o l i c i e s  were u s e d ) ;  and ( 2 . )  
t h e i r  an n u a l  n e t  p r o f i t s  b e f o r e  t a x e s  r o s e ,  f e l l  o r  s ta y e d  th e  same 
( f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  an n u a l  n e t  p r o f i t  changes  were u s e d ) .  The 
s tu d y  found th e  d e a l e r s  to  be f a v o r a b ly  d i s p o s e d  to  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
to  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s ,  b u t  n e g a t i v e l y  d i s p o s e d  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  
g r e a t e r  d i s t r i b u t o r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l .  D e a le r  r e s i s t a n c e  to  
d i s t r i b u t o r  c o n t r o l  o f  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  p r i c i n g  was found to  i n c r e a s e  
a t  an i n c r e a s i n g  r a t e  a t  s u c c e s s i v e l y  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  d i s t r i b u t o r  
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  T h is  f i n d i n g  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s  su rveyed  
would r e s i s t  d i s t r i b u t o r  demands f o r  r e t a i l  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  beyond a 
r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  no m a t t e r  what econom ic rew ard s  
th e  s u p p l i e r  o f f e r e d .
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C h a p te r  1
CONTROL IN A DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS AN OVERVIEW
I n c re a s e d  a t t e n t i o n  was g iv e n  d u r in g  th e  1 9 5 0 's  and 1 9 6 0 's  
to  th e  e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  a s  a s o c i a l  o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n  w ith  b e h a v io r a l  a s  w e ll  a s  econom ic d im e n s io n s .*  B e h a v io r a l  
c o n c e p ts  t h a t  r e c e iv e d  th e  g r e a t e s t  a t t e n t i o n  by s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  
i n t e r e s t e d  in  ch a n n e l  system s in c lu d e d  pow er, c o n t r o l ,  c o n f l i c t ,  
c o o p e r a t io n  and com m unica tion . A f t e r  more th a n  a  d e c a d e  o f  a rm c h a ir  
t h e o r i z i n g ,  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  i s  c u r r e n t l y  b e in g  u n d e r ta k e n  to
2
v e r i f y  t h e o r i e s  o f  b e h a v io r a l  d im e n s io n s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls .
Wroe A ld e r s o n ,  Dynamic M a rk e t in g  B eh av io r  (Homewoodi R. D. 
I rw in ,  1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p .  239-241 and 244 -2 4 8 ; Jo se p h  C. P a la m o u n ta in ,  J r . ,  
The P o l i t i c s  o f  D i s t r i b u t i o n  (C am bridge! H arvard  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1 95 5 ) ;  B ruce  M a lle n ,  "A Theory o f  R e t a i l e r - S u p p l i e r  C o n f l i c t ,  Con­
t r o l  and C o o p e r a t io n , "  J o u r n a l  o f  R e t a i l i n g , V o l .  39 (Summer, 19 6 3 ) ,  
pp . 2 4 -3 2 ,  51; V a le n t in e  Ridgeway, " A d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  M a n u fa c tu re i -  
D e a le r  S y s te m s ,"  A d m in i s t r a t i v e  S c ie n c e  Q u a r t e r l y , V o l.  1 (March, 
19 5 7 ) ,  p p .  464-483 ; L o u is  W. S t e r n  ( e d . ) ,  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e ls ! 
B e h a v io ra l  D im ensions (B o s to n i  H o u g h to n -M if f l in ,  1 9 6 9 ) .
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L a r ry  R o sen b erg ,  "An E m p ir ic a l  E x am in a t io n  o f  t h e  C auses ,  
L e v e ls ,  and Consequences o f  C o n f l i c t  in  a High S ta k e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  
C h a n n e l ,"  U npub lished  Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n  (The Ohio S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  
Columbus, Ohio, 1 9 6 9 ) ;  R o b e r t  S h u l t z ,  "A L a b o ra to ry  S tu d y  o f  Power 
B a s e - C o n f l i c t  R e l a t i o n s h i p s —As A p p l i c a b le  t o  C hannels  o f  D i s t r i ­
b u t i o n , "  U npub lished  Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n  (The Ohio S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  
Columbus, Ohio, 1 9 7 1 ) ;  O r v i l l  C. W alker,  J r . ,  " B a rg a in in g  B eh av io r  
and th e  B a lan ce  o f  P ow er,"  U npub lished  Ph.D . D i s s e r t a t i o n  ( U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  M in n eso ta ,  M in n e a p o l i s ,  M in n eso ta ,  1 9 7 1 ) ;  Ia n  F. W ilk in s o n ,  "Power 
R e l a t i o n s  Between Firm s in  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C hanne ls !  An B n p i r i c a l  Exam­
i n a t i o n , "  U npublished  Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  New South  
W ales, A u s t r a l i a ,  1 9 7 1 ) ;  Adel I .  E l -A n sa ry ,  "Power Measurement in  th e
1
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T h is  s tu d y  fo c u s e d  upon th e  o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  and v e r i f i ­
c a t i o n  o f  a  c o n c e p tu a l  model o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Based 
upon th e o r y  and e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  in  many d i s c i p l i n e s ,  a c o n c e p tu a l  
model was d ev e lo p ed  which r e l a t e s  ( 1 . )  middleman and s u p p l i e r  p e r ­
c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
o f  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  and ( 2 . )  middleman and s u p p l i e r  
f e e l i n g s  o f  burden  and s a c r i f i c e  i n c u r r e d  from a c c e d in g  to  th e  
o t h e r ' s  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  A u n iq u e  r e s e a r c h  m ethodo logy  was d ev e lo p ed  
to  o p e r a t i o n a l i z e  and t e s t  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  m ode l.  F i n a l l y ,  th e  model 
was s u b j e c t e d  to  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t i n g  among a  g roup  o f  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  
d e a l e r s .
A B r i e f  H i s t o r i c a l  S y n o p s is  o f  C o n tro l  
in  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C hannels
To p l a c e  t h i s  s tu d y  in  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  
t o  h i g h l i g h t  a number o f  m a jo r  s t r a n d s  o f  th o u g h t  d e a l i n g  w ith  th e  
co n ce p t  o f  c o n t r o l  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s .  C h a p te r  2 p r o v id e s  a 
much more d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  th a n  i s  
w a r ra n te d  in  t h i s  p re v ie w .
Concern f o r  c o n t r o l  among economic o r g a n i z a t i o n s  p a r t i c i ­
p a t i n g  in  c h a n n e ls  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f i r s t  emerged in  t h e  d ru g  i n d u s t r y  
w i th  m a n u fa c tu r e r  and r e s e l l e r  i n t e r e s t  in  r e s a l e  p r i c e  m a in ten a n ce  
d u r in g  th e  l a t e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .  The deve lopm en t o f  b randed  d ru g s
D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h an n e l« An B n p i r i c a l  I n v e s t i g a t i o n , "  U npub lished  Ph.D. 
D i s s e r t a t i o n  (The Ohio S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y ,  Columbus, O hio , 1970)}
S he lby  D. Hunt and John N evin , "Power in  a Channel o f  D i s t r i b u t i o n !  
S ou rces  and C o n seq u en ces ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  M a rk e t in g  R e s e a rc h ,  V o l.  11 
(May, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  pp . 186-193 .
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weakened th e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  p h a r m a c i s t s  v i s - a - v i s  d ru g  m a n u fa c tu re r s
and l e d  to  demands by d ru g  m a n u fa c tu r e r s  t h a t  th e y  c o n t r o l  r e t a i l
. . 3p r i c e s  t o  e n s u re  s p a t i a l  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  A s e r i e s  o f  d i s p u t e s  o v e r
m a n u fa c tu re r  c o n t r o l  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  c u s to m e rs ,  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g ,
b ro k e ra g e  f e e s ,  and o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  i s s u e s  in  many o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s
4
took  p l a c e  d u r in g  th e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y .
Second, grow th o f  mass r e t a i l e r s  in  th e  1 9 4 0 's  and 1 9 5 0 's  
r e s u l t e d  in  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  th e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  as  
channe l  l e a d e r .  The deve lopm ent o f  c h a in  and d e p a r tm e n t  s t o r e s  as  
w e l l  as  r e t a i l e r  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  l e d  t o  " b a t t l e s  f o r  ch an n e l  
c o n t r o l . T h e  ch an g in g  s t r u c t u r e  o f  power and c o n t r o l  w i th in  
i n d u s t r i e s  became a t o p i c  o f  i n t e r e s t  to  r e s e a r c h e r s . ^
The t h i r d  m a jo r  s t r a n d  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch an n e l  th o u g h t  
emerged in  1949 when Ralph B re y e r  i n v e s t i g a t e d  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n
3
L ou is  B u c k l in ,  "A Theory o f  Channel C o n t r o l , "  J o u r n a l  o f  
M a rk e t in g , V o l.  37 ( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 3 ) ,  p .  39.
4
For a r e v ie w  o f  some o f  t h e s e  i s s u e s  s e e  Lee E. P r e s to n ,  
" R e s t r i c t i v e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  A rran g em en ts i  Economic A n a ly s i s  and P u b l i c  
P o l i c y  S t a n d a r d s , "  Law and C ontem porary  P ro b lem s ,  V o l.  30 (Summer, 
1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p .  506-529 .
^See f o r  example David R. C ra ig  and N e m e r  R. G a b le r ,  "The 
C o m p e ti t iv e  S t r u g g l e  f o r  M arket C o n t r o l , "  The A nnals  o f  th e  American 
Academy o f  P o l i t i c a l  and S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s , V o l.  209 (May, 1 9 4 0 ) ,  pp. 
84-107} M a llen ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  30 ; B u c k l in ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  40 .
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See e s p e c i a l l y  Ralph C assady and W ylie L. J o n e s ,  The 
Changing C o m p e ti t iv e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  W holesa le  G rocery  T ra d e , 
(B erk e ley *  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  19491); and R alph  Cassady 
and Wylie L. J o n e s ,  The N a tu re  o f  C o m p e ti t io n  i n  G a s o l in e  D i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  a t  t h e  R e t a i l  L e v e l , (B e rk e ley *  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  
1 9 5 1 ) .
4
ch an n e l  as  a t o t a l  sy s tem  o r  g r o u p . 7 A lthough  m a in ly  co n ce rn ed  w ith  
ch an n e l  c o s t  a n a l y s i s ,  B rey e r* s  c o n c e p tu a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  channe l  fo c u s e d  upon c o n t r o l  o f  th e  c h a n n e l  a s  a g ro u p .
g
B re y e r  d e f in e d  c o n t r o l  as  " . . . t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  g o v e rn in g  i n f l u e n c e . "  
He em phasized th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c h i e v in g  ch a n n e l  e f f i c i e n c y  
th ro u g h  ch an n e l  management. F u r t h e r ,  he  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  ch an n e l  
c o n t r o l  i s  needed f o r  channe l  management and c o o r d i n a t i o n .  "C er­
t a i n l y ,  i f  we a r e  t o  im prove th e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  m a rk e t in g ,  such
c o n t r o l  must be pushed w e l l  beyond th e  c o n f in e s  o f  th e  s i n g l e
9ow nersh ip  whenever t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  p r e s e n t s  i t s e l f . "
A f o u r t h  ap p ro ach  was i n i t i a t e d  by Wroe A ld e rso n  in  1957.
He in d i c a t e d  t h a t  some mechanism f o r  c o o r d i n a t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
even th e  s i m p l i s t  b e h a v io r  sy s tem  i f  th e  sy s tem  i s  t o  f u n c t i o n  
e f f i c i e n t l y . ^  A ld e rs o n  co n c e iv e d  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  as  
o rg a n iz e d  b e h a v io r  sy stem s  s i n c e  th e y  a r e  p re p la n n e d  and c o o r d in a t e d ,  
and he c o n te n d e d ,  a s  d id  B re y e r ,  t h a t  th e  e f f e c t i v e  b u i l d i n g  and 
managing o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  r e q u i r e  th e  em ergence o f  system  
l e a d e r s h i p  th ro u g h  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  c o n t r o l .
7Ralph F. B re y e r ,  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  S y s te m ic  A n a ly s i s  and C o n t r o l ! 
S tudy  No. 1_ Channel C o s t in g  and Channel Group C o n t r o l , ( P h i l a d e l p h i a !  
Wharton School o f  F in an c e  and Commerce, U n i v e r s i t y  o f  P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  
19 4 9 ) .
^ I b i d . , p . 49 .
9 I b i d . , p .  270.
l 0 Wroe A ld e r s o n ,  M a rk e t in g  B e h a v io r  and E x e c u t iv e  A c t i o n i 
A F u n c t i o n a l i s t  Approach to  M a rk e t in g  T heo ry , (Homewoodi R. D.
I rw in ,  1 9 5 7 ) ,  p .  87.
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"The e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  b e h a v i o r a l  and econom ic t h e o r i e s  a s  a
b a s i s  f o r  o b t a i n i n g  th e  n e c e s s a r y  system  c o o r d i n a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  th e
f i n a l  l i t e r a t u r e  theme r e l e v a n t  t o  ch an n e l c o n t r o l . " * *  S t e m  and
o t h e r s  l a i d  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  f o u n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  ch an n e l
12system  pow er, c o n f l i c t  and com m unica tion . More r e c e n t l y ,  r e ­
s e a r c h e r s  have begun to  p ro p o se  and t e s t  m e th o d o lo g ie s  f o r  th e
. . .  . . .  . 1 3e m p i r i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l  t h e o r i e s .
Power and i t s  m easurem ent in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  has
r e c e n t l y  a t t r a c t e d  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  s e v e r a l  r e s e a r c h e r s .  In  1971,
E l-A n sa ry  p ro p o sed  and t e s t e d  a  m e thodology  f o r  m e a su r in g  power in  a
d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l .  H is  r e s e a r c h  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i n  a  h e a t i n g  and
a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g  equ ipm ent s u p p ly  c h a n n e l ,  power was d i s p e r s e d  and
14a lo c u s  o f  power d id  n o t  e x i s t .  W ilk in so n  used  a d i f f e r e n t  
m ethodo logy  to  m easure  power r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  f i rm s  in  a ch an n e l  
s y s t e m .*"* He o b ta in e d  m easu res  o f  ch an n e l  members' s e l f - p e r c e i v e d  
and a t t r i b u t e d  power and u s u a l  c o n s t r a i n i n g  i n f l u e n c e .  L ik e  E l -A n sa ry ,  
he r e l a t e d  m easu res  o f  dependence  and s o u rc e s  o f  pow er. U sing  a 
s l i g h t l y  m o d if ie d  v e r s i o n  o f  E l - A n s a r y 's  m ethodo logy ,  Hunt and Nevin
* * B u c k l in ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  40 .
12 S t e m ,  op . c i t .
13See e s p e c i a l l y  L a r ry  J .  R osenberg  and L ou is  W. S t e m ,  "Con­
f l i c t  M easurement i n  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e l ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  M ark e tin g  
R e s e a rc h , V o l.  8 (November, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  p p .  437-443} and Adel I .  E l-A n sa ry  
and L o u is  S t e r n ,  "Power M easurement in  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e l ,"  
J o u r n a l  o f  M ark e tin g  R e s e a rc h , V o l.  9 (F e b ru a ry ,  1 9 7 2 ) ,  p p .  537-539 .
14 E l-A n sa ry ,  op . c i t . , p .  167.
* "^Wilkinson, op . c i t .
in  1974 a t te m p te d  t o  m easure  power in  a  f r a n c h i s e  ch an n e l  sy s tem .
They co n c lu d ed  t h a t  an i d e n t i f i a b l e  power s t r u c t u r e  d id  e x i s t  in
th e  f r a n c h i s e  sy s te m .
C o n tro l  i s  a more n e b u lo u s  c o n c e p t  th a n  power and h as  been
l a r g e l y  ig n o re d  by s tu d e n t s  o f  management and m a rk e t in g .  C o n tro l  i s
a g e n e r a l  and u n d e r ly i n g  c o n c e p t  t h a t  h e l p s  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  a  wide
v a r i e t y  o f  i s s u e s  w hich a r e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  t r e a t e d  a s  d i s c r e t e  t o p i c s
e . g . ,  l e a d e r s h i p ,  pow er, a u t h o r i t y ,  c o n f l i c t  and c o o p e r a t io n .* ^
Only r e c e n t l y  have  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e o r i s t s  begun to  d e a l  w i th
th e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o n t r o l .  The " h u m a n - r e l a t i o n i s t s "  av o id ed  e x p l i c i t
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  s o c i a l  power and c o n t r o l  " . . . p a r t l y  b e c a u se  t h e s e
te rm s c a r r i e d  c o n n o t a t io n s  t h a t  w ere i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  i d e a l  o f
18th e  h a rm o n io u s ,  c o n f l i c t - f r e e  o r g a n i z a t i o n . "  The s o c io l o g y ,
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n c e  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  th e o ry  l i t e r a t u r e  on c o n t r o l  and
i t s  m easurem ent b lossom ed d u r in g  th e  1 9 6 0 's .
At t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  th e o ry  and l e s s  e m p i r i c a l
r e s e a r c h  d e a l i n g  w ith  c o n t r o l  i n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls .  In  1973,
B u c k l in  p ro p o sed  a th e o ry  o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  which r e p r e s e n t e d  an
19i n i t i a l  c o n c e p t io n  in  t h i s  a r e a  o f  m a rk e t in g  t h e o r y .  However, 
h i s  model was in c o m p le te  and s u f f e r e d  from s e v e r a l  f a l l a c i o u s
16Hunt and N evin , op . c i t .
*^Tannenbaum ( e d . ) ,  C o n tro l  in  O r g a n iz a t io n s , p .  v i i .
18 .I b i d . , p .  7.
19B u c k l in ,  op . c i t .
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assu m p tio n s  ab o u t th e  n a t u r e  o f  m id d le m a n -s u p p l ie r  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s .  B u c k l i n ' s  model o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  i s  c r i t i c a l l y  rev iew ed  
in  th e  second  c h a p t e r .
As y e t ,  no o t h e r  e f f o r t s  have  been made to  o p e r a t i o n a l i z e  th e  
co n ce p t  o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l .  T h is  s tu d y  goes  beyond th e  m easurem ent 
o f  c o n t r o l ,  how ever, and exam ines th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een channe l  
c o n t r o l  and p e r c e iv e d  channe l  member p e r fo rm a n ce  and s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The O b je c t iv e s  o f  t h i s  Study
The o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  w erei
1 .  t o  d e v e lo p  a c o n c e p tu a l  model w hich e x p l a in s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f
c o n t r o l  betw een middleman on d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  i n  a d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  c h a n n e l ;
2 .  t o  d e v e lo p  a m ethodology f o r  e m p i r i c a l l y  t e s t i n g  th e  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p s  h y p o th e s iz e d  in  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model o f  r e t a i l e r -  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ;
3. t o  a p p ly  th e  m ethodology t o  a group  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  channe l  
members t o  t
a .  examine th e  m ethodo logy ;
b .  v e r i f y  th e  middleman p o r t i o n  o f  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  m odel.
The r e s e a r c h  m ethodology was d e s ig n e d  t o  m easure  t h e  p e r c e iv e d
p a y o f f  ( p r o f i t )  o f  a group o f  middlemen ( r e t a i l  d e a l e r s )  a t  v a r i o u s
l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -s u p p l ie r  c o n t r o l  o f  a c r u c i a l  m a rk e t in g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  The m ethodology a l s o  m easured th e  m id d lem en 's  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f
8
o r  p r o f i t .
The Scope o f  t h e  S tu d y
The c o n c e p tu a l  scope  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  was d e l im i t e d  by th e  
o b j e c t i v e s  s t a t e d  in  th e  p r e v io u s  s e c t i o n .  The s tu d y  was d e s ig n e d  
to  d e v e lo p  a c o n c e p tu a l  model w hich e x p l a in s  th e  n a t u r e  o f  c o n t r o l  
in  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  t o  d e v e lo p  a  m e thodology  to  t e s t  th e  
c o n c e p tu a l  model and to  a p p ly  th e  m ethodology  t o  an e n t e r p r i s e  
ch an n e l  g ro u p .
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  a r e  n o t  g e n e r a l i z a b l e  beyond th e  
ch an n e l  group  su rv e y e d .  The e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  e x p l a in  th e  n a t u r e  o f  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  a s i n g l e  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e ,  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g ,  and 
a r e  n o t  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  an a g g r e g a t e  model o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a l l  mar­
k e t i n g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e s .
The r e s e a r c h  was co n d u c ted  in  a c a r p e t  and ru g  su p p ly  
c h a n n e l .  The m a rk e t  a r e a  su rv e y e d  was Baton  Rouge and New O r le a n s ,  
L o u i s i a n a .  The p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  ch an n e l  s t u d i e d  was a  n a t i o n a l l y  
b randed  l i n e  o f  c a r p e t s  o f  a  m a jo r  c a r p e t  and ru g  m a n u fa c tu r e r  s o ld  
to  u l t i m a t e  consum ers .  The c h a n n e l  group  was com prised  o f  r e t a i l  
c a r p e t  and ru g  d e a l e r s  in  t h e  m a rk e t  a r e a  who c a r r y  th e  c a r p e t  
and ru g  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  b randed  m e rc h a n d is e .
R esea rc h  d a t a  in c lu d e s  r e s p o n s e s  from a l l  r e t a i l  c a r p e t
The c o n c e p ts  o f  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  a r e  d e f in e d  l a t e r  in  
t h i s  c h a p t e r .  A d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  each  o f  t h e s e  c o n c e p ts  i s  
p r e s e n te d  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r  a lo n g  w ith  a  f u l l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  
p roposed  c o n c e p tu a l  model o f  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l . The c o n c e p ts  a r e  
o p e r a t i o n a l l y  d e f in e d  in  C h a p te r  4 .
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d e a l e r s  who ag re e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  s t u d y .  A l l  d e a l e r s  in  th e  
m a rk e t  a r e a  who c a r r i e d  th e  m a jo r  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  b rand  o f  m e rc h an d ise  
were asked  to  p a r t i c i p a t e .  R esponses  were s o u g h t  from th e  r e t a i l  
s t o r e  owner o r  m anager, w h ich ev e r  had th e  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r a c t i o n  w ith  
th e  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r .  The d a t a  was o b ta in e d  th ro u g h  a s t r u c t u r e d -  
d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  The d e t a i l s  o f  th e  sa m p lin g  p ro c e d u re  a r e  
p r e s e n te d  i n  th e  f o u r t h  c h a p t e r .
A B r i e f  I n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  t h i s  S tudy
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  h a s  bo th  
t h e o r e t i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e .  I t  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  th e  developm en t 
o f  m a rk e t in g  th e o ry ,  a more e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  economic 
r e s o u r c e s ,  th e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  s m a l l  b u s in e s s e s  and th e  a b i l i t y  o f  
bus inessm en  to  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  p r o f i t  and c o n t r o l  o b j e c t i v e s .  In  th e  
f o l lo w in g  s e c t i o n s ,  e v id e n c e  i s  p r e s e n te d  which i n d i c a t e s  th e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a t t e m p t s  to  d e v e lo p  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  th e o r y  and to  
e m p i r i c a l l y  examine th e  th e o ry  f o r  v a l i d i t y  and r e l e v a n c e .
M ark e tin g  Theory N eeds . As a  r e l a t i v e l y  young d i s c i p l i n e ,  
m a rk e t in g  l a c k s  a r i c h  body o f  t h e o r y .  M a rk e t in g  th e o r y  i s  needed 
by m a rk e te r s  t o  g u id e  them in  t h e i r  complex d e c i s io n -m a k in g  a c t i v i ­
t i e s  which depend upon t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  d e s c r i b e ,  e x p l a in  and p r e d i c t  
21m arke t  b e h a v io r .  The p a u c i t y  o f  m a rk e t in g  th e o ry  p r o v id e s  j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  f o r  s e r i o u s  e f f o r t s  t o  d e v e lo p  th e o ry  in  m a rk e t in g .
21 George F i s k ,  "The R o le  o f  M ark e tin g  T h e o ry ,"  in  George 
F is k  ( e d . ) ,  New E ssays  i n  M a rk e t in g  Theory (B ostons  A lly n  and 
Bacon, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  p .  1 .
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M ark e tin g  c h a n n e ls  a r e  th e  o n ly  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  which a r e
u n iq u e ly  d e s ig n e d  and o p e ra te d  t o  s e r v e  th e  p u rp o s e s  o f  m a rk e t in g .
The s t r u c t u r e  and o p e r a t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
s e t s  which co m p rise  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e ls  a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  c e n t r a l  t o p i c s
22which m ust be r e c o g n iz e d  in  th e  deve lopm en t o f  m a rk e t in g  th e o r y .
A d m in i s t r a t i o n  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e o r i e s  have to o  lo n g  been 
r e l i e d  upon to  g u id e  d e c i s io n - m a k e r s  in  t h e i r  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  A d m in i s t r a t i o n  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e o r i s t s  have  concen­
t r a t e d  on th e  s i n g l e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and have  l a r g e l y  ig n o re d  th e  need
to  p r o v id e  u n iq u e  and r e l e v a n t  g u i d e l i n e s  t o  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o f
23system s o f  s e p a r a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  I t  i s  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  some o f  
th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e o r i s t s  may 
n o t  be r e l e v a n t  f o r  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  s u p e r o r g a n iz a t io n s  o r  sy s tem s  o f  
s e p a r a t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
New t h e o r i e s  which d e a l  w i th  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( e . g . ,  channe l  
g ro u p s )  a s  s o c i a l  sy s tem s  r a t h e r  th a n  a s  h i e r a r c h i e s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  s o r e l y  n eed e d .  Paradigm s a r e  needed t o  e x p la in  
how autonomous s o c i a l  sy stem s  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a f f e c t  one a n o t h e r .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e o r i e s  c o n c e rn in g  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power t o  a c h ie v e  
c o n t r o l  and c o o r d in a t io n  where fo rm al a u t h o r i t y  i s  a b s e n t  must be 
d e v e l o p e d . ^
22 I b i d . ,  p .  3.
23Ridgeway, " A d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  M a n u fa c tu r e r -D e a le r  S y s te m s ,"  
p p .  466-467 .
24
A Thomas H o l l in g s w o r th ,  "A pply ing  O r g a n iz a t io n  Theory  to  
M ark e tin g  C h a n n e ls ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  R e t a i l i n g , V ol. 49 (Summer, 1 9 7 3 ) ,  
p p .  6 3 -6 4 .
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S te r n  i n d i c a t e d  th e  v e r y  c r u c i a l  need to  d e v e lo p  th e o ry  f o r
i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s .
The u s e  o f  c u r r e n t  management t h e o r i e s  and modern d e c i s i o n  
t o o l s  which c o n t r i b u t e  t o  r a t i o n a l  J n t r a f i r n  management 
d e c i s i o n s i  ( a )  f o s t e r s  n a r ro w ,  s e l f - o r i e n t e d  g o a l - d e f i ­
n i t i o n s ,  and (b )  o f t e n  r e s u l t s  in  d e c i s i o n s  which im p a ir  
t h e  p e rfo rm an ce  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m s  w i t h i n  a group o f  
i n t e r - r e l a t e d  f i r m s ,  th e r e b y  d im in i s h in g  th e  p e rfo rm a n ce  
o f  th e  e n t i r e  s y s t e m .^5
B u c k l in  a l s o  h a s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  w i th  r e g a r d  t o
26ch an n e l  c o n t r o l ,  c u r r e n t  m a rk e t in g  th e o ry  l a g s  c u r r e n t  n e e d s .  To 
some e x t e n t ,  a l l  c h a n n e l  sy s tem s  a r e  a d m in i s t e r e d  o r  managed — even 
i f  th e  system  o p e r a t e s  i n  an en v iro n m e n t  i n  w hich i n f l u e n c e  i s  
d i s p e r s e d  e q u a l l y  among a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  However, t h e r e  a r e  few 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  by m a rk e t in g  t h e o r i s t s  t h a t  y i e l d  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
o f  ch a n n e l  phenomena.
R esou rce  A l l o c a t i o n  B e n e f i t s . The e x e r c i s e  o f  ch an n e l  
c o n t r o l  a f f e c t s  th e  c h a n n e l ' s  econom ic p e r fo rm a n c e .  The e a r l i e r  
r e v ie w  o f  t h e  works o f  Ralph B re y e r  and Wroe A ld e rso n  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
ch an n e l  c o o r d i n r t i o n  th ro u g h  c o n t r o l  o f f e r s  th e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r
in c re a s e d  e f f i c i e n c y .  T h is  im p l ie s  an improvement in  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n
f  27o f  s c a r c e  econom ic r e s o u r c e s .
I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  c o n s id e r  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t  o f  channe l
25L ou is  W. S t e m ,  "Channel C o n tro l  and I n t e r - O r g a n i z a t i o n  
M anagem ent," in  P e t e r  D. B e n n e t t  ( e d . ) ,  M a rk e t in g  and Economic 
Development (C h ic ag o : American M a rk e t in g  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p .  665.
26
B u c k l in ,  "A Theory o f  Channel C o n t r o l , "  p .  39.
Supra, pp. 3 -4 .
12
c o n t r o l  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  upon ch a n n e l  p e r fo rm a n ce  and th e  r e s u l t i n g  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  among ch a n n e l  members and consum ers 
in  a  s o c i e t y .  S l a t e r  i n v e s t i g a t e d  th e  im pac t o f  m arke t  p ro c e s s  
c o o r d i n a t i o n  in  u n d e rd ev e lo p ed  c o u n t r i e s  upon th e  l e v e l  and d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  o f  income w i th i n  a community. Based upon r e s e a r c h  in  San 
J u a n ,  P u e r to  R ic o ,  R e c i f e ,  B r a z i l ,  and La P az ,  B o l i v i a ,  S l a t e r  
conc lu d ed  t h a t  m a rk e t  c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  tw in  g o a l s
o f  econom ic d e v e lo p m en t;  i . e .  i t  i n c r e a s e d  r e a l  income and r e d i s t r i -
28bu ted  r e a l  income to  y i e l d  a  b r o a d e r  b a s e  o f  e f f e c t i v e  demand.
Thus, s tu d y  o f  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  p o t e n t i a l  i n f l u e n c e  ( a u t h o r i t y  a n d /o r  
pow er) t o  a c h ie v e  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  i s  c r u c i a l  i f  one 
i s  to  a c h ie v e  an optimum o r  even  s a t i s f a c t o r y  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  
econom ic r e s o u r c e s .
S u r v iv a l  and V i a b i l i t y . Theory  and r e s e a r c h  which s e e k s  to  
d e s c r i b e ,  e x p l a in  a n d /o r  p r e d i c t  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  i s  
j u s t i f i e d  t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  th e  s u r v i v a l  o f  th e  
sm a l l  b u s in e s s  f i r m .  S u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  c e r t a i n  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  
i s s u e s  th ro u g h o u t  a ch a n n e l  sy s tem  can be j u s t i f i e d  on th e  grounds 
t h a t  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  g o v e rn in g  in f l u e n c e  may a c t u a l l y  p r o t e c t  s m a l l e r  
f i rm s  from v i c i o u s  i n t r a - c h a n n e l  c o m p e t i t io n  and p ro v id e  them w ith  
b e t t e r  p rogram s f o r  i n t e r - c h a n n e l  c o m p e t i t io n .  Inasmuch a s  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een m a n u fa c tu re r s  and ch an n e l  middlemen i s  one o f
28
C h a r le s  C. S l a t e r ,  "M arket Channel C o o rd in a t io n  and 
Economic D ev e lo p m en t,"  i n  L ou is  P. B u c k l in  ( e d . ) ,  V e r t i c a l  M ark e tin g  
System s (G lenv iew i S c o t t ,  Foresman and Company, 19 7 0 ) ,  p p .  135- 
157.
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m utua l in t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,  th e  s u r v i v a l  and v i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  ch an n e l
and i t s  members i s  a l s o  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t .
M a n u fa c tu re r s  d e s i r e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  m a rk e t in g  p r a c t i c e s
29o f  middlemen f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  when a m a n u fa c tu re r  
p e r c e i v e s  t h a t  h i s  middlemen c a n n o t  make d e c i s i o n s  to  b e s t  s e rv e  
t h e i r  own much l e s s  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  i n t e r e s t s ,  th e n  th e  m anufac­
t u r e r  may p e r c e iv e  h i s  c o n t r o l  t o  be j u s t i f i e d .  Second, beca u se  
most ch a n n e l  sy s tem s  a r e  com prised  o f  middlemen w ith  d i f f e r e n t  
g o a l s ,  r e s o u r c e s  and c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  in d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s  o f  th e  
middlemen to  o p t im iz e  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n s  may y i e l d  
su b o p t im a l  sy stem  p e r fo rm a n c e .  F i n a l l y ,  whenever s t r o n g  i n t e r ­
c h an n e l  c o m p e t i t io n  ( e . g . ,  i n t e r - b r a n d  c o m p e t i t io n )  t h r e a t e n s  th e  
v e ry  s u r v i v a l  o f  th e  m a n u fa c tu re r  a s  w e l l  a s  h i s  m iddlem en, manu­
f a c t u r e r s  may p e r c e iv e  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  middlemen t o  be n e c e s s a r y .  
For exam ple , th e  developm en t by Schwinn and Company o f  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
sys tem  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  m a n u fa c tu re r  c o n t r o l  o f  
d i s t r i b u t o r s  and r e t a i l e r s  was based  upon a  d e s i r e  " . . . t o  e n a b le
i t s  in d e p e n d e n t  d e a l e r s  t o  com pete on an e q u a l  b a s i s  w i th  th e  o th e r
30b ra n d s  o f  b i c y c l e s  on th e  m a r k e t . "  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  c o n t r o l  
by t h e  m a n u fa c tu r e r  was t o  m in im ize  c o m p e t i t io n  among th e  Schwinn
29B u c k l in ,  op . c i t . , p p .  4 0 -4 1 .  For f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
th e  a rgum ents  f o r  m a n u fa c tu re r  c o n t r o l  se e  R o b e r t  W. L i t t l e ,  "The 
M a rk e t in g  Channels Who Should  Lead t h i s  E x t r a - C o r p o r a te  O rgan i­
z a t i o n ? "  J o u r n a l  o f  M a rk e t in g ,  V o l.  34 ( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 0 ) ,  p p .  3 4 -3 6 ; 
and Lee E. P r e s to n ,  " R e s t r i c t i v e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  A rrangem ents!  Eco­
nomic A n a ly s i s  and P u b l i c  P o l i c y  S t a n d a r d s . "
30
L ou is  W. S t e r n  and John  R. G ra b n e r ,  J r . ,  C o m p e ti t io n  in  th e  
M a rk e tp la c e , (G lenv iew t S c o t t ,  Foresman and Company, 1 9 7 0 ) ,  p .  136 .
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d e a l e r s  and to  en co u ra g e  them t o  com pete w ith  middlemen who c a r r i e d  
o t h e r  b r a n d s .
There  i s  a l s o  a d e s i r e  among ch a n n e l  middlemen ( e s p e c i a l l y
l a r g e  w h o le s a l e r s ,  l a r g e  r e t a i l e r s  and r e t a i l e r  c o o p e r a t i v e s )  t o
31c o n t r o l  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  th ro u g h o u t  th e  c h a n n e l .  A
p a r t i c u l a r  middleman r e s i s t s  c o n t r o l  by m a n u fa c tu r e r s  and o t h e r
middlemen to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  he  p e r c e i v e s  such  c o n t r o l  t o  l i m i t
h i s  a b i l i t y  to  a c h ie v e  h i s  u n iq u e  o b j e c t i v e s .  Some middlemen
p r e f e r  to  c o n t r o l  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e s  a t  s e v e r a l  ch an n e l
l e v e l s  b e ca u se  th e y  a r e  p h y s i c a l l y  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  consum er and
b e l i e v e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  th e y  hav e  a  b e t t e r  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  m o n i to r
32th e  co n su m ers ' c h an g in g  w ants  and n e e d s .  C ra ig  and G a b le r  e a r l i e r
a rgued  t h a t  in  a lo n g - r u n  b u y e r ' s  m a rk e t ,  a  r e t a i l e r - g u i d e d  system
33would be most e f f e c t i v e  in  s a t i s f y i n g  consum er w a n ts .  To th e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  m a rk e t  s u c c e s s  d epends  upon th e  a b i l i t y  o f  r e t a i l e r s  t o  
m odify  t h e i r  m a rk e t in g  mix e le m e n ts  t o  s a t i s f y  r a p i d l y  chang ing  
consumer d e s i r e s ,  t h e i r  d e s i r e  f o r  c o n t r o l  i s  j u s t i f i e d .
The d e c i s i o n  by a p a r t i c u l a r  middleman o r  m a n u fa c tu re r  t o  
c o n t r o l  o r  t o  be c o n t r o l l e d  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  any  s p e c i f i c  m a rk e t in g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  sh o u ld  be based  upon some a n a l y s i s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
c a p a b i l i t y .  W hichever ch an n e l  member can  make d e c i s i o n s  which
31L i t t l e ,  op . c i t . , p .  33.
32M allen ,  "A Theory o f  R e t a i l e r - S u p p l i e r  C o n f l i c t ,  C o n tro l  
and C o o p e r a t io n ,"  pp . 31 -32 .
33 C ra ig  and G a b le r ,  "The C o m p e t i t iv e  S t r u g g l e  f o r  M arket 
C o n t r o l , "  p .  99.
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c o n t r i b u t e  th e  most t o  t h e  a c h iev em en t  o f  a l l  members* o b j e c t i v e s  
sh o u ld  le a d  th e  o t h e r s  i n  t h e i r  d e c i s io n - m a k in g .  Such l e a d e r s h i p  
sh o u ld  c o n t r i b u t e  to  th e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  which a r e  
in c a p a b le  o f  making e f f e c t i v e  in d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s .
P r o f i t  and C o n tro l  O b j e c t i v e s . B u s in e s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
t y p i c a l l y  s t r i v e  t o  a c h ie v e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  w i l l  a t  l e a s t  e n a b le  them 
to  m a in ta in  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  e x i s t e n c e .  A se c o n d a ry  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  b u s in e s s  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i s  t o  m a in ta in  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  autonomy o r  
s e l f - c o n t r o l  so as  t o  be in  a  p o s i t i o n  to  p r o t e c t  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  
f u t u r e .  These two o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  o f t e n  in  c o n f l i c t ,  how ever. To 
a c h ie v e  th e  f i r s t ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  som etim es m ust r e l i n q u i s h  c o n t r o l .
In  economic t h e o r y ,  m a rk e t  s t r u c t u r e  ( c o n c e n t r a t i o n  r a t i o s ,
th e  r e l a t i v e  s i z e s  o f  com peting  f i r m s  and th e  number o f  com peting
f i r m s )  has  se rv e d  a s  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  m a rk e t  c o n t r o l .  With r e g a r d  to
ch an n e l  s y s te m s ,  economic th e o ry  im p l ie s  t h a t  in  th e  a b s e n c e  o f
monopoly power th ro u g h o u t  a c h a n n e l  sy s te m , open  m a rk e t  f o r c e s  would
d e te rm in e  b u s in e s s  p r a c t i c e s  and sh o u ld  a l s o  p r o h i b i t  th e  e s t a b l i s h -
34raent o f  a lo c u s  o f  c o n t r o l  a t  any one ch a n n e l  l e v e l .  S t e m ' s  
r e s e a r c h  o f  th e  wood h o u seh o ld  f u r n i t u r e  i n d u s t r y  l e d  t o  a  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n c lu s io n ,  how ever. T hat i n d u s t r y  i s  b i l a t e r a l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e ;  i . e .  
low c o n c e n t r a t i o n  r a t i o s  a t  a l l  ch a n n e l  l e v e l s .  S t e m  found t h a t  a 
lo c u s  o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  does  e x i s t  a t  th e  r e t a i l  l e v e l  " . . . b e c a u s e  
f u r n i t u r e  r e t a i l e r s  have g a in ed  th e  g r e a t e s t  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  th e
34L ouis  W. S t e r n ,  "The Concept o f  Channel C o n t r o l , "  p .  16.
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35f i n a l  s a l e  o f  p r o d u c t s  m  th e  i n d u s t r y . ” T h is  f i n d i n g  r e f l e c t s
th e  te n d en cy  o f  f i rm s  to  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  t o  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l ;
th e y  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  power a s  w e l l  a s  t h e i r  l i m i t e d  a u t h o r i t y  to
ac c o m p lish  b o th  p r o f i t  and c o n t r o l  r e l a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s .
On an in d i v i d u a l  c h a n n e l  g roup  l e v e l ,  t h e r e  a r e  a d v a n ta g e s
to  be g a in e d  by a l l  ch an n e l  members by ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  and d i r e c t i o n .
P rehoda  h a s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  two p o s s i b l e  a p p ro ac h es
to  a c h i e v in g  g o a ls  g iv e n  b a s i c  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  o r  econom ic c a p a b i l i -  
36t i e s .  One i s  an e v o l u t i o n a r y  o r  " t r i a l  and e r r o r "  a p p ro a c h .  The
second  i s  a c o n s c io u s ,  p la n n e d  e f f o r t  t o  a c h ie v e  o p t im a l  r e s u l t s .
A pp ly ing  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  to  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l  s y s te m s ,  Bowersox
and McCarthy p o s t u l a t e d  t h a t  peak  sy s tem  p e r fo rm a n ce  can  be a c h ie v e d
37f a s t e r  i n  p la n n e d  (and  c o o r d i n a t e d )  ch a n n e l  s y s te m s .  In  a d d i t i o n  
to  p ro p o s in g  t h a t  p la n n e d  sy s tem s  a c h ie v e  peak  p e r fo rm a n c e  f a s t e r ,  
Bowersox and McCarthy c i t e d  e v id e n c e  t h a t  a  p la n n e d  and more i n t e ­
g r a t e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch an n e l  o p e r a t e s  a t  from o n e - t h i r d  t o  o n e - h a l f
th e  c o s t  o f  c h a n n e ls  u s in g  an  e v o l u t i o n a r y  and l e s s  i n t e g r a t e d
38a p p ro a c h .  These f i n d i n g s  p a r a l l e l  S t e m ' s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  " . . . i n t e r -
35I b i d . , p .  17 .
36R o b e r t  W. P reh o d a ,  D e s ig n in g  th e  F u tu re  ( P h i l a d e l p h i a !  
C h i l to n  Book Company, 1 9 6 7 ) ,  p .  i 7.
37Donald J .  Bowersox and E. Jerom e M cCarthy, " S t r a t e g i c  
D evelopm ent o f  P lanned  V e r t i c a l  M ark e t in g  S y s te m s ,"  in  B u c k l in  ( e d . ) ,  
V e r t i c a l  M ark e t in g  S y s tem s , p p .  5 5 -5 6 .
38 I b i d . , p .  56. The o r i g i n a l  r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  
in  E. Jerom e McCarthy and R. J .  W i l l i a m s ,  " S im u la t io n  o f  P r o d u c t io n -  
M a rk e t in g  C h a n n e ls ,"  in  R. M. Haas ( e d . ) ,  S c i e n c e , Technology and 
M ark e tin g  (C h icago !  American M a rk e t in g  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  1 9 6 7 ) ,  p p .  335- 
346.
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o r g a n i z a t i o n  management, once a c c o m p lish e d ,  can  a c h ie v e  e f f e c t i v e
ch an n e l  p e r fo rm a n c e  and a more e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s
39among ch a n n e l  m em bers."
The B a s ic  D e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  S tudy
I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  b r i e f l y  d e f i n e  t h e  te rm s u sed  th ro u g h o u t  
t h i s  s tu d y .  The c o n c e p ts  o f  c o n t r o l ,  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  a r e  
d e f in e d  in  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r  and t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n s  a r e  p r e s e n te d  i n  th e  f o u r t h  c h a p t e r .
D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e l . S e v e r a l  a u t h o r s '  c o n c e p t io n s  o f  th e
d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l  a r e  in c o r p o r a t e d  in  t h e  f o l lo w in g  d e f i n i t i o n .
A ch a n n e l  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  a  s u p e r o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  a  system  
made up o f  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and e n t i t i e s  t h a t  
e v o lv e  and i n t e r a c t  u n d e r  t e c h n ic a l - e c o n o m ic , s o c i a l -  
b e h a v i o r a l  and s o c i e t a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  p e r fo rm  
th e  m a rk e t in g  f lo w s  — o r d e r i n g ,  p h y s i c a l  p o s s e s s i o n ,  
o w n e rsh ip ,  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  paym ent, f i n a n c i n g ,  p ro m o t io n ,  and 
r i s k i n g  — needed  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  goods from th e  
p ro d u c e r  t o  t h e  f i n a l  c o n s u m e r . ^0
M a rk e t in g  Channel T ype. T h is  i s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v iew  o f  a
41
ch an n e l  a s  an  o rd e re d  s e r i e s  o f  s p e c i a l i z e d  m a rk e t in g  u n i t s .  For 
exam ple ,  i f  a  m a n u fa c tu r e r  s e l l s  d i r e c t l y  t o  mass r e t a i l e r s  and a l s o  
t o  r e g i o n a l  w h o l e s a l e r s , th e n  th e  m a n u fa c tu r e r  u t i l i z e s  two m a rk e t in g  
ch a n n e l  t y p e s .
39
L o u is  W. S t e r n ,  "C hannel C o n tro l  and I n t e r - O r g a n i z a t i o n  
M anagem ent," p .  665.
40
Adel I .  E l-A n s a ry ,  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e ls i The Management 
o f  S ocioeconom ic  S y s tem s , t o  be p u b l i s h e d  in  1975.
41B reyer , op. c i t . , p . 279.
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E n t e r p r i s e  M ark e t in g  C h an n e l . A ch a n n e l  which i s  co n ce iv ed
in  te rm s o f  s p e c i f i c  in d e p en d en tly -o w n ed  b u s in e s s  o r  econom ic u n i t s
42i s  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  an e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e l .  A m a n u fa c tu r e r  
who s e l l s  d i r e c t l y  to  250 l a r g e  r e t a i l e r s  and to  2000 s m a l l e r  r e ­
t a i l e r s  th ro u g h  tw en ty  w h o le s a le r s  h as  2 ,2 5 0  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  
c h a n n e l s .
Channel L e v e l . Channel l e v e l s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  number o f  agency
43ty p e s  in  a p a r t i c u l a r  ch an n e l  s e q u e n c e .  For i n s t a n c e ,  a  m anufac­
t u r e r -  con sumer ty p e  c h a n n e l  h a s  two l e v e l s .  A m a n u fa c tu re r -w h o le -  
s a l e r - r e t a i l e r - c o n s u m e r  ty p e  c h a n n e l ,  on th e  o t h e r  han d ,  h a s  f o u r  
l e v e l s .
Channel G roup. For t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  a  ch a n n e l  
group was d e f in e d  a s  any group  o f  in d e p e n d e n t ly  owned e n t e r p r i s e s  
t h a t  have  a common i n t e r a c t i o n  w i th  a  f i r m  on a n o t h e r  ch a n n e l  l e v e l .  
For exam ple, i f  tw en ty  r e t a i l e r s  a r e  a l l  s u p p l i e d  d i r e c t l y  from a 
s i n g l e  m a n u fa c tu r e r ,  th e n  th e  tw en ty  r e t a i l e r s  c o m p rise  a  channe l 
g ro u p .
I n f l u e n c e . An a c t  o f  i n f l u e n c e  was d e f in e d  a s  any b e h a v io r  
t h a t  p ro d u c e s  an e f f e c t  in  b e h a v io r ,  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  s t a t e ,  o r  any
42 I b i d . ,  p .  19.
43
L ou is  P. B u c k l in  and S ta n l e y  F. S t a s c h ,  "P rob lem s in  th e  
S tudy  o f  V e r t i c a l  M ark e t in g  S y s te m s ,"  in  B u c k l in  ( e d . ) ,  V e r t i c a l  
M ark e tin g  S y s tem s , p .  19 .
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44o t h e r  c o n d i t i o n .  T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n f l u e n c e  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  an 
a t t e m p t  t o  i n f l u e n c e  a n o th e r  p e r s o n  o r  g roup  may have  an e f f e c t  t h a t  
i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  th e  i n t e n t  o f  th e  i n f l u e n c i n g  a g e n t .
C o n t r o l . C o n tro l  was d e f in e d  a s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  
e v e n t s  and a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  ou tcom es . In  te rm s  o f  i n f l u e n c e ,  one 
p e rs o n  o r  group h a s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a n o t h e r  i f  h j  i n f l u e n c e  i s  s u f f i ­
c i e n t l y  s t r o n g  t h a t  th e  c y c l e  o f  d e s i r e d  b e h a v io r  w i l l  be com ple ted
and any r e s i s t a n c e  o r  c o u n t e r i n f l u e n c e s  w i l l  be overcome in  th e
45p r o c e s s .
T h is  c o n c e p t io n  o f  c o n t r o l  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h r e e  m a jo r
m a rk e t in g  t h e o r i s t s '  e a r l i e r  c o n c e p t io n s .  Helmy B a l ig h  d e s c r ib e d
c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  in  th e  f o l l o w in g  m anneri
A f i r m  on one l e v e l  o f  th e  c h a n n e l . . . i s  s a i d  t o  c o n t r o l  a 
f i r m  in  a n o th e r  l e v e l . . . i f  i t  m akes, p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  o r  
i n f l u e n c e s  some d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h a t  f i r m . . .  The e x t e n t  to  
w hich one f i r m  c o n t r o l s  a n o t h e r  i s  d e te rm in e d  by th e  p ro ­
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  f i r m ' s  d e c i s i o n s  which th e  fo rm er  
m akes, and by th e  amount o f  i n f l u e n c e  on th o s e  d e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  i t  has
L ou is  W. S t e r n  o f f e r e d  a  n a r ro w e r  c o n c e p t io n  o f  ch an n e l  
c o n t r o l .  He d e f in e d  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  a s  " . . . t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  a  member 
o f  a  m a rk e t in g  ch a n n e l  f o r  a g iv e n  p ro d u c t  ( o r  b ra n d )  t o  s t i p u l a t e
44D a n ie l  K atz and R o b e r t  L. Kahn, The S o c ia l  P sycho logy  o f  
O r g a n iz a t io n s  (New Yorki John  W iley and S ons , 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p .  219.
45 .I b i d .
46 Helmy B a l ig h ,  "A T h e o r e t i c a l  Framework f o r  Channel C h o ic e s ,"  
in  B e n n e t t  ( e d . ) ,  M ark e tin g  and Economic D evelopm ent, p .  633.
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m a rk e t in g  p o l i c i e s  t o  o t h e r  ch an n e l  m em bers ."^7
Most r e c e n t l y ,  L ou is  B u c k l in  d e f in e d  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  a s  
" . . . t h e  e x t e n t  o f  middleman com pliance  to  th e  s u p p l i e r ' s  commands."^8 
T h is  c o n c e p t io n  n a r ro w ly  d e f i n e s  c o n t r o l  from a  s u p p l i e r ' s  p e r s p e c ­
t i v e  b u t  i s  most c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  t h a t  was 
used  th ro u g h o u t  t h i s  s tu d y ;  i . e .  c o n t r o l  i s  th e  a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  
e v e n t s  and a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  ou tcom es .
R e l a t i v e  C o n t r o l . R e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  was d e f in e d  a s  th e  
amount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by a  s i n g l e  ch a n n e l  member o v e r  th e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a n o th e r  member compared t o  th e  t o t a l  amount o f  c o n t r o l  
a c h ie v e d  by b o th  in  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e l .  T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  v iew s o f  s e v e r a l  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i s t s  who s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  t o t a l  amount o f  c o n t r o l  in  a system
i s  n o t  f ix e d  in  amount and system  members a r e  n o t  engaged in  a  z e ro
. . 49sum b a r g a i n in g  game f o r  c o n t r o l .  S e v e r a l  a u t h o r s  i n d i c a t e  s p e c i f i c
"m echanism s" t h a t  can be u t i l i z e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  t o t a l  amount o f
^ 7L ou is  W. S t e m ,  "The Concept o f  Channel C o n t r o l , "  J o u r n a l  
o f  M a rk e t in g , V o l.  23 (Summer, 1 9 6 7 ) ,  p .  14 .
^ 8B u c k l in ,  o p .  c i t . , p .  42.
49 ,For exam ples o f  t h i s  v iew  s e e i  George Homans, S o c i a l
B e h a v io r » I t s  E lem en ta ry  Forms (New Yorkt H a r c o u r t ,  B race  and
W orld, 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p p .  85 -8 9 ; and A rnold  S .  Tannenbaum ( e d . ) ,  C o n tro l
in  O rg a n iz a t io n s  (New Yorki M cG raw -H ill,  1 9 6 8 ) ,  pp . 1 4 -2 3 .
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c o n t r o l  in  a  sy s tem .
The r e l e v a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  a  d y a d ic  ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  
t h e  p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  i s  n o t  t o t a l  c o n t r o l .  R a th e r ,  th e  r e l a t i v e  
amount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by ch a n n e l  members engaged in  an  e n t e r ­
p r i s e  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  more i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  ch a n n e l  m em ber's  
a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  e v e n t s  and a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  o u tcom es .  In  a 
m id d le m a n -s u p p l ie r  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e l ,  i f  t h e  m id d lem an 's  
c o n t r o l  i n c r e a s e s  by some a b s o l u t e  amount b u t  i s  m atched by an 
e q u i v a l e n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s u p p l i e r ' s  a b s o l u t e  amount o f  c o n t r o l ,  
th e n  t h e r e  i s  no change in  e i t h e r ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  o t h e r .
Power. Power was d e f in e d  a s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u ­
e n c e . ^  T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  power and c o n t r o l  in  
te rm s o f  i n f l u e n c e .  C o n tro l  in c lu d e s  th o s e  i n f l u e n c e  a t t e m p t s  
which r e s u l t  i n  t h e  e f f e c t  in te n d e d  by th e  i n f l u e n c i n g  a g e n t .
Power, on th e  o t h e r  hand ,  i s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e .
Power i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  backed  by th e  means t o  c o e rc e  c o m p lia n c e .  
I f  a  ch an n e l  member h as  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  making an i n f l u e n c e
^ S e e  f o r  example K. W. D e u tsc h ,  "Some Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Con­
s t r a i n t s  on V alue  A l l o c a t i o n  in  S o c ie ty  and P o l i t i c s , "  B e h a v io ra l  
S c i e n t i s t , V o l.  11 , No. 2 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  245-252) C. J .  Lammers,
"Power and P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  D ec is io n -M ak in g  i n  Formal O r g a n i z a t i o n s , "  
American J o u r n a l  o f  S o c io lo g y , V o l.  73, No. 2 (1 9 6 7 ) ,  p p .  201-216 ; 
R e n s is  L i k e r t ,  New P a t t e r n s  o f  Management (New Y orkt M cG raw-H ill, 
1 9 6 1 ) ;  T a l c o t t  P a r s o n s ,  "On th e  Concept o f  P o l i t i c a l  P o w e r ,"  P ro ­
c e e d in g s  o f  th e  American P h i lo so p h y  S o c i e t y , V o l.  107 ( J u n e ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  
p p .  23z -2 6 2 ; A. Tannenbaum and R. L. Kahn, " O r g a n iz a t i o n a l  C o n tro l  
S t r u c t u r e , "  Human R e l a t i o n s ,  V o l.  10 , No. 2 (1 9 5 7 ) ,  p p .  127-140 .
^ K a tz  and Kahn, op. c i t . , p . 220.
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a t t e m p t  and th e  means t o  c o e rc e  co m p lian c e  o r  p u n is h  non co m p lian ce ,  
th e n  he h a s  pow er.
52A u t h o r i t y . A u th o r i t y  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  pow er. I t  i s  th e
p r e s c r i b e d  r i g h t  t o  a f f e c t  b e h a v io r  w hich i s  a c c e p te d  by o r g a n i z a t i o n  
53
m em bership . T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  B a r n a r d 's  co n cep t
o f  a u t h o r i t y  which m in im izes  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n
h i e r a r c h y  in  d e f i n i n g  a u t h o r i t y .  B a rn a rd  d e f in e d  a u t h o r i t y  as
" . . . t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  com m unica tion  in  a  fo rm a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  by
v i r t u e  o f  which i t  i s  a c c e p te d  by a  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  o r  'm em ber' o f
54th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  g o v e rn in g  th e  a c t i o n  he c o n t r i b u t e s . "
Channel L e a d e r s h ip . Channel l e a d e r s h i p  was d e f in e d  a s  th e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  a u t h o r i t y  a n d / o r  power t o  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a f f e c t  th e  
b e h a v io r  o f  o t h e r  c h a n n e l  members t o  c a u s e  th a n  t o  a c t  i n  a  manner 
t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e s  to  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o r  a ch iev em en t o f  a  h ig h  l e v e l  
o f  ch an n e l  e f f i c i e n c y .  T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ch a n n e l  l e a d e r s h i p  i s  
synonymous w i th  B r e y e r ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  ch an n e l  c o o r d i n a t i o n . ^
The c o n c e p ts  o f  pow er, a u t h o r i t y ,  c o n t r o l  and l e a d e r s h i p  
were c r u c i a l  t o  t h i s  s tu d y  and r e q u i r e d  c l e a r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
52
I b i d .
53
Adel I .  E l-A n sa ry  and R o b e r t  A. R ob icheaux ,  "A Theory  o f  
Channel C o n t r o l i  R e v i s i t e d , "  J o u r n a l  o f  M a rk e t in g , V o l.  38 
( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 7 4 ) ,  p p .  2 - 7 .
54
C h e s te r  I .  B a rn a rd ,  The F u n c t io n s  o f  t h e  E x e c u t iv e , 
(Cambridge* H arvard  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 3 8 ) ,  p .  163.
"^Breyer, op. c i t . , p . 270.
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F ig u re  1 .1  p r e s e n t s  a g r a p h ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  i n t e r r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s  among th e  f o u r  c o n c e p t s .  I t  i s  shown in  t h i s  p r o c e s s  model 
t h a t  power and a u t h o r i t y  a r e  i n p u t s  t o  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  ch a n n e l  





t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  
power a n d / o r  
a u t h o r i t y
F ig u re  1 .1
A P ro c e s s  Model o f  Power, A u t h o r i t y  and C o n tro l
A u th o r i t y  i s  a  s u b s e t  o f  power i n  te rm s  o f  ch a n n e l  member 
i n f l u e n c e .  A ch an n e l  m em ber 's  power r e f l e c t s  h i s  c a p a c i t y  t o  
in f l u e n c e  o t h e r  ch an n e l  members. A u t h o r i t y  i s  d e f in e d  a s  l e g i t i m a t e  
power o r  t h e  p r e s c r i b e d  r i g h t  t o  a f f e c t  b e h a v io r  which i s  a c c e p te d  
by o r g a n i z a t i o n  members. Thus, a  ch a n n e l  m em ber 's  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  
o t h e r  members w i l l  a lw ays  be l e s s  th a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  h i s  power o v er  
them. When a ch a n n e l  m em ber's  a u t h o r i t y  i s  e q u a l  t o  h i s  power o v er  
a n o th e r  o r  o t h e r s ,  th e n  an i n c r e a s e  in  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
h i s  pow er. However, h i s  power can  be in c r e a s e d  v i a  s o u rc e s  o f  power 
o t h e r  th a n  a u t h o r i t y ;  e . g . ,  c o e r c i o n ,  r e w a rd ,  r e f e r e n t  a n d / o r  e x p e r t  
b a se s  o f  pow er.
Channel c o n t r o l ,  w hich was d e f in e d  a s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  a
ch an n e l  member t o  p r e d i c t  e v e n t s  and a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  outcom es in  h i s  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  o t h e r  ch an n e l  members, i s  a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h  th e  e x e r c i s e  
o f  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  a n d /o r  pow er. In  o t h e r  w ords ,  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  ch an n e l  
l e a d e r s h i p  r e s u l t s  in  some d e g re e  o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l .
Power S t r u c t u r e . Emerson d e f in e d  th e  power s t r u c t u r e  o f  a 
sy s tem  as  th e  ra n k  o r d e r  o f  sy s tem  members' r e s p e c t i v e  power o r  
c a p a c i t y  t o  in f l u e n c e  one a n o t h e r . ^  The power s t r u c t u r e  o f  a d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  ch an n e l  was d e f in e d  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  as  th e  ra n k  o r d e r  o f  
ch an n e l  members' r e s p e c t i v e  c a p a c i t i e s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  eac h  o t h e r .
Power Domain. The s e t  o f  p e r s o n s  o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o v e r  whom 
some o t h e r  p e r s o n  o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  e x e r c i s e s  power i s  t h e  domain o f  
th e  l a t t e r ' s  p o w e r . I f  a m a n u fa c tu r e r  e x e r c i s e s  h i s  power o v er  
a l l  r e t a i l e r s  in  h i s  m a n u f a c t u r e r - r e t a i l e r  ty p e  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e l ,  
th e n  th o s e  r e t a i l e r s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  domain o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  
pow er.
Channel I s s u e . C a r tw r ig h t  d e f in e d  a  power sc o p e  a s  a  s p e c i f i c
i s s u e  o v e r  which one sys tem  member may e x e r c i s e  h i s  power o v e r  o t h e r
58members. A ch an n e l  i s s u e  was d e f in e d  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  a s  a s p e c i f i c  
a r e a  o f  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  o v e r  w hich th e  power o f  one c h a n n e l  member
56R ic h a rd  B nerson , "Power-D ependence R e l a t i o n s , "  American 
S o c i o l o g i c a l  Review, V ol.  27 ( F e b ru a ry ,  1 9 6 2 ) ,  p p .  3 9 -4 0 .
^ D o rw in  C a r tw r ig h t ,  " I n f l u e n c e ,  L e a d e r s h ip ,  and C o n t r o l , "  
in  James G. March ( e d . ) ,  Handbook o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n s , (C h ic ag o i  Rand 
McNally and Company, 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p .  22 .
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may be e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  o t h e r  c h a n n e l  members.
I s s u e  W eig h t. For t h e  p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  i s s u e  w e ig h t  
r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  p e rc e iv e d  im p o r ta n c e  o f  each  ch a n n e l  i s s u e  t o  th e  
i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m .
The c o n c e p ts  o f  power dom ain , ch an n e l  i s s u e ,  and i s s u e  
w e ig h t  a r e  b e s t  e x p la in e d  th ro u g h  an exam ple .  A p a r t i c u l a r  s u p p l i e r  
may have  th e  a b i l i t y  t o  i n f l u e n c e  c e r t a i n  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  d e c i s i o n  
v a r i a b l e s  o f  h i s  m iddlem en. The s t r a t e g y  a r e a s  o v e r  w hich he has  
power may in c lu d e  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g ,  l e n g t h  o f  o r d e r  c y c l e  and minimum 
o r d e r  q u a n t i t y .  The middlemen r e p r e s e n t  th e  s u p p l i e r ' s  power dom ain . 
The t h r e e  s t r a t e g y  a r e a s  r e p r e s e n t  ch a n n e l  i s s u e s .  I f  t h e  middlemen 
f e e l ,  on th e  a v e ra g e ,  t h a t  on an im p o r ta n c e  s c a l e  o f  one t o  f i v e i  
( 1 . )  t h e  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  i s s u e  i s  m ost im p o r ta n t  ( s c o r e  o f  1 ) ;  ( 2 . )  
t h e  minimum o r d e r  q u a n t i t y  i s s u e  i s  second in  im p o r ta n c e  ( s c o r e  o f  
3)} and ( 3 . )  th e  l e n g th  o f  th e  o r d e r  c y c l e  i s  l e a s t  im p o r ta n t  
( s c o r e  o f  5 ) ,  th e n  th e  s c o r e s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  i s s u e  w e ig h t s .
P a y o f f . P a y o ff  was d e f in e d  a s  th e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  a r e  p e rc e iv e d  
t o  a c c r u e  to  an  i n d i v i d u a l  middleman o r  s u p p l i e r  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
en g a g in g  i n  an e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  P a y o f f  
may be s t a t e d  in  a b s o l u t e  d o l l a r  te rm s  ( e . g . ,  g r o s s  o r  n e t  d o l l a r  
p r o f i t ) ,  a s  a  r a t i o  ( e . g . ,  p e r c e n ta g e  r e t u r n  on in v e n to r y  in v e s tm e n t  
o r  p e r c e n ta g e  r e t u r n  on t o t a l  in v e s tm e n t ,  o r  a s  a  change in  t h e  d o l l a r  
o r  r a t i o  m e a su re s .  In  any d y a d ic  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  ( i . e .  a 
s i n g l e  s u p p l i e r  and a s i n g l e  m idd lem an),  th e  two p a r t i e s  r e c e i v e  
some econom ic re w a rd ,  p a y o f f  o r  p r o f i t ,  which may be p o s i t i v e  o r
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n e g a t i v e .  An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  b e h a v io r  i s  a co nsequence  o f  h i s  p e r ­
c e p t i o n s  o f  s i t u a t i o n s !  how ever. T h e r e f o re ,  p e r c e iv e d  p a y o f f  was
deemed a  c r u c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  a f f e c t s  e n t e r p r i s e  as  w e l l  as
59i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v io r .
T o l e r a n c e . In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  t o l e r a n c e  r e f l e c t e d  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  
f i r m ' s  f e e l i n g  o f  bu rden  and s a c r i f i c e  i n c u r r e d  from a c c e d in g  to  
c o n t r o l  by a n o t h e r  f i rm  a t  a d i f f e r e n t  ch an n e l  l e v e l . ^  Channel 
member A 's  t o l e r a n c e  was d e f in e d  a s  t h e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  by ch an n e l  member B a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  ch an n e l  l e v e l  t h a t  A was 
w i l l i n g  to  a c c e p t  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  p a y o f f  t o  A.
The c o n c e p t  d e f i n i t i o n s  p r e s e n te d  above a r e  h i g h l y  a b s t r a c t .  
O p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  th e  c o n c e p ts  a r e  p r e s e n te d  in  th e  f o u r t h  
c h a p t e r .
The Q u e s t io n s  t h a t  Were Answered
S e v e r a l  q u e s t i o n s  w ere examined th ro u g h o u t  t h i s  s tu d y .  The 
q u e s t i o n s  w ere r e l a t e d  t o  two m a jo r  i s s u e s !  ( 1 . )  r e t a i l e r s '  
p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  th e  e f f e c t  a change in  a s u p p l i e r ' s  ch an n e l  i s s u e  
p o l i c y  would have upon r e t a i l e r ' s  p r o f i t s ;  and ( 2 . )  r e t a i l e r s '  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h a t  ch an n e l  i s s u e  a t
P eo p le  behave a c c o r d in g  t o  what s i t u a t i o n s  "mean t o  them" 
and n o t  a c c o r d in g  to  " o b j e c t i v e  r e a l i t y . "  For a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  
g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p te d  view  o f  b e h a v io r  s e e i  Edwin H o l la n d e r  and Raymond 
H unt, " E d i t o r i a l  Commentary to  a  C h ap te r  on P e r c e p t i o n ,  I n t e r a c t i o n ,  
and R o le , "  i n  Edwin H o l la n d e r  and Raymond Hunt ( e d s . ) ,  C u rre n t  
P e r s p e c t i v e s  i n  S o c ia l  P sycho logy  (New Yorki Oxford U n iv e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  1967'), p p .  251-252 .
T h is  d e f i n i t i o n  was based  upon L o u is  P . B u c k l i n ' s  d e f i ­
n i t i o n  o f  th e  middleman t o l e r a n c e  c o n s t r u c t  in  B u c k l in ,  op . c i t .
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d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e t a i l e r  p a y o f f .  The fo l lo w in g  s i x  q u e s t i o n s  
were an sw ered .
1 . Did r e t a i l e r s  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  would be a f f e c t e d  
i f  t h e i r  s u p p l i e r  ad o p ted  a  d i f f e r e n t  m a rk e t in g  p o l i c y  which would 
have  g iv e n  th e  s u p p l i e r  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a  c r u c i a l  
c h a n n e l  i s s u e ?
2 .  How d id  t h e  r e t a i l e r s  th in k  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  would be 
a f f e c t e d  by each  o f  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  s u p p l i e r  p o l i c i e s  which 
r e p r e s e n t e d  a w ide ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  a c r u c i a l  
ch a n n e l  i s s u e ?
3 . Were th e  r e t a i l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  
ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a f f e c t e d  by d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  a  c h a n n e l  i s s u e  and by d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  
r e t a i l e r  p r o f i t s ?
4 .  How d id  p ro p o sed  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e t a i l e r  p r o f i t s  a f f e c t  
t h e  r e t a i l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  c h a n n e l  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s ?
5. How d id  p ro p o sed  i n c r e a s e s  i n  th e  s u p p l i e r ' s  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  r e t a i l e r s '  ch a n n e l  i s s u e  d e c i s i o n  a f f e c t  th e  r e ­
t a i l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ?
6 .  What was t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  
maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a  ch an n e l  i s s u e  
t o l e r a t e d  by r e t a i l e r s  and r e t a i l e r s '  p r o f i t s ?
These s i x  q u e s t i o n s  w ere d e r iv e d  from th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model 
o f  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  which i s  p r e s e n te d  in  C h ap te r  3 .  T e s t a b le  
h y p o th e s e s  based  upon t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  and th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  c r i t e r i a
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u t i l i z e d  to  t e s t  t h e  h y p o th e se s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  in  C h a p te r  4 .
P la n  o f  P r e s e n t a t i o n
The p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  i n i t i a l  c h a p t e r  was t o  i n t r o d u c e  v e ry  
b r i e f l y  th e  c o n c e p t  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  and t o  i n d i c a t e  
th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  p ro p o sed  r e s e a r c h .  The b a s i c  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  
o b j e c t i v e s  and q u e s t i o n s  t o  be answ ered  w ere p r e s e n te d  to  p r o v id e  an  
o v e rv ie w  o f  th e  p rob lem . The second  c h a p t e r  p r e s e n t s  a  more d e t a i l e d  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  b ased  upon an expanded r e v ie w  o f  th e  
e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  which d e a l s  w i th  th e  c o n c e p ts  o f  pow er, c o n t r o l ,  
p e r fo rm a n ce  and s a t i s f a c t i o n .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  B u c k l in * s  th e o r y  o f  
ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  i s  c r i t i c a l l y  exam ined .
The t h i r d  c h a p t e r  i s  d e v o te d  to  t h e  deve lopm en t o f  a  model o f  
ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  which s e r v e s  a s  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  f o u n d a t io n  upon which 
th e  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  i s  b a s e d .  The model i s  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  th e  
model p ro p o sed  by B u ck l in  and i s  a  more co m p le te  c o n c e p tu a l  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
The f o u r t h  c h a p t e r  i n c l u d e s  a  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  th e  c o n s t r u c t s  u t i l i z e d  in  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model 
p r e s e n t e d  i n  th e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r .  A ls o ,  t h i s  c h a p t e r  p r e s e n t s  a d i s ­
c u s s io n  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  m e th o d o lo g y . H ypo theses  a r e  s t a t e d  and th e  
s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  u t i l i z e d  t o  d e te r m in e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t o  r e j e c t  
each  h y p o th e s i s  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  in  C h ap te r  4 .  The f i f t h  c h a p t e r  i s  
d e v o te d  t o  a p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  r e s u l t s  and th e  g e n e r a l  
c o n c lu s io n s  drawn from th e  r e s u l t s .
The s i x t h  and f i n a l  c h a p t e r  i s  com prised  o f  a b r i e f  r e v ie w
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o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  scope  and m ethodology  o f  t h e  s tu d y .  A summary 
i s  a l s o  p r e s e n te d  o f  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l .
R esea rc h  r e s u l t s ,  c o n c lu s io n s  and a  c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  s tu d y  
a r e  b r i e f l y  h i g h l i g h t e d .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c h a p t e r  c l o s e s  w i th  a  d i s ­
c u s s io n  o f  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  f o r  
f u t u r e  ch an n e l  r e s e a r c h .
Summary
The g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  o f  th e  p rob lem  i n v e s t i g a t e d  in  t h i s  
s tu d y  was p r e s e n te d  in  t h i s  i n i t i a l  c h a p t e r .  The c o n c e p t  o f  
ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  was in t ro d u c e d  and th e  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  p r a c t i c a l  and 
m ora l j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  was h i g h l i g h t e d .  The b a s i c  
d e f i n i t i o n s ,  o b j e c t i v e s  and scope  o f  t h e  s tu d y  were p r e s e n te d  a lo n g  
w ith  a  b r i e f  r e v ie w  o f  th e  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  l i t e r a t u r e .
C h ap te r  2 c o n t a in s  an expanded e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
t h a t  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l .  P a r t i c u l a r  
a t t e n t i o n  i s  d e v o te d  t o  r e c e n t  c o n c e p tu a l  and e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  
d e a l i n g  w ith  c o n t r o l  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s .
L ouis  P . B u c k l i n ' s  th e o ry  o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  i s  c r i t i c a l l y  r e v ie w e d .
Chapter 2
THE PROBLEM IN ITS SETTING!
A LITERATURE REVIEW
The p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  to  r e v ie w  l i t e r a t u r e  t h a t  i s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  s tu d y  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l .  T h is  s tu d y  
fo cu sed  upon two r e l a t i o n s h i p s !  ( 1 . )  r e t a i l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  th e  
im pac t o f  c o n t r o l  by a s i n g l e  f i r m  on a n o th e r  ch a n n e l  l e v e l  upon th e  
r e t a i l e r s '  p r o f i t s  ( p a y o f f ) ;  and ( 2 . )  r e t a i l e r s '  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  con­
t r o l  by a n o t h e r  f i rm  on a n o th e r  ch a n n e l  l e v e l .  L i t e r a t u r e  o f  r e l e ­
vance  to  t h i s  s tu d y  in c lu d e s  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s ,  m e th o d o lo g ie s  and 
r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s  r e l a t e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e ,  power and c o n t r o l  in  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n  and i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n  s e t t i n g s .
A s im p le  model o f  some c r u c i a l  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  f i r s t  
p r e s e n t e d  w hich s e r v e s  as  a g u id e  f o r  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e v ie w  t h a t  
f o l l o w s .  Second , p r i o r  r e s e a r c h  and th e o ry  r e l a t e d  to  th e  i n t e r r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p s  among pow er, c o n t r o l ,  p e r fo rm a n c e ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and t o l e r ­
ance  a r e  r e v ie w e d .  T h i r d ,  K en d a ll  A. Adams' s tu d y  o f  r e t a i l e r s '  
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  comply w i th  w h o le s a le r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  in  v o lu n t a r y  
r e t a i l e r  c o o p e r a t iv e s  i s  c i t e d  a s  a c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  developm ent 
o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  th e o r y .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  c h a p t e r  c o n c lu d e s  w ith  an 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e  th e o ry  o f  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l  e spoused  by L ou is  P. 
B u c k l in  in  1973.
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A Model o f  E n t e r p r i s e  Channel R e l a t i o n s h i p s
A few c r u c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and 
ch an n e l  l i t e r a t u r e  a s  b e in g  p e r t i n e n t  t o  th e  deve lopm en t o f  ch an n e l  
c o n t r o l  th e o ry  a r e  summarized g r a p h i c a l l y  in  F ig u re  2 . 1 .  As d e p i c t e d  
in  th e  d ia g ra m ,  th e  r e l a t i v e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by one f i rm  
o v e r  a n o th e r  f i rm  in  a ch an n e l  s e t t i n g  i s  in  l a r g e  m easure  d e t e r ­
mined by i ( 1 . )  th e  f i r s t  f i r m ' s  power o r  a b i l i t y  to  i n f l u e n c e  th e  
seco n d ;  and ( 2 . )  th e  second f i r m ' s  t o l e r a n c e  o r  w i l l i n g  a c c e p ta n c e  
o f  th e  i n f l u e n c e  a t t e m p t s  by th e  f i r s t .  The p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  a channe l  
member i s  shown to  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  
a c h ie v e d  by o t h e r  f i rm s  in  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l .
O r g a n iz a t io n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  m easured  p e rh a p s  by in t e r v i e w in g  
"key o r g a n i z a t i o n  m em bers ,"  i s  i n f l u e n c e d  d i r e c t l y  by b o th  th e  amount 
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by o t h e r  ch a n n e l  members and th e  l e v e l  
o f  p e r fo rm a n ce  ( e . g . ,  s a l e s ,  p r o f i t s ,  e t c . )  a c h ie v e d  by th e  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n .  A two-way r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  shown to  e x i s t  betw een p e rfo rm an ce  
and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  how ever.  In  o t h e r  w ords ,  i t  i s  
su g g e s te d  in  F ig u re  2 .1  t h a t  a ch an n e l m em ber 's  p e r fo rm a n c e  in f l u e n c e s  
and i s  i n f lu e n c e d  by th e  l e v e l  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  which 
r e s u l t s  from th e  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
T o le ra n c e  r e f l e c t s  an i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m ' s  f e e l i n g  o f  burden  o r  
s a c r i f i c e  in c u r r e d  from a c c e d in g  to  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i r m  on a 
d i f f e r e n t  channe l l e v e l . * F ig u re  2 .1  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a f i r m ' s  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i r m  i s  a f f e c t e d  by th e  l e v e l  o f
Supra, p. 26.
32
Finn  A 's  Power 
Over Firm B
Firm B 's  
T o le ra n c e  f o r  
Firm A ’s C o n tro l  
Over Firm B 's
V
R e l a t i v e  Amount o f  
C o n tro l  A chieved  By 
Firm A Over Firm B 's ■ >
Perfo rm an ce  o f  
Firm B
M a rk e t in g  S t r a t e g i e s  M a rk e t in g  S t r a t e g i e s
O r g a n iz a t i o n a l  S a t i s f a c t i o n
o f  Firm B w i th  t h e  A-B 
Channel R e l a t i o n s h i p
F ig u r e  2 .1
A S i m p l i s t i c  Model t o  G uide th e  L i t e r a t u r e  S e a rc h
33
s a t i s f a c t i o n  which r e s u l t s  from th e  ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
C l e a r l y ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r fo rm a n c e  i s  a f f e c t e d  by a m yriad  
o f  f a c t o r s  in  a d d i t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i r m  a t  a n o t h e r  channe l  
l e v e l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  a s  p e r c e iv e d  by key  o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n  members. In d e e d ,  m a rk e t  c o n d i t i o n s  and p r o d u c t i o n ,  f i n a n c i n g ,  
and m a rk e t in g  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  o b v io u s ly  a f f e c t
p e r fo rm a n c e .  The model d e p i c t e d  i n  F ig u r e  2 .1  i s  n o t  s u g g e s te d  a s  a
2
th e o ry  o f  ch an n e l  c o n t r o l  o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r fo rm a n c e .  I t  i s  
p r e s e n te d  s im p ly  a s  a g r a p h i c a l  g u id e  t o  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  re v ie w  
which f o l l o w s .
Power, C o n t r o l ,  P e r fo rm an c e ,  S a t i s f a c t i o n  and 
T o le r a n c e !  Key I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s
The s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l i t e r a t u r e  i s  r e p l e t e  w i th  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  
th e  c o n c e p ts  o f  i n f l u e n c e ,  pow er, a u t h o r i t y  and c o n t r o l  a s  th e y  
r e l a t e  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  L i t t l e  th e o ry  and even l e s s  
e m p i r i c a l  e v id e n c e ,  how ever, have  a p p e a re d  w i th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e s e  con­
c e p t s  a s  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n  b e h a v i o r a l  phenomena. In  t h e  f o l lo w in g  
s e c t i o n s ,  p e r t i n e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  which r e l a t e s  t o  th e  key i n t e r r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p s  o f  th e  b e h a v i o r a l  c o n c e p ts  i n d i c a t e d  in  F ig u r e  2 .1  i s  
r e v ie w e d .
Much o f  t h e  f o l lo w in g  r e v ie w  fo c u s e s  upon th e o ry  and r e s e a r c h  
t h a t  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  phenomena.
The model in  F ig u re  2 .1  i s  s i m i l a r  i n  n a t u r e  t o  th e  b e h a v io r a l  
m odels u sed  by March and Simon t o  e x p l a i n  human b e h a v io r .  See f o r  
exam ple , James G. March and H e rb e r t  A. Simon, O r g a n iz a t io n s  (New Yorki 
John  W iley and S ons , 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  49, 8 7 -8 8 ,  106.
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W hile o r g a n i z a t i o n  th e o ry  and r e s e a r c h  p r o v id e  v a l u a b l e  a s s i s t a n c e  to
m a rk e te r s  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  b u i l d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l  t h e o r y ,  th e
d a n g e r  o f  c a r e l e s s  t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f i n d i n g s  to
3
ch an n e l  s i t u a t i o n s  ca n n o t  be o v e r lo o k e d .  The key  c o n c e p t  l i t e r a t u r e  
r e v ie w  which fo l lo w s  does  s u g g e s t  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch an n e l 
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s  and r e s e a r c h ,  ho w ev er .
Power and C o n t r o l . F ig u re  2 .1  shows c o n t r o l  t o  r e s u l t  from 
t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  pow er. As d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h ap te r  1 ,  a  f i r m  a c h ie v e s
c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  o f  a n o t h e r  f i r m  on a n o t h e r
. . .  4ch a n n e l  l e v e l  by e x e r c i s i n g  i t s  power in  t h e  ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
S in c e  c o n t r o l  r e s u l t s  f r a n  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power (w hich  can  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  th e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  c o n t r o l ) ,  th e  m easurem ent o f  power 
and c o n t r o l  i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h .
1 .  C o n tro l  m easu rem en t. O r g a n iz a t io n  r e s e a r c h e r s  have  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  m ethods t o  m easu re  c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s .  The t h r e e  m a jo r  m ethods u sed  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  below . Four 
a d d i t i o n a l  m easu re s  w hich c o u ld  be u sed  t o  m easure  c o n t r o l  in  a 
c h a n n e l  s e t t i n g  a r e  a l s o  p r e s e n t e d .  T h is  i s  fo l lo w e d  by a d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  th e  u s e s  o f  c o n t r o l  g ra p h s  t o  d e p i c t  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  
m easurem ents  and t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  ch an n e l  s t u d i e s .
3
See f o r  exam ple , B ruce M a llen ,  " I n t r o d u c i n g  th e  M ark e tin g  
Channel to  P r i c e  T h e o ry ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  M a rk e t in g , V o l .  28 ( J u l y ,
1 9 6 4 ) ,  p .  31} Ridgeway, " A d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  M a n u fa c tu r e r -D e a le r  
S y s te m s ,"  pp . 466-467} H o l l in g s w o r th ,  "A pp ly ing  O r g a n iz a t io n  Theory 
t o  M ark e t in g  C h a n n e l s ,"  pp . 63 -6 4 .
^Supra, pp. 2 2 -2 4 .
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a .  Common c o n t r o l  m e a s u re s . Most s t u d i e s  o f  c o n tro l  in  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  have  r e l i e d  upon one o r  more o f  t h r e e  c o n t r o l  m e asu re s!  
( 1 . )  i n d i v i d u a l  co m p en sa t io n ;  ( 2 . )  t h e  span  o f  c o n t r o l  o r  s t r u c ­
t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  fo rm a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ;  ( 3 . )  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  
i n t e r p e r s o n a l  i n f l u e n c e  r e c o rd e d  on a q u e s t i o n n a i r e . '*  Each o f  
t h e s e  t h r e e  m easu re s  o f  c o n t r o l  i s  based  upon a d i f f e r e n t  co n ce p t  o f  
th e  p r o c e s s  o f  c o n t r o l  in  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
The co m p en sa tio n  ( r e w a rd )  p a id  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  members o f  an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  h a s  been  used  to  i n f e r  th e  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .  C o n tro l  in  t h i s  c a s e  i s  viewed a s  a " c o n t r i b u t i o n "  
made by i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and t h e i r  co m p en sa tio n  i s  
viewed a s  th e  inducem ent g iv e n  t o  them from th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  
o u tp u t  t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e i r  c o n t in u e d  c o n t r i b u t i o n .
The span  o f  c o n t r o l  o r  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  fo rm al 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  a  second p o s s i b l e  m easure  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .  
T h is  m easu re  i s  based  upon th e  c o n c e p t io n  o f  c o n t r o l  a s  fo rm a l ly  
d e f in e d  o r  in t e n d e d  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  i n f l u e n c e .  The span  o f  c o n t r o l  
m easu re  can be used  i n  a tw o - l e v e l  h i e r a r c h y  to  a p p ro x im a te  th e  
s h a r e  o f  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  s u p e r i o r  and th e  s u b o r d i n a t e s .  
"The a v e ra g e  i n d i v i d u a l  s h a r e  i s  i n v e r s e l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  th e  
n u m b e r - s h a r in g .  Thus, i n c r e a s i n g  th e  span  o f  c o n t r o l  r e d u c e s  th e
^Thomas L. W h is le r ,  e t .  a l . , C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  O r g a n iz a t io n a l  
C o n t r o l i  An E m p ir ic a l  S tudy  o f  I t s  Meaning and M easu rem en t,"  J o u r n a l  
o f  B u s in e s s ,  V o l.  40 ( J a n u a r y ,  1 9 6 7 ) ,  p .  10.
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r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  s u p e r i o r ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s ."**
F i n a l l y ,  s c a l e d  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n f l u e n c e  have 
been used  to  m easure  c o n t r o l .  T h is  m easu re  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  when 
c o n t r o l  i s  d e f in e d  a s  a  p r o c e s s  o f  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  i n f l u e n c e . S in c e  
c o n t r o l  i s  a c h ie v e d  o n ly  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  p e r c e iv e d  a s  
b e in g  a c h ie v e d  by members o f  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n , 7 t h i s  m easu re  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t .  T h is  m e asu re  o f  c o n t r o l  i s  o b ta in e d  by 
a s k in g  an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  members t o  i n d i c a t e  on a  s c a l e  t h e  amount 
o f  i n f l u e n c e  th e y  t h i n k  th e y  and o t h e r s  p o s s e s s  w i t h i n  t h e  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n .  A se m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c a l e  r a n g in g  from "no i n f l u e n c e "  
t o  "a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  i n f l u e n c e "  in  g e n e r a l  and o v e r  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s  
i s  u s e d .
I f  a l l  t h r e e  m easurem ent t e c h n iq u e s  m easure  th e  t o t a l  amount 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  i n  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  th e n  r e s e a r c h e r s  
cou ld  s e l e c t  t h e  method which i s  e a s i e s t  o r  m ost e f f i c i e n t  f o r  a 
g iv e n  s e t  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .  The r e l a t i v e  e a s e  o f  a p p ly in g  each o f  
th e  t h r e e  t e c h n iq u e s  m ig h t a l s o  be u sed  t o  s e l e c t  t h e  m ost ap p ro ­
p r i a t e  m easure  o f  c o n t r o l  in  an  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .
Formal o r g a n i z a t i o n  c h a r t s  w hich i n d i c a t e  s p a n s - o f - c o n t r o l  
and com pensa tion  d a t a  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  a c c e s s i b l e  w i th i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
( i f  one h a s  a c c e s s  t o  c o n f i d e n t i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ) .  
Q u e s t io n n a i r e  d a t a ,  how ever, i s  o f t e n  r e l a t i v e l y  more c o s t l y  and
6 I b i d . ,  p .  12 .
7I b i d . ,  p .  11.
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d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a in  f o r  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  r e s e a r c h .
On an i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  b a s i s ,  co m p en sa tio n  f o r  th e  
s e v e r a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  a ch a n n e l  ne tw ork  m igh t be r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
p r o f i t s  o r  g r o s s  r e v e n u e s .  Form al o r g a n i z a t i o n  c h a r t s  m igh t be 
ap p ro x im ated  in  a ch an n e l  s e t t i n g  by d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  s t r u c t u r e s  
o r  th e  ch an n e l  ne tw ork  c h a r t s .  M easures  o f  p e r c e iv e d  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
c o n t r o l  m igh t be g a th e r e d  by q u e s t i o n n a i r e s .
P r o f i t  d a t a  i s  t y p i c a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  from s e v e r a l  
f i r m s .  F u r t h e r ,  r e p o r t e d  n e t  p r o f i t s  f o r  in d e p e n d e n t  b us inessm en  
a r e  n o t  a lw ays  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e i r  r e a l  n e t  p r o f i t s .  Many in d e p e n ­
d e n t  bu s in essm en  w ithdraw  h ig h e r  s a l a r i e s  th a n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  would 
demand in  th e  l a b o r  m a rk e t  and many c h a rg e  p e r s o n a l  e x p e n s e s  t o
g
th e  b u s i n e s s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  in  te rm s  o f  e a s e  a s  w e l l  a s  a c c u ra c y  
o f  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  in  an  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t u d y ,  t h e  netw ork  
s t r u c t u r e  (w hich r e f e r s  t o  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and th e  
number o f  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  th e  ch a n n e l  sy s te m )  and th e  i n f l u ­
ence  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  m ig h t be th e  more a p p r o p r i a t e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  
th e  r e s e a r c h e r .
A n a ly s i s  o f  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  ne tw ork  a l lo w s  one to  
s p e c u l a t e  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  th e  amount o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by 
th e  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  th e  ch a n n e l  h i e r a r c h y .  On th e  one hand ,  i t  
m igh t be h y p o th e s iz e d  t h a t  c o n t r o l  i s  c e n t r a l i z e d  in  c h a n n e ls
g
Adel I .  E l-A n s a ry ,  On th e  M easurement o f  Power in  D i s t r i ­
b u t io n  C h a n n e ls , O c c a s io n a l  P ap e r  Number 12 (B a to n  Rouget D iv is io n  
o f  R e s e a rc h ,  C o lle g e  o f  B u s in e s s  A d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  
U n i v e r s i t y ,  May, 1 9 7 3 ) ,  p .  7 .
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c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by e x c l u s i v e  t e r r i t o r i a l  d i s t r i b u t o r s h i p s .  By
g r a n t i n g  e x c l u s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p r i v i l e g e s ,  a s u p p l i e r  u s u a l l y
hopes  to  g a in  more d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s '  p o l i c i e s
9
on p r i c e s ,  p ro m o t io n ,  c r e d i t  and v a r i o u s  o t h e r  s e r v i c e s .  On th e  
o t h e r  han d ,  i t  m igh t be h y p o th e s i z e d  t h a t  c o n t r o l  i s  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  
in  i n t e n s i v e  ( b r o a d c a s t )  c h a n n e l s .  An i n t e n s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
sy s tem  m igh t be compared to  a l a r g e  span  o f  c o n t r o l  ( a  h ig h  su b -  
o r d i n a t e - t o - s u p e r i o r  r a t i o )  w i t h i n  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
D i s t r i b u t i o n  i n t e n s i t y  i s  o f t e n  a m i s l e a d in g  c r i t e r i o n  o f  
c o n t r o l  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ,  how ever.  A s u p p l i e r  who g r a n t s  e x c l u s i v e  
t e r r i t o r i a l  d i s t r i b u t o r s h i p s ,  f o r  exam ple , may l i m i t  h i s  a v a i l a b l e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  and o v e r  t im e  become v e r y  d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  middlemen 
g r a n te d  th e  e x c l u s i v e  p r i v i l e g e s .  S in c e  a m id d le m a n 's  power o v e r  a 
s u p p l i e r  i n c r e a s e s  a s  th e  s u p p l i e r  becomes more d e p e n d e n t  upon him, 
th e  middleman m igh t be a b l e  t o  a c h ie v e  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  s u p p l i e r  in  an e x c l u s i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  sy s tem .
G a th e r in g  d a t a  from r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  s e v e r a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
which a r e  members o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  e n t e r p r i s e  c h a n n e l  g roup  would 
p o se  t h e  p rob lem  o f  g a i n in g  th e  c o o p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  whose p e r c e p t i o n s  w ere d e s i r e d .  A ls o ,  i f  t h e  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s  were g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  d i s p e r s e d  and th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  o f  a
9
P h i l l i p  K o t l e r ,  M ark e t in g  Management> A n a l y s i s , P la n n in g , 
and C o n t r o l ,  (2d e d . j  Englewood C l i f f s i  P r e n t i c e  H a l l ,  1 9 ^ 2 ) ,  
p .  571.
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c o m p lic a te d  n a t u r e  so  t h a t  p e r s o n a l  in t e r v i e w in g  was r e q u i r e d ,  th e  
p r o c e s s  would a l s o  be e x p e n s iv e .
In  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  r e s e a r c h ,  t h e  u s e  o f  s t r u c ­
t u r e s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l  n e tw o rk s  a p p e a r s  g e n e r a l l y  t o  be t h e  
e a s i e s t  way to  m easure  ( a t  l e a s t  t o  i n f e r )  t h e  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  ( a l t h o u g h ,  a s  shown a b o v e ,  th e  s t r u c t u r e s  may be 
m i s l e a d i n g ) .  However, r e s e a r c h  h a s  shown t h a t  e a s e  o f  d a t a  c o l l e c ­
t i o n  i s  n o t  a s u f f i c i e n t  c r i t e r i o n  t o  u s e  i n  th e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  th e  
m ost a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t r o l  m e a su r in g  d e v i c e .
W h is le r ,  e t .  a l .  c o l l e c t e d  co m p e n sa t io n ,  s p a n - o f - c o n t r o l  and 
p e r c e iv e d  i n f l u e n c e  d a t a  from s e v e n t y - t h r e e  d e p a r tm e n ts  w i th i n  a 
l a r g e  in s u r a n c e  f i r m  and computed i n d i c e s  o f  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  
c o n t r o l .  T h e i r  f i n d i n g s  showed t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  m easu re s  o f  c o n t r o l  
were h ig h l y  c o r r e l a t e d  ( s im p le  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  from 1.64 1 
t o  | . 8 6 | )  o n ly  when th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  had a  h i g h l y  r o u t i n i z e d  o r  
programmed t a s k .  C o n v e rse ly ,  w henever th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t a s k  was 
r e l a t i v e l y  unprogrammed, th e  t h r e e  m easu re s  te n d e d  t o  d i v e r g e  ( s im p le  
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  from | . 1 6 |  t o  | . 3 8 | ) . * ^  Where t a s k s  a r e  n o t  
h i g h l y  r o u t i n i z e d  ( a s  i n  m ost c h a n n e l  s y s t e m s ) ,  s u r r o g a t e  m e a su re s ,  
o r  m easu re s  w hich a l lo w  r e s e a r c h e r s  o n ly  t o  i n f e r  t h e  p e r c e iv e d  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l ,  a r e  in a d e q u a te .
^ W h i s l e r ,  e t .  a l . , o p .  c i t . , p .  22 .
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While t h e  ch a n n e l  s t r u c t u r e  m igh t be e a s y  t o  a s c e r t a i n ,  t h e r e  
i s  an a d d i t i o n a l  p rob lem  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  th e  u s e  o f  t h i s  m easu re  t o  
d e te rm in e  th e  t o t a l  amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  in  an i n t e r ­
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .  A l l  t h a t  can be i n f e r r e d  from an i n s p e c t i o n  
o f  th e  ch an n e l s t r u c t u r e  i s  an  a p p ro x im a t io n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  amount 
o f  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  ch an n e l  l e v e l s .  
However, th e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  a c t u a l l y  a t t a i n e d  by members o f  th e  
ch a n n e l  system  may v a r y  f o r  t h e  s e v e r a l  m a rk e t in g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
For exam ple, a  s u p p l i e r  m igh t e x e r c i s e  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  power and a s
a consequence  a c h ie v e  a h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  p h y s i c a l
p r o d u c t  q u a l i t y  and p r i c i n g  i s s u e s .  However, t h e  middlemen may have  
a h ig h  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  in v e n to r y  and s e r v i c e  l e v e l s  t o  th e  
f i n a l  consum er. T h e r e f o r e ,  b o th  th e  s u p p l i e r  and t h e  middlemen can 
a c h ie v e  d i f f e r e n t  d e g re e s  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  s e v e r a l  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
A m a jo r  l i m i t a t i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  o f  th e  u s e  o f  t h e  ch an n e l  
netw ork  s t r u c t u r e  a s  an  i n d i c a t o r  o f  c o n t r o l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  
y i e l d s  o n ly  a  g lo b a l  m easure  w hich  m igh t c o n c e a l  more th a n  i t  r e v e a l s .  
T h is  p rob lem  i s  a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  u se  o f  p r o f i t s  (compen­
s a t i o n )  as  a  m easu re  o f  c o n t r o l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  a  c h a n n e l  sy s tem .
Firm s w ith  e q u a l  l e v e l s  o f  p r o f i t s  may in  f a c t  have  v a r y in g  d e g r e e s
o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
The u s e  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e - q u e s t i o n n a i r e  e n a b le s  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  
to  overcome t h i s  p rob lem  by o b t a i n i n g  r e s p o n d e n t s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s . In  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  th e
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r e s p o n d e n ts  may be asked  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  
e x e r c i s e d  by th e  v a r i o u s  c h a n n e l  members upon f i n a l  cu s to m er  p r i c i n g ,  
in v e n to r y  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  cu s to m er  s e r v i c e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  e t c .
P a tc h e n  a n a ly z e d  d a t a  from  s t u d i e s  o f  a  m a n u fa c tu r in g  company 
and a s e t  o f  a u to m o b i le  d e a l e r s h i p s  t h a t  in c lu d e d  b o th  g lo b a l  m easu re s  
o f  i n f l u e n c e  w i th i n  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and i n d i c e s  based  upon i n f l u e n c e  
in  s p e c i f i c  a r e a s .  H is  a n a l y s i s  showed t h a t  t h e r e  was more ag reem en t 
among n o n - s u p e r v i s o r y  p e r s o n s  o f  th e  same o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  l e v e l  when 
in f l u e n c e  i s  m easured  by an  in d e x  o f  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e rn in g  s p e c i f i c  
a r e a s  o f  i n f l u e n c e  th a n  when i t  was m easured  by a  g lo b a l  q u e s t i o n .
" I n  o t h e r  w ords,  t h e  in d e x  m easu re  i s  more r e l i a b l e  th a n  th e  g lo b a l  
m easure  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t . " ^
b .  A d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  m e a s u re s . In  a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  t h r e e  
methods commonly u sed  to  m easu re  c o n t r o l  i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h r e e  
o t h e r  m e th o d o lo g ie s  c o u ld  be u sed  t o  m easu re  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l .
K aduskin  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c o n t r o l  be m easured  by s tu d y in g  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in  d e c i s i o n s .  The p ro c e d u re  i s  o u t l i n e d  h e r e  and p r e s e n t e d  in  a 
ch a n n e l  c o n t e x t .
S te p  1 .  U sing  docum ented e v id e n c e  and k n o w led g ea b le  in f o r m a n t s ,  
d e v e lo p  a  l i s t  o f  im p o r ta n t  r e c e n t  d e c i s i o n s .  The 
o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  main ch a n n e l  d e c i s i o n  a r e a s .
H l a r t i n  P a tc h s n ,  " A l t e r n a t i v e  Q u e s t io n n a i r e  A pproaches t o  
t h e  M easurement o f  I n f lu e n c e  i n  O r g a n i z a t i o n s , "  The A m erican J o u r n a l  
o f  S o c io lo g y , V o l.  69 ( J u l y ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  p .  50.
12 C. K adusk in , "Power, I n f lu e n c e  and S o c ia l  C i r c l e s t  A New 
M ethodology f o r  S tu d y in g  O pin ion  M a k e rs ,"  A m erican S o c io l o g i c a l  
Review, V o l.  33 (O c to b e r ,  1 9 6 8 ) ,  p p .  6 85 -698 .
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S te p  2 . L i s t  a l l  o f  t h e  f i rm s  and key  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p e r s o n n e l  who 
a r e  th o u g h t  t o  have  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  making th e  d e c i s i o n s .
S te p  3 .  I n t e r v i e w  th e  p e r s o n n e l  i d e n t i f i e d  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  r o l e ( s )  
each  p la y e d  in  t h e  d e c i s i o n  making a c t i v i t i e s  and to  
i d e n t i f y  a d d i t i o n a l  p e o p le  who p a r t i c i p a t e d .
T h is  p ro c e d u re  i s  t im e-co n su m in g ,  complex and may n o t  y i e l d  
v a l i d  m e a su re s .  For exam ple , a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p o w e rfu l  c h a n n e l  member 
may s u p p re s s  an  i s s u e  so  t h a t  no d e c i s i o n  i s  e v e r  made. A ls o ,  s in c e  
no fo rm a l  h i e r a r c h y  e x i s t s  i n  m ost c h a n n e l  s y s te m s ,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  
n e c e s s a r y  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  be tw een  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  d e c i s io n - m a k in g  
and a c t u a l  i n f l u e n c e .  For exam ple ,  power e x e r c i s e d  i n d i r e c t l y  by 
a m a n u fa c tu r e r  th ro u g h  w h o le s a l e r s  t o  a c h i e v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e t a i l e r s  
may be ig n o re d  by t h i s  m ethod. T h is  p r o c e d u re  seems p a r t i c u l a r l y  
w e l l  s u i t e d  f o r  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  t o  d e t e r m in e  key  ch an n e l  
i s s u e s  and to  i d e n t i f y  p o t e n t i a l l y  i n f l u e n t i a l  c h a n n e l  members.
A second  p o s s i b l e  m e thodology  f o r  m e a su r in g  c o n t r o l  i s
13s u g g e s te d  by Goldhammer and S h i l s .  A lthough  th e y  p ro p o se d  th e  
method t o  m easure  pow er, i t  a c t u a l l y  m easu re s  c o n t r o l  o r  t h e  e x t e n t  
t o  w hich power i s  e x e r c i s e d  t o  a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  o u tco m es .  Goldhammer 
and S h i l s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  o f  an  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  ( o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s )  
s u c c e s s f u l  a t t e m p t s  t o  e x e r c i s e  power t o  a l l  o f  h i s  ( i t s )  a t t e m p t s  
t o  e x e r c i s e  power i s  a  m easure  o f  t h e  p e r s o n ' s  ( o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s )  
pow er. S in c e  power i s  d e f in e d  a s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  e x e r t  i n f l u e n c e ,  
t h i s  m easure  i s  in a d e q u a te  t o  m easu re  power b e c a u se  i t  m easu re s
13H e rb e r t  Goldhammer and R. S h i l s ,  "Types o f  Power and 
S t a t u s , "  American J o u r n a l  o f  S o c io lo g y , V o l .  XLV (S ep tem b er ,  1 9 3 9 ) ,  
pp . 171-182 .
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power e x e r c i s e d  and ig n o r e s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  a c h ie v e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l .
T h is  m ethod, l i k e  th e  one s u g g e s te d  by K adusk in ,  r e q u i r e s  a 
complex a n a l y s i s  o f  p a s t  b e h a v io r  o f  ch a n n e l  members i f  ch a n n e l  con­
t r o l  i s  t o  be m easu red .  Such a n a l y s i s  w i l l  i d e n t i f y  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
which c h a n n e l  members p e r c e iv e  th e m s e lv e s  and o t h e r s  t o  have  i n f l u ­
enced d e c i s i o n s .  However, i t  s u f f e r s  t h e  same two s e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  K a d u s k in 's  p r o c e d u r e .
Hopkins s u g g e s t s  a t h i r d  m ethodology  t h a t  c o u ld  be used  to  
14m easure  ch a n n e l  c o n t r o l .  The m ethod, d e v e lo p e d  f o r  u s e  in  sm a l l  
g roup  e x p e r im e n ts ,  in v o lv e s  d e t e r m in in g  each  p e r s o n ' s  i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  
on an i s s u e  and com paring  t h i s  w i th  th e  f i n a l  g roup  d e c i s i o n .  The 
m a jo r  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  method i s  t h a t  p e r s o n s  ( o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s )  
who i n i t i a l l y  h o ld  a m i d d l e - o f - t h e - r o a d  p o s i t i o n  and who have  l i t t l e  
c o n t r o l  may a p p e a r  t o  be most i n f l u e n t i a l  i f  a  compromise i s  made 
by two p o w e rfu l  members who h e ld  ex trem e  p o s i t i o n s  i n i t i a l l y .
The l a s t  t h r e e  m e th o d o lo g ie s  d i s c u s s e d  above o f f e r  some 
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  m e asu r in g  c o n t r o l  o v e r  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s  i n  ch an n e l  
d e c i s i o n s .  In  each  c a s e ,  how ever,  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  e x e r c i s e d  cou ld  
o n ly  r o u g h ly  be a p p ro x im a te d .  To m easure  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  mar­
k e t i n g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  in  a ch a n n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  
would have  t o  s p e c i f y  a l l  t h e  i s s u e s  and w e ig h t them t o  r e f l e c t  th e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  i s s u e s .
The u se  o f  c o n t r o l  g ra p h s  t o  d e p i c t  t h e  m easu re s  o f  o r g a n i -
14T. K. H opk ins ,  The E x e r c i s e  o f  I n f lu e n c e  i n  Sm all Groups 
(New J e r s e y i  B ed m is te r  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 4 ; ,  p p .  4 8 -4 9 .
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z a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  f o l lo w in g  s e c t i o n .  The a p p l i c a ­
b i l i t y  o f  c o n t r o l  g rap h  a n a l y s i s  t o  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l  
a n a l y s i s  i s  h i g h l i g h t e d .
c .  C o n tro l  g r a p h s . C o n tro l  g ra p h s  w ere  f i r s t  p ro p o sed  by 
Tannenbaum and Kahn to  d e p i c t  t h e  amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  
i n  o r g a n i z a t i o n s . ^  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  g rap h  shown 
in  F ig u r e  2 .2  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
and th e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  p e r c e iv e d  t o  
be a t t a i n e d  by th e  r e s p e c t i v e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s .
C o n tro l  g ra p h s  a r e  u sed  t o  d e p i c t  t h e  t o t a l  amount and
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  p e r c e iv e d  w i th i n  a  sy s tem  w i th  m easu re s  o f
th e  h e i g h t s  and s lo p e s  o f  th e  c o n t r o l  g raph  c u r v e s .  The c u rv e s  a r e
u s u a l l y  d e v e lo p e d  from  r e s p o n s e s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s .
O r g a n iz a t io n  members a r e  a sk ed  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  th e
l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by v a r i o u s  e c h e lo n s  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
h i e r a r c h y  o v e r  s i n g l e  i s s u e s  o r  i n  g e n e r a l .  Members g e n e r a l l y
re sp o n d  a lo n g  a  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e  s c a l e .  An exam ple o f
th e  ty p e  o f  q u e s t i o n  u sed  is«
In  g e n e r a l ,  how much do you th i n k  th e  p r e s i d e n t  h a |g  
t o  say  a b o u t  how t h i n g s  a r e  d e c id e d  in  t h i s  l o c a l ?
The q u e s t i o n s  a r e  answ ered  w i th  checks  on a  f i v e - p o i n t  s c a l e  r a n g in g
from "a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  s ay "  t o  "no  say  a t  a l l . "
15A m o ld  S .  Tannenbaum and R o b e r t  L. Kahn, " O r g a n iz a t io n a l  
C o n tro l  S t r u c t u r e *  A G en e ra l  D e s c r i p t i v e  T ech n iq u e  a s  A p p lie d  t o  
Four L o ca l  U n io n s ,"  Human R e l a t i o n s , V o l .  10 , No. 2 (1 9 5 7 ) ,  pp . 
127-140 .











F ig u re  2 .2
The C o n tro l G raph i The Amount and D i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  O rg a n iz a t io n a l  C o n tro l a s  P e rc e iv e d  
by D i f f e r e n t  H ie r a r c h i c a l  L e v e ls
B
(D em ocracy)
(A u to c ra c y )
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C o n tro l g ra p h s  can  be u sed  to  p l o t  i n d i v i d u a l s '  and g ro u p s ' 
p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by th e m se lv e s  a n d /o r  
o t h e r s .  The g rap h  p ro v id e s  a  m ore a c c u r a te  d e p ic t io n  o f  th e  t o t a l  
amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  th a n  d o es  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  demo­
c r a t i c ,  a u t o c r a t i c ,  e t c .  ty p o lo g y . Curve A in  F ig u re  2 .2  r e p r e s e n t s  
a s i t u a t i o n  o f  a u to c ra c y  w h ile  c u rv e  B r e p r e s e n t s  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  
dem ocracy . D i f f e r e n t  s lo p e s  o f  th e  c u rv e s  would c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e ,  
how ever, g r e a t e r  o r  l e s s e r  d e g re e s  o f  dem ocracy  and a u to c r a c y .
The c o n t r o l  g rap h  p ro v id e s  a  v e h ic le  f o r  d e m o n s tra t in g  th e  
e s s e n c e  o f  th e  f ix e d  v e r s u s  v a r i a b l e  c o n t r o l  a rg u m e n t. I f  th e  t o t a l  
amount o f  c o n t r o l  in  a sy stem  i s  f ix e d  in  am ount, th e n  any in c r e a s e  
in  one h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l ' s  c o n t r o l  would r e q u i r e  a  d e c r e a s e  in  some 
o th e r  l e v e l ' s  c o n t r o l .  However, i f  t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  t h e r e  a r e  t r u l y  
c o n f l i c t i n g  arg u m en ts  r e g a r d in g  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c o n t r o l .  One a rg u ­
ment i s  t h a t  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  can  be in c re a s e d  by 
en h an c in g  th e  c o n t r o l  e x e r c is e d  by lo w er l e v e l  members b e c a u se  
in v o lv em en t in  d e c is io n -m a k in g  i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  f o s t e r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  
m o t iv a t io n ,  and l o y a l t y .  O th e rs  a rg u e  t h a t  a h ig h  d e g re e  o f  l e a d e r  
c o n t r o l  i s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  th e  e f f i c i e n t  d i r e c t i o n  and a d m in i s t r a t io n  
o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n s .  Curve C in  F ig u re  2 .2  shows t h a t  i t  i s  c o n c e iv a b le  
to  in c r e a s e  th e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r c is e d  by th e  lo w e r o r g a n i ­
z a t io n a l  l e v e l s  a n d , a t  th e  same tim e , to  in c r e a s e  th e  c o n t ro l  
e x e r c is e d  by th e  u p p e r  l e v e l s .  W ith in  an  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  f o r  exam ple , 
a d e p a rtm e n t m anager and h i s  s u b o rd in a te s  may b o th  p o s s e s s  some 
power o r  p o t e n t i a l  to  in f lu e n c e  w ork ing  c o n d i t io n s .  N e i th e r  may 
e x e r c i s e  t h a t  pow er, how ever. T h e re fo re ,  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h a t  i s s u e
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would be l i t t l e  o r  n o n e . I f  th e  s u b o rd in a te s  b e g in  to  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  
pow er and a c h ie v e  some c o n t r o l ,  th e n  th e  m anager may e x e r c i s e  h i s  
pow er. In  th e  en d , b o th  may a c h ie v e  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r 
em ployee w ork ing  c o n d i t io n s .  I f  c o n t r o l  w ere v iew ed a s  f ix e d  in  
am ount, t h i s  would be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
E a r ly  s tu d ie s  u t i l i z i n g  c o n t r o l  g rap h  a n a l y s i s  w ere n o t 
w ith o u t l i m i t a t i o n s ,  how ever. Some e a r l y  u s e r s  c o n s t r u c te d  o v e r a l l  
c o n t r o l  g ra p h s  by s im p ly  a v e ra g in g  a l l  r e s p o n d e n ts ' p e r c e p t io n s .  
O fte n tim e s  th e  o v e r a l l  c o n t r o l  c u rv e  was found to  be v e ry  s im i l a r  
to  th e  a v e ra g e  c o n t ro l  c u rv e  f o r  th e  lo w er e c h e lo n  o f  th e  s e v e r a l  
h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  in c lu d e d  in  th e  s tu d ie s  and q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from  
th e  h ig h e r  l e v e l s '  a v e ra g e  c o n t r o l  c u r v e s .  The o b v io u s  r e a s o n  f o r  
t h i s  i s  t h a t  u s u a l ly  more r e s p o n s e s  w ere o b ta in e d  from  lo w e r e c h e lo n  
p e rs o n n e l and a  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  w e ig h t was a t ta c h e d  to  t h e i r  
p e r c e p t io n s  in  th e  c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  th e  o v e r a l l  c o n t r o l  c u r v e . ^
T here  i s  o f t e n  a  g r e a t  d e a l  o f  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  amount 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
l e v e l s  in  o r g a n iz a t io n s .  McMahon and P e r r i t t  p ro p o sed  t h a t  a n a l y s t s  
com pare th e  d e g re e  o f  co n co rd a n ce  ( s i m i l a r i t y )  and d iv e rg e n c e  
( d i f f e r e n c e )  o f  th e  r e s p o n d e n ts ' p e r c e p t io n s  o f  t h e i r  own and o t h e r s '  
in f lu e n c e  in  o r g a n iz a t io n s  to  m easu re  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  p e r c e p t io n s .  
C oncordance i s  o p e r a t io n a l iz e d  by m e asu rin g  th e  e x te n t  to  w hich c o n t r o l
^ J .  T im othy McMahon and G. N. P e r r i t t ,  "The C o n tro l S t r u c t u r e  
o f  O rg a n iz a t io n s !  An E m p ir ic a l E x a m in a tio n ,"  Academy o f  Management 
J o u r n a l , V o l. 14 (S ep tem ber, 1 9 7 1 ), p p . 328-331 .
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c u rv e s  based  upon th e  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  each  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  l e v e l  
co in c id e .* ®
I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  u se  c o n t r o l  g rap h  a n a l y s i s  to  d e te rm in e  
and d e p i c t  th e  t o t a l  am ount, d i s t r i b u t i o n  and co n co rd an ce  o f  c o n t r o l  
a s  p e rc e iv e d  by c h an n e l members a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  a c h an n e l 
sy s tem . F ig u re  2 .3  p r e s e n ts  t h r e e  h y p o th e t ic a l  c o n t r o l  g rap h  c u rv e s  
f o r  a  c h a n n e l group  com prised  o f  a  m a n u fa c tu re r  and h i s  w h o le s a le r s  
and r e t a i l e r s .  In  t h i s  f i g u r e ,  th e  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  ch a n n e l g roup  
members a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n c o rd a n t.
2 . Power m easu rem en t. Power i s  a  k ey  c o n c e p t in  u n d e r­
s ta n d in g  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l .  S e v e ra l  a p p ro a c h e s  h ave  b een  p ro p o sed  by 
r e s e a r c h e r s  to  o b ta in  v a l id  m e asu re s  o f  power (d e f in e d  h e r e  a s  th e  
p o t e n t i a l  to  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l ) .  V a lid  m easu res  o f  pow er a r e  d i f f i c u l t  
to  o b ta in ,  how ever, f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  pow er r e p r e s e n t s  th e  
p o t e n t i a l  to  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l  a n d , t h e r e f o r e ,  m a n if e s ts  i t s e l f  o n ly  
when e x e r c i s e d .  L a te n t  power p o t e n t i a l  may be much g r e a t e r  th an  
t h a t  w hich i s  e x e r c i s e d .  S econd , l i k e  c o n t r o l ,  power i s  i s s u e  
s p e c i f i c  and g lo b a l  m easu re s  o f t e n  h id e  more th a n  th e y  d i s c l o s e .
T h ird ,  power can  be e x e r c is e d  i n d i r e c t l y  a s  w e ll  a s  d i r e c t l y .  
In  o th e r  w o rd s, A may be a b le  t o  in f lu e n c e  C by e x e r c i s in g  h i s  power 
o v e r B. I f  B h as  power o v e r C, th e n ,  even i f  A h as  no d i r e c t  power 
o v e r C, A h as  i n d i r e c t  power o v e r  C th ro u g h  B. F in a l ly ,  pow er, as  
p o t e n t i a l  to  in f lu e n c e ,  i s  s u b je c t  to  th e  f r a i l t i e s  o f  p e r c e p t io n .
F o r exam ple , A h a s  power o v e r  B to  th e  e x te n t  t h a t  B p e r c e iv e s  A to












F ig u re  2 .3
ORGANIZATION
LEVEL
H y p o th e t ic a l  C o n tro l G raphs f o r  a  M a n u fa c tu re r  
and H is  W h o le sa le rs  and R e t a i l e r s
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p o s s e s s  power o v e r  h im . In  a  g iv e n  s i t u a t i o n ,  how ever, A may a c t u a l l y
p o s s e s s  g r e a t e r  pow er o v e r B th a n  B p e r c e iv e s .  Only when A e x e r c i s e s
h i s  power d o es  B become aw are o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e .  T hus, o b je c t iv e
r e a l i t y  and i n d i v i d u a l s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  r e a l i t y  a r e  b o th  im p o r ta n t
in  th e  a s se s sm e n t o f  pow er.
T h ree  s e p a r a t e  e f f o r t s  h av e  b een  u n d e r ta k e n  by m a rk e te r s
r e c e n t ly  to  m easu re  power in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls .  Each o f  th e
th r e e  s tu d ie s  a r e  rev ie w e d  below  w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  d e v o te d
to  th e  m e th o d o lo g ie s  u se d .
a .  E l-A n sa ry  -  1970 . E l -A n s a ry 's  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  h e a t in g
and c o o l in g  su p p ly  c h a n n e ls  r e p r e s e n te d  th e  f i r s t  a t te m p t to  m easu re  
19c h a n n e l pow er. E l-A n sa ry  m easured  pow er d i r e c t l y  by o b ta in in g
w h o le s a le r  and d e a l e r  s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  pow er and a t t r i b u t e d  power
p e r c e p t io n s .  He d e f in e d  ch a n n e l pow er a s  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  one member
to  in f lu e n c e  th e  d e c i s io n  v a r i a b l e s  in  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  o f
a n o th e r  member a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  c h a n n e l l e v e l .  F o r t h i s  in f lu e n c e
to  q u a l i f y  a s  pow er, how ever, i t  m ust be d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  in f lu e n c e d
20
m em ber's o r i g i n a l  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  h i s  own m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y .
To o b ta in  th e  a t t r i b u t e d  m easu re s  o f  pow er, each  d e a l e r  was 
a sk ed  to  i n d i c a t e  th e  e x te n t  to  w hich h i s  a c t u a l  m a rk e tin g  p o l i c i e s  
d e v ia te d  from  w hat h e  would h av e  o r i g i n a l l y  p la n n ed  w ith o u t  a  p a r t i -
19E l-A n sa ry , "Power M easurem ent in  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h an n e li 
An E m p ir ic a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n . "  S ee  a l s o  E l-A n sa ry  and S te r n ,  "Power 
M easurem ent in  th e  D i s t r i b u t io n  C h a n n e l,"  and A del E l-A n sa ry , "A 
Model in  Pow er-D ependence R e la t io n s  in  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e l,"  in  
F red  E. A lv in e  ( e d . ) ,  R e lev an ce  in  M a rk e tin g  (C h ic a g o i A m erican 
M a rk e tin g  A s s o c ia t io n ,  1 9 7 1 ), p p . 200 -2 0 3 .
20Supra, p. 21.
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c u l a r  w h o le s a le r 's  in f lu e n c e  (p o w e r) . L ik e w ise , each  w h o le s a le r  was 
a sk ed  to  i n d i c a t e  th e  e x te n t  to  w hich h i s  a c t u a l  m a rk e tin g  p o l i c i e s  
d e v ia te d  from  w hat he would h av e  o r i g i n a l l y  p la n n e d  w ith o u t a 
p a r t i c u l a r  d e a l e r ' s  in f lu e n c e  (p o w e r) .
To o b ta in  s e l f - p e r c e iv e d  m easu res  o f  pow er, each  d e a l e r  was 
a sk ed  to  i n d i c a t e  th e  e x te n t  to  w hich a  w h o le s a le r 's  a c t u a l  m ar­
k e t in g  p o l i c i e s  d e v ia te d  from  w hat th e  t f i o l e s a l e r  would h ave  o r i ­
g i n a l l y  p la n n ed  w ith o u t th e  d e a l e r ' s  in f lu e n c e  (p o w e r) . A lso , each  
w h o le s a le r  in d ic a te d  th e  e x te n t  to  w hich a  d e a l e r ' s  a c t u a l  m a rk e tin g  
p o l i c i e s  d e v ia te d  from  w hat t h a t  d e a l e r  would h av e  o r i g i n a l l y  p la n n ed  
w ith o u t th e  w h o le s a le r 's  in f lu e n c e  (p o w e r) .
The d e a l e r s  and w h o le s a le r s  re sp o n d ed  to  a  L i k e r t - t y p e  s c a l e .  
An exam ple o f  th e  ty p e  o f  q u e s t io n  u sed  to  a s s e s s  th e  l e v e l  o f  power 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  a w h o le s a le r  by a  d e a l e r  is«
T h is  w h o le s a le r 's  in f lu e n c e  on th e
number o f  sa le sm en  you em ploy is«  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___
1 2  3 4 5
w here i
1 . n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t  o r  no in f lu e n c e
2 . i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in f lu e n c e
3 . some in f lu e n c e
4 . s i g n i f i c a n t  in f lu e n c e
5 . v e ry  s i g n i f i c a n t  in f lu e n c e .
E l-A n sa ry  a l s o  o b ta in e d  i n d i r e c t  m easu re s  o f  s e l f - p e r c e iv e d  
and a t t r i b u t e d  m easu res  o f  pow er. T hese m easu re s  w ere o b ta in e d  
th ro u g h  s e l f - p e r c e iv e d  and a t t r i b u t e d  m easu re s  o f  depen d en ce  and 
s o u rc e s  o f  pow er. W hile th e s e  m easu res  and E l -A n s a ry 's  f in d in g s  
a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e  p rim ary  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  h i s  r e s e a r c h  f o r  t h i s  
s tu d y  i s  h i s  m ethodology  to  m easu re  power d i r e c t l y .  S ubseq u en t
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r e s e a r c h e r s  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  c h a n n e l power u sed  d i f f e r e n t  m e th o d o lo g ie s  
and th e s e  a r e  rev ie w e d  n e x t .
b . W ilk in so n  -  1 9 7 2 . W ilk in so n  m easured  power in  a d i s t r i ­
b u t io n  ch a n n e l f o r  a  h o u seh o ld  d u r a b le  in  th e  s t a t e  o f  New S outh
21W ales and th e  A u s t r a l i a n  C a p i ta l  T e r r i t o r y .  The c h a n n e l c o n s is te d  
o f  t h r e e  l e v e l s t  s u p p l i e r s  o f  com ponents to  m a n u fa c tu re r s  who 
d i s t r i b u t e d  th e  f i n i s h e d  p ro d u c t  th ro u g h  r e t a i l e r s .
A key  e x e c u t iv e  in  each  f irm  in  th e  ch a n n e l g roup  su rv ey ed  
was a sk ed  to  r a t e  th e  "maximum p o s s ib le "  and " u s u a l"  c o n s t r a in in g  
in f lu e n c e  he p e rc e iv e d  h i s  f i rm  ( s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n )  to  h av e  and each  
o f  s e v e r a l  named f irm s  ( a t t r i b u t e d )  to  h ave  on h i s  f i r m 's  m a rk e tin g  
p o l i c i e s .  S e p a ra te  q u e s t io n s  w ere ask ed  f o r  each  m a rk e tin g  p o l ic y  
a r e a  ( e . g .  p r i c i n g ,  p ro m o tio n , e t c . ) .
The "maximum p o s s i b le "  e f f e c t  was d e s ig n e d  to  r e f l e c t  s e l f -  
p e rc e iv e d  and a t t r i b u t e d  pow er. The " u s u a l"  e f f e c t  was d e s ig n e d  to  
m easu re  s e l f - p e r c e iv e d  and a t t r i b u t e d  in f lu e n c e  o r  c o n t r o l .  Respon­
d e n ts  r a t e d  th e s e  e f f e c t s  u s in g  a  sev en  p o in t  s e m a n tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
s c a le  o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  ty p e .
n i l  o r  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  v e ry  g r e a t
e f f e c t    i  i___ ______  « _ i   «   i  e f f e c t
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
L ik e  E l-A n sa ry , W ilk in so n  o b ta in e d  m easu res  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  
21 I .  F . W ilk in so n , "Pow er R e la t io n s  Betw een F irm s in  D i s t r i ­
b u t io n  C h an n e ls i An B n p ir i c a l  S tu d y ."  See a l s o ,  I .  F . W ilk in so n , 
"Power R e la t io n s  in  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e ls ,"  A u s t r a l i a n  J o u rn a l  o f  
M a rk e tin g  R e s e a rc h , V o l. 4 (S e p te m b e r, 1 9 7 1 ), p p . 6 4 -6 6 ; and I .  F. 
W ilk in so n , "Power R e la t io n s  Betw een F irm s ,"  A u s t r a l l a n  J o u rn a l  o f  
M ark e tin g  R e s e a rc h , V o l. 5 (May, 1 9 7 2 ), p p . 4 9 -5 5 .
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depen d en ce  and s o u rc e s  o f  pow er. What i s  r e l e v a n t  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y ,
how ever, i s  t h a t  W ilk in so n  m easured  c o n t r o l  by a s k in g  k ey  e x e c u t iv e s
to  a s s e s s  " u su a l c o n s t r a in in g  i n f l u e n c e . "
c .  Hunt and N evin -  1 9 7 4 . In  an  e f f o r t  to  e m p i r ic a l ly  a s s e s s
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een pow er and s o u rc e s  o f  pow er in  a ch a n n e l o f
d i s t r i b u t i o n  w ith  a  w e l l -d e f in e d  pow er s o u rc e ,  Hunt and N evin in v e s -
22t i g a t e d  a f r a n c h i s o r - f r a n c h i s e e  c h a n n e l g ro u p . They d e f in e d  pow er
a s  " . . . t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  f r a n c h i s o r ,  a s  p e rc e iv e d  by th e  f r a n c h i s e e ,
. . .  23to  c o n t r o l  th e  d e c i s io n  v a r i a b l e s  o f  th e  f r a n c h i s e e . "
Each f r a n c h i s e e  in d i c a te d  th e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich h e  had " re s p o n ­
s i b i l i t y  f o r "  each  o f  sev en  m a rk e tin g  d e c i s io n  a r e a s .  F or each  
d e c i s io n  a r e a ,  th e  f r a n c h i s e e  re sp o n d e d  to  one o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  s ix  
s c a le  p o s i t i o n s i
  ( 1 . )  I  h ave  a lm o s t co m p le te  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h i s .
  ( 2 . )  I have much m ore r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h i s  th a n  ray
f r a n c h i s o r  d o e s .
  ( 3 . )  I  h ave  a  l i t t l e  m ore r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h i s  th a n
my f r a n c h i s o r  d o e s .
  ( 4 . )  My f r a n c h i s o r  h a s  a  l i t t l e  more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r
t h i s  th a n  I  d o .
  ( 5 . )  My f r a n c h i s o r  h a s  much more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r
t h i s  th a n  I  d o .
  ( 6 . )  My f r a n c h i s o r  h a s  a lm o s t c o m p le te  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r  t h i s .
22S h elb y  D. Hunt and Jo h n  R. N ev in , "Power in  a  C hannel o f  
D i s t r i b u t i o n i  S o u rces  and C o n se q u e n c e s ."
23I b i d . , p . 18 .
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The sev en  m a rk e tin g  d e c i s io n  a r e a s  a s s e s s e d  by th e  f r a n ­
c h is e e s  a r e «
( 1 . )  s e t t i n g  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  f o r  p ro d u c ts  and s e r v i c e s ;
( 2 . )  d e te rm in in g  th e  number o f  em p loyees;
( 3 . )  ad d in g  o r  d e l e t i n g  ite m s  from  th e  p ro d u c t  l i n e  
(menu c o n t r o l )
( 4 . )  s p e c i f y in g  th e  book k eep in g  sy s tem ;
( 5 . )  a p p ro v in g  th e  c o n te n t  and m edia f o r  l o c a l  a d v e r t i s i n g ;
( 6 . )  d e te rm in in g  th e  h o u rs  o f  o p e r a t io n ;
( 7 . )  d e te rm in in g  th e  a p p r o p r ia te  s tan d a rd s , o f  c l e a n l i n e s s .
T here  a r e  two s e v e re  l i m i t a t i o n s  in  th e  Hunt and N evin 
a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t ,  th o s e  a u th o rs  m easured  f r a n c h i s o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r 
f r a n c h i s e e  o p e r a t io n s  and n o t pow er. The q u e s t io n n a i r e  u t i l i z e d  
ask ed  each  re s p o n d e n t to  i n d i c a t e  th e  l e v e l  o f  h i s  " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r "  sev en  d e c i s io n  a r e a s .  The m easu res  d e r iv e d  from  such  re s p o n s e s  
r e f l e c t  f r a n c h i s o r s '  a b i l i t y  o r  p o t e n t i a l  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  d e c i s io n  
a r e a s  o n ly  by c h a n c e .
The n e c e s s i t y  f o r  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  betw een power and 
c o n t r o l  h a s  been s t r e s s e d  th ro u g h o u t t h i s  s tu d y .  B ecause  th e y  
m easured  c o n t r o l  and n o t pow er, Hunt and N evin d id  n o t  i n v e s t i g a t e  
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  p e rc e iv e d  pow er and s o u rc e s  o f  pow er which 
th e y  p ro p o sed  to  exam ine.
S econd , th e  r e s e a r c h e r s  d e v e lo p ed  an in d e x  o f  t o t a l  power by 
com puting  th e  mean o f  th e  f r a n c h i s e e 's  r e s p o n s e s  f o r  each  o f  th e  
sev en  d e c i s io n  a r e a s .  The r e s e a r c h e r s  p ro b a b ly  d id  n o t s p e c ify  a l l  
o f  th e  r e l e v a n t  m a rk e tin g  d e c i s io n  a r e a s  o f  im p o rta n c e  to  th e  f r a n ­
c h i s e e s .  ( S i t e  l o c a t i o n ,  f o r  exam ple , was n o t one o f  th e  d e c i s io n  
a r e a s  s p e c i f i e d . )  I f  some im p o r ta n t d e c i s io n  a r e a s  w ere o m itte d , 
th e n  th e  com puted in d e x  o f  pow er d o es  n o t  a d e q u a te ly  e s t im a te  th e  
t r u e  l e v e l  o f  pow er.
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Even i f  th e  sev en  d e c i s io n  a r e a s  s p e c i f i e d  d id  r e p r e s e n t  
a l l  o f  th e  im p o r ta n t i s s u e s ,  th e y  a r e  p ro b a b ly  n o t  a l l  o f  e q u a l 
im p o r ta n c e . S in c e  l o c a l  h e a l th  a u t h o r i t i e s  s p e c i f y  s ta n d a r d s  o f  
c l e a n l i n e s s ,  many f r a n c h i s e e s  may p e r c e iv e  f r a n c h i s o r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
h o u rs  o f  o p e r a t io n  to  be a more im p o r ta n t i s s u e .  B ecause  e q u a l 
im p o rta n c e  was a s s ig n e d  to  th e  sev en  i s s u e s ,  th e  com puted in d e x  o f  
power m ig h t n o t a c c u r a te ly  e s t im a te  th e  t r u e  l e v e l  o f  pow er.
T hroughout th e  p re c e d in g  d i s c u s s io n  o f  power and c o n t r o l ,  
p rim a ry  a t t e n t i o n  h a s  been  g iv e n  to  a l t e r n a t i v e  m e th o d o lo g ie s .  
C o n s id e ra t io n  was a l s o  g iv e n , how ever, to  th e  n e c e s s i t y  to  d i s t i n ­
g u is h  betw een  power and c o n t r o l  in  b o th  c o n c e p tu a l iz a t io n s  and 
e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  and 
p e rfo rm a n ce  i s  d is c u s s e d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  s e c t i o n .
C o n tro l and P e rfo rm a n c e . The need  to  e x e r c i s e  some form  o f
c o n t r o l  o v e r  in d iv id u a l s  in  o r g a n iz a t io n s  to  e n co u ra g e  a  d e g re e  o f
u n i ty  and common d i r e c t i o n  o f  e f f o r t s  h a s  lo n g  been  r e c o g n iz e d .
C h e s te r  I .  B arn a rd  c i t e d  th e  s u r r e n d e r  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  p e r s o n a l  co n d u c t
24a s  an  e s s e n t i a l  and u n iv e r s a l  e lem en t o f  o r g a n iz a t io n .  C o n tro l 
a c h ie v e d  by th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  pow er i s  a l s o  an  im p o r ta n t  m echanism  
u sed  to  a c h ie v e  c h an n e l o r g a n iz a t io n  and c o o rd in a te d  e f f o r t s .  In  
F ig u re  2 .1 ,  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p e rfo rm a n ce  i s  shown to  be a f f e c t e d  by 
th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by f irm s  on o th e r  c h a n n e l l e v e l s .
T here  i s  a p le th o r a  o f  e m p ir ic a l  e v id e n c e  w hich d e a ls  w ith
24B a rn a rd , The F u n c tio n  o f  th e  E x e c u tiv e , p .  84 .
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th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een c o n t r o l  and p e rfo rm a n c e . In  th e  fo l lo w in g
s e c t i o n s ,  o r g a n iz a t io n  t h e o r i s t s ' ,  e c o n o m is ts ' and m a rk e tin g  t h e o r i s t s '
s t u d i e s  w i l l  be b r i e f l y  h ig h l ig h t e d .
1 . O rg a n iz a tio n  th e o r y . McMahon and P e r r i t t  sum m arized th e
o r g a n iz a t io n  th e o ry  and r e s e a r c h  r e l a t e d  to  c o n t r o l  and p e rfo rm a n c e
25m  th r e e  h y p o th e se s  w hich a r e  d is c u s s e d  below .
O rg a n iz a t io n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  
am ount o f  t o t a l  c o n t r o l .
R e s e a rc h e rs  have c o n s i s t e n t l y  co n c lu d ed  t h a t  a  p o s i t i v e
r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  betw een  m e asu re s  o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s
and th e  t o t a l  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  p e rc e iv e d  to  be e x e r te d  by o r g a n i -  
26z a t io n  m em bers. The d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een t o t a l  c o n t r o l  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  h a s  been  e x p la in e d  to  be d ue  to  th e  in c re a s e d  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  i n d iv id u a l s  in  o r g a n iz a t io n s  
w hich e x h i b i t  a  h ig h  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l .  "The e x e r c i s e  o f  c o n t r o l  i s
i n d i c a t i v e  o f  in v o lv em en t w hich may enhance m o t iv a t io n ,  com m itm ent,
27and l o y a l t y . "
McMahon and P e r r i t t  r e c e n t l y  su rv ey ed  2537 l i n e  m anagers in  
tw e lv e  g e o g r a p h ic a l ly  d is p e r s e d  p l a n t s  o f  a  m a n u fa c tu r in g  c o r p o r a t io n .
25The h y p o th e se s  and d i s c u s s io n  t h a t  fo llo w s  a r e  based  upon 
J .  T im othy McMahon and G. W. P e r r i t t ,  "Toward a  C o n tin g en cy  T heory  o f  
O rg a n iz a t io n a l  C o n t r o l ,"  Academy o f  Management J o u r n a l , V o l. 16 
(D ecem ber, 1 9 7 3 ), p p . 626 -6 2 8 .
26S ee f o r  exam ple R. L i k e r t ,  New P a t t e r n  o f  M anagem ent; and 
J .  W. L o rsc h , O rg a n iz a tio n  and E nvironm ent (Homewood» R. D. I rw in ,  
1 9 6 9 ); A. S . Tannenbaum, o p . c i t . , and McMahon and P e r r i t t ,  I b i d . , 
p . 633.
27McMahon and P e r r i t t ,  op . c i t . , p .  626.
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They co n c lu d ed  t h a t i
The f i r s t  l e v e l  m anagers in  m a n u fa c tu r in g  p l a n t s  c h a r a c te r i z e d  
by a  h ig h  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r te d  w i th in  th e  managem ent sy stem  
r e p o r t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m ore f a v o r a b le  a s s e s sm e n ts  o f  co m m u n ica tio n s , 
p e rfo rm a n c e  r a t i n g ,  i n t e r u n i t  c o o p e r a t io n ,  g e n e ra l  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
h an g u p s , c o s t  r e d u c t io n ,  and  work p r e s s u r e  th a n  th o s e  in  th e  low  
t o t a l  c o n t r o l  p l a n t s .
B ased upon th e s e  f i n d i n g s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  s p e c u la te  t h a t  c h an n e l
e f f e c t iv e n e s s  m ig h t be  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  c o n t r o l
p e rc e iv e d  to  be a c h ie v e d  in  th e  sy s tem .
The l e s s  n e g a t iv e  (m ore p o s i t i v e )  th e  s lo p e  o f  th e  c o n t r o l  
c u rv e , th e  g r e a t e r  th e  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
T h ere  a r e  c o n f l i c t i n g  t h e o r i e s  w ith  r e g a r d  to  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
t h a t  e x i s t s  betw een  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  a s  p e r c e iv e d  by 
o r g a n iz a t io n  members and o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Some r e ­
s e a r c h e r s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  c o n t r o l  sh o u ld  be  d i s t r i b u t e d  in  a  h i e r a r ­
c h i c a l  f a s h io n  w ith  th e  lo c u s  o f  c o n t r o l  r o o te d  in  th e  u p p e r  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n a l  e c h e lo n s  i f  c o n fo rm ity ,  c o o r d in a t io n  and u n i t y  o f  d i r e c t i o n
29i s  t o  be a c h ie v e d .  An o p p o s i te  v ie w , ta k e n  by o th e r  t h e o r i s t s ,
s u g g e s ts  t h a t  a  more p o s i t i v e  ( i . e .  d e m o c ra t ic )  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f
30c o n t r o l  i s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  The second
28 I b i d . ,  p .  633 .
29 F or exam ples o f  t h i s  v iew  r e f e r  t o  L. G u lic k  and L . Urwick 
( e d s . ) ,  P a p e rs  on th e  S c ie n c e  o f  A d m in is t r a t io n  (New Y ork i I n s t i t u t e  
o f  P u b l ic  A d m in is t r a t io n ,  193777 J .  D. Mooney, The P r i n c i p l e s  o f  O rgan­
i z a t i o n  (New Y orki H a rp e r , 1 9 4 7 ) ; L. U rw ick , The E lem en ts  o f  A dm in is­
t r a t i o n  (New Y ork i H a rp e r , 1 9 4 4 ) j and M. W eber, The T heory  of~~Soclal 
and Econom ic O rg a n iz a tio n s  (New Y ork i O xford  U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1 9 4 7 ) .
30
F or exam ples o f  t h i s  v iew  s e e  C h r is  A r g y r is ,  P e r s o n a l i ty  and 
O r g a n iz a t io n ! The C o n f l i c t  Betw een th e  System  and th e  In d iv id u a l  
(New Y ork i H a rp e r , l$ 5 7 )n  W. G. B e n n ls , C hanging O rg a n iz a t io n s  (*New 
Y orki M cG raw -H ill, 1966 ) |  and H. S h e p a rd , "C hanging  I n te r p e r s o n a l  
and I n te r g r o u p  R e la t io n s  i n  O r g a n iz a t io n s ,"  i n  M arch ( e d . ) ,  Handbook 
o f  O r g a n iz a t io n s , p p . 1 1 1 5 -1142 .
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h y p o th e s is  s u g g e s te d  above i s  b ased  upon t h i s  l a t t e r  v iew .
The in t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h  o f  McMahon and P e r r i t t  le d
th o s e  r e s e a r c h e r s  to  a c c e p t th e  second  h y p o th e s i s .  T h a t i s ,  th e
pow er e q u a l i z a t io n  t h e o r i e s  w ere su p p o r te d  a t  th e  f i r s t  l e v e l  o f  
31m anagem ent. T hese f in d in g s  a g a in  s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  th ro u g h o u t th e  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  a  c h an n e l
netw ork  may be d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  o v e r a l l  c h a n n e l e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
The g r e a t e r  th e  c o n co rd a n ce  among th e  c o n t r o l  c u rv e s  
o f  th e  v a r io u s  m a n a g e r ia l  l e v e l s ,  th e  g r e a t e r  th e  
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
C oncordance r e f e r s  to  th e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e
am ount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  d i f f e r e n t  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s
a r e  in  a g re e m e n t. The t h i r d  h y p o th e s is  i s  based  upon th e  b e l i e f  t h a t
" . . . a  la d e  o f  ag reem en t among o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  members a s  to  who h as
th e  c o n t r o l  a d v e r s e ly  a f f e c t s  th e  p r o c e s s e s  o f  com m un ica tion , c o o r -
32d i n a t i o n ,  and i n t e g r a t i o n . "
M utual u n d e r s ta n d in g  and ag reem en t h ave  been  c i t e d  by B lak e  
and Mouton a s  im p o r ta n t i n g r e d i e n t s  in  th e  a c h iev em en t o f  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  F u r th e r ,  M arch and Simon h av e  im p lie d  t h a t
in te r g r o u p  c o n f l i c t  may r e s u l t  from  d is a g re e m e n t among o r g a n iz a t io n
33members r e l a t e d  to  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and am ount o f  c o n t r o l .  McMahon
3HicMahon and P e r r i t t ,  o p . c i t . , p .  634 .
32 I b i d . , p .  627 .
33 I b i d . , p .  628 . F o r an  expanded re v ie w  o f  th e  B lak e  and 
Mouton and March and Simon v ie w s , s e e  R. R. B lak e  and J .  S . M outon, 
The M a n a g e ria l G rid  (H o u sto n t G u lf ,  1964) and J .  G. March and H. A. 
Sim on, O rg a n iz a tio n s  (New Y ork i Jo h n  W iley and S o n s , 1 9 6 8 ).
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and P e r r i t t  found in  t h e i r  s tu d y  o f  2537 l i n e  m anagers t h a t  a h ig h
d e g re e  o f  co n co rd an ce  i s  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  f a v o r a b le  m easu re s  o f
34
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  T hus, t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  o f f e r s  s u p p o r t  
f o r  th e  t h i r d  h y p o th e s i s .  T hese  t h e o r i e s  and f in d in g s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
c h an n e l e f f e c t i v e n e s s  may be d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  d e g re e  o f  con­
co rd a n c e  among th e  d i f f e r e n t  c h a n n e l l e v e l s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  
amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l .
The p re c e d in g  d i s c u s s io n  fo c u se d  upon a l t e r n a t i v e  m easu res  o f  
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  c o n t r o l  and pow er. C hannel pow er r e s e a r c h  was h ig h ­
l i g h t e d .  A lso , some in t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h e r s '  c o n c lu s io n s  a s  
to  th e  am ount and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  w i th in  o r g a n iz a t io n s  a s  
w e ll a s  th e  co n co rd a n ce  o f  m em bers' p e r c e p t io n s  w ere r e l a t e d  to  
c h a n n e l sy s te m s . The fo l lo w in g  s e c t i o n  fo c u s e s  upon econom ic m a rk e t 
s t r u c t u r e  th e o ry  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  to  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  and c h a n n e l p e r f o r ­
m ance.
2 . Economic th e o r y . M arket s t r u c t u r e  th e o ry  s u g g e s ts  a
g e n e ra l  m e th o d o lo g ic a l a p p ro ac h  to  econom ic a n a l y s i s  o f  m a rk e ts .
A cco rd in g  to  th e  th e o ry ,  m ark e t s t r u c t u r e  i s  assum ed to  d e te rm in e  th e
c o n d u c t o f  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  th e  m a rk e t,  and th e  c o n d u c t, in  t u r n ,
t o  d e te rm in e  th e  m a r k e t 's  p e rfo rm a n c e , i . e .  th e  econom ic r e s u l t  t h a t
35flo w s from  th e  m a rk e t. A lth o u g h  some q u e s t io n  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
c a u s a t io n ,  th e  g e n e ra l  b e l i e f  i s  t h a t  th e  p r im a ry  d i r e c t i o n  o f
3^ I b i d . , p .  634 .
35John  M. V ernon, M arket S t r u c t u r e  and I n d u s t r i a l  P e rfo rm a n c e » 
A Review  o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  F in d in g s  (B o s to n t A lly n  and B acon, 1972!), 
p .  7 .
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c a u s a t io n  i s  from  s t r u c t u r e  to  co n d u c t t o  p e rfo rm a n c e .
B ain  s t a t e s  t h a t  th e  m ost s a l i e n t  d im e n s io n s  o f  m ark e t
s t r u c t u r e  a r e i
( a . )  th e  d e g re e  o f  s e l l e r  c o n c e n t r a t io n
( b . )  th e  d e g re e  o f  b u y e r c o n c e n t r a t io n
( c . )  th e  d e g re e  o f  p ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
( d . )  th e  c o n d i t io n  o f  e n t r y  to  th e  m arke t.^®
V ernon s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  d e g re e  o f  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  and
o th e r  a s p e c t s  o f  m a rk e tin g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  a r e  im p o r ta n t
37a s p e c t s  o f  m ark e t s t r u c t u r e .
M arket co n d u c t d im en s io n s  t h a t  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  th e  r e a l
w orld  e x te n d  beyond p r i c e  and o u tp u t  d e c i s i o n s .  C ru c ia l  d im en s io n s
o f  m a rk e t co n d u c t in c lu d e !
( a . )  m ethods em ployed by th e  f i rm  o r  g roup  o f  f i rm s  in  
d e te rm in in g  p r i c e  and o u tp u t )
( b . )  p ro d u c t p o l ic y )
( c . )  s a l e s  p ro m o tio n  p o l i c y )
( d . )  means o f  c o o r d in a t io n  and c r o s s - a d a p ta t io n  o f  p r i c e ,  
p ro d u c t and s a l e s  p ro m o tio n  p o l i c i e s  among com peting  
f i rm s )
( e . )  p re s e n c e  o r  a b se n c e  o f ,  and e x te n t  o f ,  p r e d a to r y  o r
e x c lu s io n a ry  t a c t i c s  d i r e c t e d  a g a in s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  r i v a l s  
o r  p o t e n t i a l  en tra n ts .-* ®
M arket p e rfo rm a n ce  i s  b e l ie v e d  to  r e s u l t  from  s t r u c t u r e  and
36Jo e  S . B a in , I n d u s t r i a l  O rg a n iz a t io n , 2nd e d i t i o n  (New 
Y ork t John  W iley and S ons, 1 9 6 8 ), p .  7.
37V ernon , o p . c i t . , p p . 2 8 -2 9 .
38J o e  S . B a in , B a r r i e r s  to  C o m p e titio n  (C am bridge! H arvard  
U n iv e r s i ty  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 6 ), p p . 1 0 -1 1 .
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c o n d u c t. P u b lic  p o l ic y  ( a n t i t r u s t  la w s , d i r e c t  r e g u l a t i o n ,  e t c . )  i s
d e s ig n e d  to  im prove p e rfo rm a n ce  by a f f e c t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  and c o n d u c t.
M easures o f  t o t a l  m ark e t p e rfo rm a n ce  in c lu d e i
( a . )  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  betw een  p r i c e  and a v e ra g e  p ro d u c tio n  
c o s t ;
( b . )  th e  r e l a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  p ro d u c t io n ;
( c . )  th e  r a t i o  o f  s a l e s  p ro m o tio n  c o s t s  to  p ro d u c t io n  
c o s t s ;
( d . )  p ro d u c t a t t r i b u t e s ,  e . g .  q u a l i t y  and v a r i e t y ;  ^9 
( e . )  th e  r a t e  o f  company and in d u s t r y  p r o g r e s s iv e n e s s .
I t  i s  c l e a r l y  e v id e n t  t h a t  th e  econom ic m a rk e t s t r u c t u r e -  
c o n d u c t-p e rfo rm a n c e  th e o ry  s u p p o r ts  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  p ro p o sed  in  
F ig u re  2 .1 ;  i . e .  i n d iv id u a l  f i rm  a s  w e ll a s  t o t a l  in d u s t r y  p e r f o r ­
mance i s  a f f e c t e d  by i n t e r - f i r m  c o n t r o l ,  one d im en s io n  o f  m arke t 
c o n d u c t. O b v io u s ly , how ever, c o n t r o l  i s  n o t  th e  o n ly  v a r i a b l e  
w hich a f f e c t s  p e rfo rm a n c e .
3 . M ark e tin g  r e s e a r c h . M a rk e te r s ,  to o ,  have  in v e s t ig a t e d  
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  and f i rm  and c h an n e l p e r ­
fo rm an ce . S l a t e r  in v e s t ig a t e d  th e  im pact o f  m a rk e t c o o r d in a t io n  in  
u n d e rd ev e lo p ed  c o u n t r i e s .  He co n c lu d ed  th a t  m ark e t c o o r d in a t io n
c o n t r ib u te d  to  in c re a s e d  r e a l  incom e and w id e r d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f
40incom e w hich r e s u l t e d  in  a  b ro a d e r  b a se  o f  e f f e c t i v e  dem and.
The m o tiv e s  o f  a  s in g l e  f i rm  to  c o n t r o l  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a ­
te g y  o f  f irm s  a t  o th e r  ch a n n e l l e v e l s  a r e  many and v a r i e d .  A s in g le  
s u p p l i e r ,  f o r  exam ple, may s t r i v e  t o  a c h ie v e  m ark e t c o n t r o l  f o r  one
39
B a in , I n d u s t r i a l  O rg a n iz a t io n , p .  12 .
40
S l a t e r ,  "M arket C hannel C o o rd in a tio n  and Economic D evelop­
m e n t."  S u p r a . ,  p p . 1 1 -1 2 .
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41o r  more o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  r e a s o n s t
( a . )  to  o b ta in  m a rk e t a c c e s s  — in  some c a s e s  d i s t r i b u t o r s
a r e  u n w il l in g  to  c a r r y  a  s u p p l i e r 's  p ro d u c t  u n le s s  th e y  
a r e  p a r t i a l l y  p r o te c te d  from  in t r a b r a n d  c o m p e ti t io n ;
( b . )  to  in c r e a s e  p ro d u c t e x p o su re  — s u p p l i e r s  may w ish  to  
l i m i t  each  o u t l e t  t o  some s i z e  and in c r e a s e  th e  number 
o f  o u t l e t s  to  a  maximum to  m axim ize e x p o su re ;
( c . )  to  in c r e a s e  d i s t r i b u t o r s '  s a l e s  e f f o r t  — s u p p l i e r
s t r a t e g i e s  o f t e n  a r e  d e s ig n e d  to  l i m i t  th e  g e o g ra p h ic  
co v e ra g e  by a d i s t r i b u t o r  to  en c o u ra g e  in - d e p th  c o v e ra g e  
o f  n a rro w ly  d e f in e d  g e o g ra p h ic  seg m en ts ;
( d . )  to  d e te rm in e  q u a l i t y  and c h a r a c t e r  o f  d i s t r i b u t o r
s e r v ic e  — r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  cu s to m er g ro u p s t o  s p e c i f i c  
d i s t r i b u t o r s ,  f o r  exam ple , may e n a b le  d i s t r i b u t o r s  to  
d e s ig n  t h e i r  p r o d u c t / s e r v i c e  o f f e r in g s  to  b e t t e r  s e rv e  
cu s to m er w a n ts .
These fo u r  m o tiv e s  a r e  by no means e x h a u s t iv e .  They do 
i n d i c a t e ,  how ever, t h a t  c o n t r o l  by s u p p l i e r s  o v e r  c e r t a i n  d i s t r i b u t o r  
m a rk e tin g  i s s u e s  may y ie ld  p o s i t i v e  a s  w e ll a s  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  upon 
th e  l e v e l  o f  d i s t r i b u t o r  p e rfo rm a n c e .
Not a l l  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  h ave  th e  same e f f e c t  upon 
an in d iv id u a l  f i r m 's  p e rfo rm a n c e . T h e re fo re ,  c o n t r o l  by s u p p l i e r s  
o v e r  d i f f e r e n t  d i s t r i b u t o r  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  h a s  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t s  upon 
d i s t r i b u t o r  p e rfo rm a n c e . A r e t a i l e r ' s  p e rfo rm a n ce  may be v e ry  p o s i ­
t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  to  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  p ro m ise  and g u a ra n te e  d e l iv e r y  
w i th in  x d a y s .  H is a b i l i t y  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  o r d e r  c y c le  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t s  h i s  p e rfo rm a n c e . On th e  o th e r  h an d , i f  m ark e t 
p r i c e s  o f  a l l  com peting  p ro d u c ts  a r e  s i m i l a r ,  th e n  th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f
41Lee E. P re s to n ,  " R e s t r i c t i v e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  A rran g em en ts i 
Economic A n a ly s is  and P u b lic  P o l ic y  S ta n d a rd s ,"  p .  511. A lso , se e  
e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s io n  o f  c o n t ro l  m o tiv e s ,  s u p ra ,  p p . 1 1 -1 6 .
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a  r e t a i l e r  to  c o n t r o l  p r i c e  a t  th e  r e t a i l  l e v e l  may n o t  m a te r i a l l y  
a f f e c t  h i s  p e rfo rm a n c e .
C o n tro l and S a t i s f a c t i o n . I t  i s  a lm o s t a x io m a tic  t h a t
in d iv id u a l s  p r e f e r  to  have more r a t h e r  th a n  l e s s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  f a c t o r s
w hich a f f e c t  t h e i r  l i v e s .  Many b u s in e s s e s ,  managed by in d iv id u a l s
w ith  a s t r o n g  d e s i r e  f o r  in d e p e n d e n c e , a r e  a l s o  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by a
p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  s u b je c t in g  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  to  a  minimum l e v e l  o f
c o n t r o l  by o r g a n iz a t io n s  a t  o th e r  l e v e l s  in  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l.
F o r t h i s  r e a s o n ,  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  in d i c a te d  in  F ig u re  2 .1  betw een
th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by one f i rm  o v e r  a n o t h e r 's  m a rk e tin g
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  and th e  " s a t i s f a c t i o n "  o f  th e  l a t t e r  o r g a n iz a t io n
w ith  th e  ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p .
O rg a n iz a tio n  r e s e a r c h e r s  have p ro p o sed  se v e ra l,  t h e o r i e s  t h a t
d e a l  w ith  th e  c o n t r o l - s a t i s f a c t i o n  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The p o w e r - e q u a l i -
z a t io n  t h e s i s  c a l l e d  f o r  m anagem ent t o  e n co u ra g e  g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i -
42p a t io n  by s u b o rd in a te s  in  d e c is io n -m a k in g .  The b e l i e f  o f  pow er- 
eq u a l i z a t i o n  o r  p a r t i c i p a t i v e  managem ent t h e o r i s t s  i s  t h a t  em ployees 
become l e s s  a p a t h e t i c ,  more in d e p e n d e n t,  and have an  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  
s e l f - a c t u a l i z e  when a llo w ed  to  r e l y  more upon s e l f - c o n t r o l .  The 
in c re a s e d  in d iv id u a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w hich r e s u l t s  from  s e l f - c o n t r o l  i s  
a l s o  b e l ie v e d  to  c o n tL ib u te  to  in c re a s e d  in d iv id u a l  and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  
p e rfo rm a n c e .
42
Jam es C. W orthy, " O rg a n iz a t io n a l  S t r u c t u r e  and B nployee 
M o ra le ,"  A m erican S o c io lo g ic a l  R eview , V o l. 15 (A p r il ,  1 9 5 0 ) , p p . 
1 6 9 -1 7 9 ; A rg y r is ,  o p . c l t . , p .  50.
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R esea rc h  by Bachman and Tannenbaum le d  them to  co n c lu d e  t h a t
" in d iv i d u a l s  te n d  to  be more s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th o s e  a s p e c t s  o f  l i f e  o r
o f  t h e i r  jo b s  o v e r  w hich th e y  h av e  some c o n t r o l  th a n  w ith  th o s e
43o v e r  w hich th e y  have n o n e ."  An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  by Bachman, Sm ith
and S le s in g e r  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  c o n t r o l  and s a t i s f a c t i o n
in  36 b ra n c h  o f f i c e s  o f  a  n a t io n a l  f i rm  in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  t o t a l
am ount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  w i th in  an  o r g a n iz a t io n  a l s o  a f f e c t s
44member s a t i s f a c t i o n .  T hese r e s u l t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  when c o n t r o l  i s  
in c re a s e d  th ro u g h o u t an  o r g a n iz a t i o n ,  member s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  i n ­
c r e a s e d .  T hus, in d iv id u a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  a f f e c t e d  n o t o n ly  by th e  
r e l a t i v e  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by v a r io u s  e c h e lo n s  o f  th e  
o r g a n iz a t io n  h ie r a r c h y  b u t  a l s o  by th e  t o t a l  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  
a c h ie v e d  by th e  e n t i r e  o r g a n iz a t io n .
Two b a s ic  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n s  i n h i b i t  in d iv id u a l  
in d e p en d en ce  o r  s e l f - c o n t r o l .  T hese  a r e i  ( 1 . )  a to p - to -b o t to m  
h ie r a r c h y  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  and ( 2 . )  a un ity -o f-co m m an d  w hich d i r e c t s  
th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  tow ard  a  s p e c i f i c  s e t  o f  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  g o a l s .
Both o f  th e s e  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  a b s e n t  in  m ost d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls .  
B ecause  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  o f  autonom y a c c o rd e d  to  th e  in d e p e n ­
d e n t  b u s in e ssm a n , d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l member s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s
43J e r a l d  G. Bachman and A rno ld  S . Tannenbaum, "The C o n tro l-  
S a t i s f a c t i o n  R e la t io n s h ip  A cro ss  V a rie d  A reas o f  E x p e r ie n c e ,"  in  
Tannenbaum ( e d . ) ,  o p . c i t . , p p . 127 -1 3 6 .
44J e r a l d  G. Bachman, C la g e t t  G. Sm ith  and J o n a th a n  A. 
S l e s in g e r ,  " C o n tro l ,  P e rfo rm an ce  and S a t i s f a c t i o n !  An A n a ly s is  o f  
S t r u c t u r a l  and I n d iv id u a l  E f f e c t s , "  J o u r n a l  o f  P e r s o n a l i t y  and 
S o c ia l  P sy c h o lo g y , V o l. 4 (A u g u st, 1966V, pp. 1 2 7 -1 3 6 ,
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s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by o th e r  
c h a n n e l members o v e r  th e  f i r m 's  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
P erfo rm an ce  and S a t i s f a c t i o n . P e rfo rm an ce  and s a t i s f a c t i o n
a r e  n o t  in e x o ra b ly  l i n k e d .  The l i t e r a t u r e  d o es  n o t  c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e
45t h a t  p r o d u c t i v i t y  le a d s  to  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  T h ere  i s  e v id e n c e , how­
e v e r ,  t h a t  in d iv id u a l  em ployee s a t i s f a c t i o n  re d u c e s  tu r n o v e r ,
46a b s e n te e is m  and g r ie v a n c e s .  W ith in  an  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  th e s e  l a t t e r  
f a c t o r s  may le a d  to  in c re a s e d  p e rfo rm a n c e .
W ith in c o n c lu s iv e  e v id e n c e , i t  i s  b e s t  to  v iew  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
and p e rfo rm a n ce  a s  two i n t e r r e l a t e d  v a r i a b l e s  w hich co u ld  s e rv e  a s  
d e p e n d e n t, in d e p e n d e n t o r  in te r v e n in g  v a r i a b l e s .  P ic k le  and 
R u n g e l in g 's  su rv e y  o f  n in e ty - s e v e n  (9 7 )  sm a ll b u s in e s s  f irm s  id e n ­
t i f i e d  a  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  ( s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  one p e r c e n t  l e v e l )
betw een  o r g a n iz a t io n  p r o f i t s  and p s y c h ic  re w a rd s  p e rc e iv e d  by o r g a n i -
47z a t io n  o w n er-m an ag e rs . O wner-m anager p s y c h ic  rew ard  m easu re s  w ere
o b ta in e d  by a s k in g i
45For d i s c u s s io n s  o f  th e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  s e e  R o b e rt L. Kahn, 
" P r o d u c t iv i ty  and Jo b  S a t i s f a c t i o n , ” P e rs o n n e l P sy c h o lo g y , V o l. 13 
(Autumn, 1 9 6 0 ) , p p . 2 7 5 -2 8 7 ; A rno ld  S . Tannenbaum and C la g e t t  G.
S m ith , " E f f e c t s  o f  Member In f lu e n c e  in  an  O rg a n iz a tio n !  Phenom enology 
v e r s u s  O rg a n iz a t io n  S t r u c t u r e , "  J o u r n a l  o f  Abnormal and S o c ia l  
P sy c h o lo g y ,  V o l. 69 (O c to b e r , 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 4 0 l - 4 l 6 |  R o b e rt J .  P au l and 
E a r l  A. C e c i l ,  "The T w o-F acto r T heory o f  M o tiv a tio n !  Some B n p ir ic a l  
F in d in g s  C o n cern in g  th e  Im pact o f  P e rc e iv e d  I n f lu e n c e ,"  M a rq u e tte  
B u s in e s s  R eview , V o l. XVII (W in te r , 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 174 -1 8 1 .
46 P au l and C e c i l ,  I b i d . , p .  180 ; and Ia n  C. R oss and A lv in  
F . Z a n d le r ,  "Need S a t i s f a c t i o n  and B nployee T u rn o v e r ,"  P e rso n n e l 
P sy c h o lo g y , V o l. 10 (Autumn, 1 9 5 7 ), p p . 327-338 .
47 H al B. P ic k le  and B r ia n  S . R u n g e lin g , " B n p ir ic a l  I n v e s t i ­
g a t io n  o f  E n t r e p r e n e u r ia l  G oals and C ustom er S a t i s f a c t i o n , "  J o u rn a l  
o f  B u s in e s s ,  V o l. 46 ( A p r i l ,  1 9 7 3 ), p p . 268 -2 7 3 .
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1 . )  How much d id  th e y  e n jo y  t h e i r  work?
2 . )  How much money would i t  ta k e  to  e n t i c e  them to  a n o th e r  
jo b ?
3 . )  What was t h e i r  s e l f - p e r c e iv e d  s t a t u s  im age in  th e  
com munity?
4 . )  What w ere t h e i r  m o tiv e s  f o r  c o n tin u e d  o p e r a t io n  o f  
t h e i r  b u s in e s s ?
O b v io u s ly , th e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o r r e l a t i o n  betw een  p r o f i t s  and 
p s y c h ic  re w a rd s  d id  n o t  i n d i c a t e  a  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  B u t, i t  
d o es  show t h a t  th e r e  i s  a s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
and p e rfo rm a n ce  when m easu re s  a r e  ta k e n  among key  e x e c u t iv e s  o f  
b u s in e s s  o r g a n iz a t i o n s .
S a t i s f a c t i o n  and T o le r a n c e . O r g a n iz a t io n a l  to l e r a n c e  f o r
c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i rm  on a n o th e r  l e v e l  o f  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h an n e l
r e f l e c t s  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n 's  f e e l i n g  o f  b u rd en  and s a c r i f i c e  in c u r r e d
48from  a c c e d in g  to  th e  l a t t e r * s  c o n t r o l .  F ig u re  2 .1  shows o r g a n i ­
z a t io n a l  to l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  f i rm  to  be  a f f e c t e d  by 
th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  i t s  ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n  w ith  th e  
l a t t e r  f i rm .
The p re c e d in g  d i s c u s s io n  h as  in d ic a te d  t h a t  two o f  th e  many 
v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  a f f e c t  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  in  a d y a d ic  ch an n e l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  a r e  th e  e x te n t  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m a rk e tin g  s t r a ­
te g y  i s s u e s  a c h ie v e d  by th e  two f irm s  and th e  f i r m s ' l e v e l  o f  p e r f o r ­
m ance. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  shown in  F ig u re  2 .1 ,  th e n ,  r e c o g n iz e s  t h a t  
an  in c r e a s e  in  F irm  A 's  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  F irm  B may d e c re a s e  B 's  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  A-B c h an n e l r e l a t i o n .  However, i f  B 's  p e r f o r -
^^Supra, p» 2 6 .
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n an ce  ( i . e .  p r o f i t s ,  s a l e s )  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  a f f e c t e d  by A 's  c o n t r o l ,
th e n  th e  im proved p e rfo rm a n ce  may p o s i t i v e l y  a f f e c t  B 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n .
The n e t  e f f e c t  upon B 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n  co u ld  be p o s i t i v e .  I f  i t  i s
p o s i t i v e ,  th e n  t h i s  f a c t o r  may e n co u ra g e  B to  be  more w i l l i n g  to
a c c e p t  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  by A.
R esea rch  by K en d a ll Adams o f  f i f t y - f o u r  (5 4 ) ow ner-m anagers
o f  su p e rm a rk e ts  showed w h o le s a le r  sp o n so re d  a d v e r t i s i n g  to  be th e
m ost e f f e c t i v e  s e r v ic e  p ro v id e d  to  r e t a i l e r s  in  w h o le s a le r  sp o n so re d
49food r e t a i l i n g  c o o p e r a t iv e s .  F u r th e r ,  o f  s e v e r a l  s e r v ic e s  o f f e r e d  
by s p o n so r in g  w h o le s a le r s ,  r e t a i l e r s  w ere m ost s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  
w h o le s a le r  sp o n so re d  c o o p e r a t iv e  a d v e r t i s i n g  p ro g ram s. Adams con­
c lu d e d  t h a t  b e c a u se  th e  c o o p e r a t iv e  a d v e r t i s i n g  p rogram s w ere 
b e l ie v e d  by th e  r e t a i l e r s  t o  be  e f f e c t i v e ,  th e  r e t a i l e r s  w ere w i l l i n g
to  a c c e p t  ( t o l e r a t e )  a s s i s t a n c e  from  th e  w h o le s a le r s  in  t h i s  d e c i s io n  
50a r e a .
C o n tro l and T o le r a n c e . In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  c o n t r o l  i s  d e f in e d  a s  
th e  a b i l i t y  o f  one f i rm  to  p r e d i c t  e v e n ts  and a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  o u t ­
comes in  c h an n e l r e l a t i o n s .  T o le ra n c e  i s  d e f in e d  a s  a  f i r m 's  f e e l i n g  
o f  b u rd en  and s a c r i f i c e  in c u r r e d  from  a c c e d in g  to  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r
49K en d a ll A. Adams, "A c h iev in g  M arket C o o rd in a tio n  Through 
V o lu n ta ry  and C o o p e ra tiv e  G ro u p s ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  R e t a i l i n g , v o l .  m  
(Summer, 1 9 6 6 ), p p . 19-28  and 60 ; K en d a ll A. Adams, "The A ccep tan ce  
and Use o f  S p e c ia l  S e rv ic e s  by S e le c te d  S u p erm ark e t Owner-M anagers 
in  M ic h ig a n ,"  U n p u b lish ed  P h .D . D i s s e r t a t i o n  (M ich igan  S t a t e  
U n iv e r s i ty ,  E a s t  L a n s in g , 1 9 6 2 ).
^  Adams, "A ch iev in g  M arket C o o rd in a tio n  Through V o lu n ta ry  
and C o o p e ra tiv e  G ro u p s ,"  p . 2 6 .
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f i rm .  F ig u re  2 .1  shows F irm  B 's  to l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by F irm  A to  
d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by A o v e r  B.
The a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  by A o v e r  B i s  a l s o  shown to  be 
a f f e c t e d  by A 's  power o v e r  B. A more co m p le te  model would show th e  
a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by A o v e r  B to  be d e p en d e n t 
upon a t h i r d  im p o r ta n t f a c t o r ,  i . e .  F irm  A 's  d e s i r e  to  c o n t r o l  th e  
m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  o f  B. In  summary, i f  F irm  A d e s i r e s  to  
a c h ie v e  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  Firm  B, th e n  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  
a c h ie v e d  by A o v e r  B w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by A 's  a b i l i t y  to  in f lu e n c e  B 
(pow er) and B 's  w i l l i n g  co m p lian ce  ( t o l e r a n c e )  f o r  A 's  c o n t r o l .
T hroughout th e  p re c e d in g  s e c t i o n s ,  l i t e r a t u r e  from  th e  f i e l d s  
o f  management and o r g a n iz a t i o n s ,  econom ics , m a rk e tin g , s o c io lo g y  and 
p sy ch o lo g y  h a s  been  b r i e f l y  rev ie w e d  to  show s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  c o n c e p tu a l 
model shown in  F ig u re  2 .1 .  The a n a l y s i s  h a s  d e m o n s tra te d  t h a t  th e r e  
i s  a  com plex r e l a t i o n s h i p  among ch a n n e l member c o n t r o l ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
and p e rfo rm a n c e . In  th e  re m a in in g  s e c t io n s  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  two 
a t te m p ts  by m a rk e te r s  to  c o n c e p tu a l iz e  th e  c h an n e l c o n t r o l ,  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  and p e rfo rm a n ce  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a r e  re v ie w e d .
Adams' I n d i f f e r e n c e  C urves A n a ly s is
To e x p la in  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  
w h o le s a le r  s e r v ic e s  p ro v id e d  in  v o lu n ta ry  r e t a i l  c o o p e r a t iv e s  and 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  r e t a i l e r s '  w i l l in g n e s s  to  comply w ith  w h o le s a le r  
re q u ire m e n ts ,  K en d a ll Adams s u g g e s te d  th e  u se  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e
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c u r v e s . ^  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  w h o le s a le r  sp o n so re d  r e t a i l  c o o p e r a t iv e s  
means t h a t  r e t a i l e r s  g iv e  up some o f  t h e i r  freedom  to  make in d e p e n ­
d e n t  p r i c i n g ,  a d v e r t i s i n g  and o th e r  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  d e c i s i o n s .
The w h o le s a l e r 's  p rogram s t h a t  r e s t r i c t  th e  r e t a i l e r s '  freedom  to  
make in d e p e n d e n t d e c i s io n s  a r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  th e  r e t a i l e r s  i f  th e  
s p e c i f i c  p e rfo rm a n ce  r e q u ire m e n ts  a r e  in  e q u i l ib r iu m  w ith  r e tu r n s  
a n t i c i p a t e d  by th e  r e t a i l e r s . (S ee  F ig u re  2 . 4 . )
The in d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e s  (1^  and ^ )  in  F ig u re  2 .4  i n d i c a t e
v a r io u s  m a rg in a l e v a lu a t io n s  w hich  a  r e t a i l e r  co u ld  p la c e  on th e  
tw in  g o a ls  o f  incom e and freed o m . Assum ing th e  m a rk e t m echanism  
would a l lo w  him  to  s e t  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  on h i s  g o o d s , a r e t a i l e r  r e l i n ­
q u is h e s  freedom  i f  he  a g re e s  t o  a d h e re  t o  p r i c e s  s u g g e s te d  by a 
w h o le s a le r .  Income i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  f i n a n c i a l  o r  econom ic r e t u r n  
a s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from  p s y c h ic  re w a rd s .
The in d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e s  (1^  and ^ )  a r e  cu rv e d  to  r e f l e c t  th e
d im in is h in g  m a rg in a l u t i l i t y  o f  freed o m . The c u rv e  in  F ig u re  2 .4 a
shows t h a t  to  rem a in  " i n d i f f e r e n t "  betw een  two p o in t s  a lo n g  th e  
i n d i f f e r e n t  c u rv e s ,  income m ust in c r e a s e  a t  an  in c r e a s in g  r a t e  a s  
r e t a i l e r  freedom  i s  d e c re a s e d .  The incom e p o s s i b i l i t y  l i n e s  (NP and 
N 'P ')  i n d i c a t e  th e  r a t e  o f  incom e in c r e a s e  a n t i c i p a t e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  
o f  in c re a s e d  w h o le s a le r  c o n t r o l .
^ I b i d . , p p . 2 7 -2 8 . F o r an  e x p la n a t io n  o f  f a r m e r s ' w i l l i n g ­
n e s s  to  a c c e p t  p ro d u c t io n  c o n t r o l s  in  one tim e  p e r io d  b u t  n o t  a n o th e r  
s e e  D ale  E. H athaw ay, " A g r i c u l tu r a l  P o l ic y  and F a rm e r 's  F reed o m  A 
S u g g es ted  F ram ew ork ," J o u rn a l  o f  Farm E conom ics, V o l. XXXV (Novem ber, 
1 9 5 3 ), p p . 4 9 6 -510 .
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Income
Com plete W h o le sa le r  
C o n tro l
C om plete R e t a i l e r  
Freedom
a . A R e t a i l e r  U n w illin g  to  R e l in q u is h  h i s  Freedom
Income
C om plete R e t a i l e r  
Freedom
C om plete W h o le sa le r  
C o n tro l
b . A R e t a i l e r  W il l in g  to  R e l in q u is h  h i s  Freedom
F ig u re  2 .4
Adams' A p p l ic a t io n  o f  I n d i f f e r e n c e  and Income P o s s i b i l i t y  
C urves to  E x p la in  C hannel B eh av io r
Adams, op. c i t . , p .  27 .
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Suppose F ig u re  2 .4 a  r e p r e s e n t s  an  in d iv id u a l  r e t a i l e r ' s  
in d i f f e r e n c e  and incom e c u rv e s  f o r  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  w h o le s a le r  
c o n t r o l  o f  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g .  1^ r e p r e s e n t s  th e  m a rg in a l r a t e  a t  
w hich th e  r e t a i l e r  would exchange freedom  f o r  incom e. NP r e p r e s e n t s  
th e  incom e t h a t  th e  r e t a i l e r  would a c t u a l l y  r e c e iv e  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  
o f  w h o le s a le r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e t a i l e r  p r i c e s .  C om plete freedom  to  
p r i c e  h i s  m e rc h an d ise  would be  optimum f o r  t h i s  r e t a i l e r .  He co u ld  
n o t  a c h ie v e  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  by r e l i n q u i s h in g  freedom .
I f ,  how ever, F ig u re  2 .4 b  r e p r e s e n t s  a  r e t a i l e r ' s  s i t u a t i o n ,  
th e n  h e  would r e l i n q u i s h  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  to  th e  w h o le s a le r .  At p o in t  
th e  m a rg in a l r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  betw een  freedom  and income 
would be e q u a l to  th e  m a rg in a l r e t u r n  e x p e c te d  by th e  r e t a i l e r .
P o in t  P2 would r e p r e s e n t  an  e q u i l ib r iu m  p o in t  f o r  th e  r e t a i l e r .  "The 
e q u i l ib r iu m  p o in t  w here th e  m a rg in a l r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  freedom  
f o r  incom e ( o r  some o th e r  v a lu e )  e q u a ls  th e  r a t e  o f  g a in  o f  income
( o r  some o th e r  v a lu e )  d e s c r ib e s  th e  l i m i t s  o f  a r e t a i l e r ' s  c o o p e r-
,,53 a t i o n . "
The u se  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  a n a l y s i s  t o  d e p i c t  in d e p e n d e n t 
b u s in e s s m e n 's  b e h a v io r  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o o r d in a t io n  o f  
ch a n n e l a c t i v i t i e s  a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l ,  in d iv id u a l  f irm  
p e rfo rm a n c e  g o a ls  and r e t a i l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  r e l i n q u i s h in g  freedom  
a r e  i n t e r r e l a t e d .  Adams' s tu d y  r e s u l t s  te n d e d  to  c o n firm  h i s  con­
c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s .  However, Adams' m ethodo logy  d id  n o t e n a b le  him to
53I b i d . ,  p . 28 .
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54d e p i c t  th e  in d i f f e r e n c e  and incom e c u rv e s  in  h i s  m odel.
In  1973, L o u is  P . B u c k lin  p ro p o sed  a  th e o ry  o f  ch a n n e l 
c o n t r o l . T h a t th e o ry  was b ased  upon a  m odel w hich i s  c o n c e p tu a l ly  
s im i l a r  to  Adams' m odel, b u t  i t  le n d s  i t s e l f  b e t t e r  to  e m p ir ic a l  
e x a m in a tio n .
B u c k lin * s  1973 T heory o f  C hannel C o n tro l
In  1968, B u c k lin  p ro p o sed  a  t e n t a t i v e  th e o ry  o f  c h an n e l 
c o n t r o l  w hich c o n s is te d  o f  a  l i s t  o f  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s . ^  In  an 
a p p a re n t  e f f o r t  to  o f f e r  a  more co m p le te  th e o r y ,  B u c k lin  p ro p o sed  a 
new th e o ry  o f  c h an n e l c o n t r o l  in  1973 w hich i s  b ased  upon an i n t e r -  
o r g a n iz a t io n a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  B a r n a r d 's  c o n c e p t o f  a u t h o r i t y . ^
T hat th e o ry  i s  rev ie w e d  below  and s e v e r a l  p e r c e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  
a r e  c i t e d .
A B r ie f  Review o f  th e  T h eo ry . A cco rd in g  to  B a rn a rd , o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  i c  d e p e n d e n t upon member w i l l in g n e s s  t o  c o m p ly .^  
B u c k l in 's  c o n t r o l  th e o ry  e x te n d s  B a r n a r d 's  c o n c e p t o f  a u t h o r i t y  to  
i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n  m anagem ent. T h a t th e o ry  i s  r e p r e s e n te d  in  F ig u re  
2 .5 .  The v e r t i c a l  a x i s  d e p i c t s  p r o f i t s  o b ta in e d  by a  m iddlem an from
54Adams, "The A ccep tan ce  and Use o f  S p e c ia l  S e r v ic e s  by 
S e le c te d  S u p erm ark e t Owner-M anagers in  M ic h ig a n ."
5\ , o u i s  P . B u c k l in ,  "The Locus o f  C hannel C o n t r o l ,"  in  
R o b e rt L . K ing ( e d . ) ,  M ark e tin g  and th e  New S c ie n c e  o f  P la n n in g  
(C h ic ag o i A m erican M ark e tin g  A s s o c ia t io n ,  19<>8), p p . 14 2 -1 4 7 .
" ^ B u c k lin , "A T heory o f  C hannel C o n t r o l ."
"^ B a rn a rd , The F u n c tio n s  o f  th e  E x e c u tiv e , p p . 1 7 3 -1 7 4 .
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d o in g  b u s in e s s  w ith  a s u p p l i e r .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  d e p i c t s  a
ra n g e  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  C o n tro l in  t h i s  m odel r e f e r s  to  th e
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F ig u re  2 .5
58L o u is  P . B u c k l in 's  Model o f  C hannel C o n tro l
The model d e p i c t s  two c o n s t r u c t s !  t o l e r a n c e  and p a y o f f .
The to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  d e p i c t s  th e  m id d lem an 's  f e e l i n g  o f  b u rd en  and 
s a c r i f i c e  in c u r r e d  from  a c c e d in g  to  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The p o s i t i v e  
s lo p e  o f  th e  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  r e f l e c t s  th e  m id d lem an 's  demand f o r  
h ig h e r  p r o f i t s  a t  s u c c e s s iv e ly  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  m a n u fa c tu re r  c o n t r o l .
58B u ck lin ,  op. c i t . , p .  42 .
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The m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  d e f in e s  th e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  th e  
m iddlem an th in k s  he  w i l l  r e c e iv e  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .  The p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  in  F ig u re  2 .5  i s  shown to  in c r e a s e  
w ith in  a  ra n g e  o f  low  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and to  d e c l in e  a t  s u c c e s s iv e ly  
h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  T h is  sh ap e  r e f l e c t s  th e  m id d le ­
m an 's  b e l i e f  t h a t  h i s  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  by fo llo w in g  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  up to  a l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  in d i c a te d  by p o in t  P . At p ro ­
g r e s s iv e ly  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  c o n t r o l  above P , th e  m iddlem an b e l ie v e s  
t h a t  h i s  p r o f i t s  become s m a l le r  and s m a l le r .  W ith in  t h i s  ra n g e  o f  a 
d e c l in in g  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n ,  a u t h o r i t y  (up  to  A) and c o e rc io n  (up  to  
C) become th e  means to  a c h ie v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
The i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  d e f in e s  
th e  maximum l i m i t s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  In  F ig u re  2 .5 ,  th e  p a y o f f  and 
to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  i n t e r s e c t  a t  p o in t  A. H owever, th e  s u p p l i e r  may 
a p p ly  c o e rc io n  to  a c h ie v e  a l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  h ig h e r  th a n  A, such  a s  C.
The model o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  p ro p o sed  by B u c k lin  
r e p r e s e n t s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  d e v e lo p in g  body o f  mar­
k e t in g  th o u g h t .  A c r i t i c a l  re v ie w  o f  th e  m odel y i e l d s ,  how ever, some 
im p o r ta n t l i m i t a t i o n s  w hich in d i c a t e  th e  need  f o r  r e v i s i n g  B u c k l in 's  
m odel o f  c h an n e l c o n t r o l .
A C r i t i c a l  A n a ly s is  o f  th e  T h eo ry . A c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  
B u c k l in 's  p ro p o sed  th e o ry  and h i s  c o n c e p tu a l model i d e n t i f i e s  s e v e r a l  
l i m i t a t i o n s .  T hese l i m i t a t i o n s  a r e  s p e c i f i e d  below .
1 . B a r n a r d 's  th e o r y . B u c k l in 's  th e o ry  i s  based  upon an 
e x te n s io n  o f  B a rn a rd 's  th e o ry  o f  a u t h o r i t y .  I t  h a s  been  r e p e a te d ly  
r e c o g n iz e d ,  how ever, t h a t  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  management th e o ry  may
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n o t  a p p ly  to  i n t e r o r g a n l z a t i o n a l  phenom ena. B a r n a r d 's  th e o ry  o f  
a u t h o r i t y  was d e v e lo p e d  in  an  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  management c o n te x t .  
A u th o r i ty  in  an  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c o n te x t  i s  g e n e r a l ly  u n id i r e c ­
t i o n a l .  I t  f lo w s  from  u p p e r management to  lo w er management l e v e l s .  
Lower management can  a c c e p t  o r  r e s i s t  a u t h o r i t y .
In  i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m anagem ent, how ever, a t te m p ts  to
e x e r t  pow er and a u t h o r i t y  a r e  d y a d ic . C hannel power h a s  been  d e f in e d
and m easured  in  te rm s o f  a m u tual r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een e n t i t i e s .  The
ch a n n e l r e s e a r c h e r s  who have i n v e s t i g a t e d  power in  d i s t r i b u t i o n
c h a n n e ls  have c o n ce iv ed  ch a n n e l member pow er to  be in v e r s e ly  r e l a t e d
59to  ch an n e l member d ep en d e n ce . Any m odel t h a t  p u r p o r ts  to  d e p ic t  
th e  n a tu r e  o f  c h an n e l c o n t r o l  m ust r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  e f f o r t  to  e x e r t  
power to  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l  i s  a m u tu a l o r  d y a d ic  p r o c e s s .  The u n id i r e c ­
t i o n a l  d e p ic t io n  o f  c o n t r o l  a lo n g  th e  h o r iz o n t a l  a x i s  in  F ig u re  2 .3  
s e v e r e ly  r e s t r i c t s  th e  m o d e l 's  a b i l i t y  to  e x p la in  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l .
2 . S u p p l ie r  d o m in a tio n . B u c k lin  seem s to  assum e s u p p l i e r  
d o m in a tio n  o f  m iddlem an m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y .  The th e o ry  o f  c o n t ro l  
b ased  upon th e  model o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s  d e s ig n e d  to  " . . . s h i f t  th e  m id d lem an 's  w i l l in g n e s s  to  
comply to  th e  p o in t  w here th e  m a n u f a c tu r e r 's  m a rk e tin g  program  can 
be im p le m e n te d ."60 The re v ie w  o f  m a rk e tin g  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
how ever, d e m o n s tra te d  t h a t  th e  ch a n n e l f i rm  o r  l e v e l  w hich sh o u ld
59
E l-A n sa ry , o p . c i t .  
6° B u c k lin ,  o p . c i t . , p .  46 .
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c o n t r o l  may be m a n u fa c tu r e r s , w h o le s a le r s  o r  r e t a i l e r s .
3 . T o ta l  c o n t r o l . Nowhere d o es  B u c k l in 's  th e o ry  r e c o g n iz e
t h a t  c o n t r o l  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  i s s u e  s p e c i f i c .  S te m  re c o g n iz e d  t h a t
th e  e x te n t  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by a c h a n n e l member may v a ry  a c r o s s
d i f f e r e n t  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
F or exam ple, th e  s e l l e r  may e s t a b l i s h  th e  p r i c e  d is c o u n t  
s c h e d u le  f o r  v a r io u s  q u a n t i t i e s ,  b u t  th e  b u y er s t i l l  
d e te rm in e s  ( w i th in  th e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  th e  s e l l e r ' s  p o l i c y )  
th e  q u a n t i ty  a c t u a l l y  p u rc h a s e d , w hich may o r  may n o t  be 
th e  m ost p r o f i t a b l e  from  th e  s ta n d p o in t  o f  th e  s e l l e r .
A lso , m e th o d o lo g ic a l p rob lem s a r e  s im p l i f i e d  i f  one d e a l s  w ith  c o n t r o l
on an i s s u e  by i s s u e  b a s i s .
4 . F u n c tio n  sh ap es  and i n t e r s e c t i o n s . B u c k lin  h y p o th e s iz e s  
p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  w hich a r e  c u r v i l i n e a r .  T h ere  i s  
good re a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  d e p ic te d  in  F ig u re  
2 .3  may be p o s i t i v e l y  s lo p e d  th ro u g h o u t a  b ro a d e r  ra n g e  o f  c o n t r o l  
th a n  i n d i c a t e d .  A r e t a i l e r ,  f o r  in s t a n c e ,  would e x h i b i t  a  p o s i t i v e l y  
s lo p e d  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  th ro u g h o u t i f  he  p e rc e iv e d  th e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
in c re a s e d  c h an n e l c o o r d in a t io n  and th e  c o n se q u e n t in c r e a s e  in  e f f e c ­
t i v e n e s s  t h a t  m ig h t r e s u l t  from  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  some p o l ic y  ( e . g . ,  
r e s a l e  p r i c i n g ) .
A lso , th e  model assum es t h a t  th e  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  and 
p a y o f f  f u n c t io n s  i n t e r s e c t .  The i n t e r s e c t i o n  d e f in e s  th e  l i m i t s  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  However, th e r e  i s  no more re a s o n  to  assum e t h a t  
th e  f u n c t io n s  i n t e r s e c t  th a n  th e r e  i s  t o  assum e t h a t  th e  m iddlem an 
p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  l i e s  above th e  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f
S te r n , op . c i t . ,  p . 656 .
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s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
5 . Power lo c u s  t h e s i s . F i n a l l y ,  B u c k lin  assum es t h a t  a 
pow er lo c u s  and a c h an n e l l e a d e r  e x i s t  and t h a t  c h an n e l c o o r d in a t io n  
can  be a c h ie v e d  o n ly  th ro u g h  c o n t r o l .  P re v io u s  r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s ts ,  
how ever, t h a t  when power i s  d i s p e r s e d ,  a lo c u s  o f  pow er d o es  n o t 
e x i s t  and c h an n e l c o o r d in a t io n  h a s  t o  be a c h ie v e d  v i a  av en u es  o th e r  
th a n  c o n t r o l . ^
D e s p ite  th e  a p p a re n t  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  B u c k l in 's  m odel and th e o ry  
o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  i s  a v a lu a b le  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  th e  grow ing  body 
o f  m a rk e tin g  th o u g h t .  In  f a c t ,  th e  th e o ry  and m odel i s  ex ten d ed  
in  C h a p te r  3 to  y i e l d  a  r e v i s e d  th e o ry  w hich i s  o f f e r e d  a s  a  more 
co m p le te  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l .
In  th e  second  c h a p te r ,  some o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  in  m a rk e tin g  
and o th e r  r e l a t e d  d i s c i p l i n e s  t h a t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  f o r  t h i s  
s tu d y  was re v ie w e d . I n i t i a l l y ,  a  s im p l i f i e d  m odel o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s  
betw een pow er, c o n t r o l ,  p e rfo rm a n c e , s a t i s f a c t i o n  and to l e r a n c e  f o r  
c o n t r o l  in  a  d y a d ic  c h a n n e l g roup  was p r e s e n te d .  The model s e rv e d  
a s  a  g u id e  f o r  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  re v ie w  w hich fo llo w e d .
The re v ie w  o f  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l in g  w ith  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
betw een  pow er and c o n t r o l  in c lu d e d  a d i s c u s s io n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
m e th o d o lo g ie s  f o r  m e asu rin g  c o n t r o l  and th e  u s e  o f  c o n t r o l  g ra p h s  
by o r g a n iz a t io n  r e s e a r c h e r s  to  d e p i c t  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  m e a su re s . S p e c ia l
62 E l-A n sa ry  and S te r n ,  "Power M easurem ent in  th e  D i s t r i b u t i o n
C h an n e l. "
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a t t e n t i o n  was a l s o  d e v o te d  to  a l t e r n a t i v e  m e th o d o lo g ie s  f o r  m e asu rin g  
pow er. Power m easurem ent r e s e a r c h  by E l-A n s a ry ; W ilk in so n  and Hunt 
and N evin was h ig h l ig h te d .
O rg a n iz a tio n  th e o ry ,  m a rk e t s t r u c t u r e  th e o ry  and m a rk e tin g  
r e s e a r c h  f in d in g s  p ro v id e  a w e a lth  o f  d a ta  c o n c e rn in g  th e  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip  betw een c o n t r o l  and p e rfo rm a n c e . O rg a n iz a tio n  t h e o r i s t s  have 
exam ined th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and 
th e  am ount, d i s t r i b u t i o n  and c o n co rd a n ce  ( o r  a g re e m e n t)  o f  c o n t ro l  
p e rc e iv e d  to  be e x e r c is e d  by v a r io u s  e c h e lo n s  in  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  
h ie r a r c h y .
M arket s t r u c t u r e  th e o ry  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e  d e te rm in e s
c o n d u c t, e . g . ,  th e  a b i l i t y  t o  in f lu e n c e ,  and t h a t  co n d u c t d e te rm in e s
m ark e t p e rfo rm a n c e . T hus, m a rk e t s t r u c tu re - c o n d u c t- p e r f o r m a n c e
th e o ry  e x p la in s  th e  c o n t ro l -p e r fo rm a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  d e p ic te d  in  th e
63d y a d ic  model shown in  F ig u re  2 .1 .  M a rk e tin g  s tu d i e s  by S l a t e r  and 
P re s to n  in d i c a t e  th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  c o n t ro l -p e r fo rm a n c e  r e l a ­
t i o n s h ip  in  m a rk e tin g  ch a n n e l s y s te m s .
R esea rc h  by o r g a n iz a t io n  t h e o r i s t s  g e n e r a l ly  s u p p o r ts  th e  
v iew  t h a t  in d iv id u a l s  p r e f e r  m ore to  l e s s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  f a c t o r s  which 
a f f e c t  t h e i r  l i v e s .  The p o w e r - e q u a l iz a t io n  o r  p a r t i c i p a t i v e  manage­
ment t h e o r i e s  a r e  based  upon th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  c o n t r o l  and 
in d iv id u a l  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  H owever, s a t i s f a c t i o n  was shown to  be 
p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d ,  n o t o n ly  t o  th e  r e l a t i v e  amount o f  c o n t r o l  
a c h ie v e d  by v a r io u s  e c h e lo n s  o f  an  o r g a n iz a t i o n a l  h ie r a r c h y ,  b u t a l s o
^ S u p r a ,  p. 32.
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to  th e  t o t a l  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h o u t th e  o r g a n iz a t io n .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  p e rfo rm a n ce  and s a t i s f a c t i o n  was 
shown to  be one o f  m u tu a l i n t e r a c t i o n  in  F ig u re  2 .1 .  S tu d ie s  a r e  
in c o n c lu s iv e  w ith  re g a rd  to  d e te rm in in g  th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c a u s a t io n  
betw een s a t i s f a c t i o n  and p e rfo rm a n c e . R esea rc h  by P ic k le  and 
R u n g e lin g  d id  d e m o n s tra te  t h a t  th e r e  i s  a s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  and o r g a n iz a t io n a l  p e rfo rm a n c e  a s  r e p o r te d  by key 
e x e c u t iv e s  o f  b u s in e s s  o r g a n iz a t i o n s .
A c h an n e l m em ber's to l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by a n o th e r  ch a n n e l 
member on a d i f f e r e n t  c h an n e l l e v e l  was shown to  be p o s i t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  to  th e  f o r m e r 's  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  d y a d ic  c h a n n e l r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p .  A s tu d y  o f  a t t i t u d e s  o f  r e t a i l e r s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  w ho le­
s a l e r  sp o n so re d  v o lu n ta r y  r e t a i l  c o o p e r a t iv e s  le d  K e n d a ll Adams to  
co n c lu d e  t h a t  r e t a i l e r s  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  r e l i n q u i s h  p e r s o n a l  c o n t r o l  
o v e r m a rk e tin g  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  th e  e x te n t  t h a t  th e y  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  
th e  w h o le s a le r 's  p e rfo rm a n ce  o f  th e  a c t i v i t i e s .
The f i n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  d e p ic te d  in  F ig u re  2 .1  was betw een 
a  f i r m 's  to l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  and th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by 
a n o th e r  f i rm .  The a c t u a l  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  a c h ie v e d  by F irm  A o v e r 
F irm  B i s  d e te rm in e d  by t ( 1 . )  F irm  A 's  d e s i r e  to  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l ;  
( 2 . )  F irm  A 's  power o r  a b i l i t y  t o  a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l ;  and ( 3 . )  F irm  B 's  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by F irm  A.
The second c h a p te r  co n c lu d ed  w ith  a  b r i e f  re v ie w  o f  two 
s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  th e o ry .  K e n d a ll A.
Adams a p p l ie d  th e  econom ic t h e o r i s t s '  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c u rv e  a n a l y s i s  
to  g r a p h ic a l ly  d e p i c t  r e t a i l e r  m a rg in a l e v a lu a t io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t
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c o m b in a tio n s  o f  income and freed o m . The ta n g en cy  o f  an  incom e- 
freedom  in d i f f e r e n c e  cu rv e  w ith  an incom e p o s s i b i l i t y  l i n e  d e f in e s  
th e  optimum o r  e q u i l ib r iu m  l e v e l  o f  freedom  f o r  a  r e t a i l e r .
In  a s e p a r a t e  e f f o r t ,  L o u is  P . B u c k lin  p ro p o sed  th e  u se  o f  
t o l e r a n c e  and p a y o f f  c u rv e s  to  d e v e lo p  a  model o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l .  
The re v ie w  o f  B u c k l in 's  e f f o r t  i d e n t i f i e d  s e v e r a l  l i m i t a t i o n s .  The 
m a jo r l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  m odel a r e i
1 . )  i t  d e p i c t s  c o n t r o l  to  be a  u n i l a t e r a l  p r o c e s s ;
2 . )  th e  model seems to  assum e s u p p l i e r  d o m in a tio n ;
3 . )  th e  model d e a l s  o n ly  w ith  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  by one f irm
o v e r  a n o th e r  f i rm .
The p e rc e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  B u c k l in 's  m odel i n d i c a t e  th e  need to  
m od ify  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  fram ew ork and to  t e s t  t h a t  m o d i f ic a t io n  w ith  
e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h .  A r e v i s e d  model o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  w hich o v e r ­
comes th e  w eaknesses o f  B u c k l in 's  model i s  p r e s e n te d  in  C h ap te r  3 .
Chapter 3
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CONTROL
A c o n c e p tu a l m odel o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  i s  p r e s e n te d  in  t h i s  
c h a p te r .  I t  p ro v id e s  a more co m p le te  c o n c e p tu a l iz a t io n  o f  th e  
n a tu r e  o f  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  betw een  in d e p e n d e n t e n t e r p r i s e s  
engaged in  an  e n t e r p r i s e  c h a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p . ^  The c o n c e p tu a l 
model i s  an  e x te n s io n  o f  B u c k l in 's  model w hich was c r i t i c a l l y  r e ­
view ed in  th e  second  c h a p te r .  I t  in c o r p o r a te s  s e v e r a l  s i g n i f i c a n t  
f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  v a r io u s  c o n c e p tio n s  o f  c o n t r o l  t h a t  w ere p r e s e n te d  
in  th e  second  c h a p te r .  The m odel o f  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  r e l a t e s  m id d le ­
man and s u p p l i e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l .  I t  a l s o  d e p i c t s  m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f o r  
v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f .
An U n d e rly in g  A ssum ption i A Dilemma
The fo llo w in g  q u o ta t io n  e lo q u e n t ly  s t a t e s  a  dilem m a which
fa c e s  m ost d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l members.
He a r e  f o r e v e r  o s c i l l a t i n g  betw een  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  w hich 
seem m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e  — on th e  one h an d , c o l l e c t i v e
* E a r ly  v e r s io n s  o f  t h i s  m odel a p p e a r  in  A del I .  E l-A n sa ry  
and R o b ert A. R o b ich eau x , "A T heory  o f  C hannel C o n tro l i  R e v i s i t e d , "  
and R o b e rt A. R ob icheaux  and Law rence M. R ic h a rd , "A P arad igm  o f  
Channel System  R e l a t i o n s h i p s , "  a  p a p e r  p r e s e n te d  a t  th e  S o u th e rn  
M ark e tin g  A s s o c ia t io n  a n n u a l m e e tin g , November 9 , 1973 , H ouston , 
T ex a s .
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A c o o rd in a te d  team  e f f o r t  among o r g a n iz a t io n s  on v a r io u s  
c h an n e l l e v e l s  im p lie s  c h a n n e l management o r  c h a n n e l l e a d e r s h ip .  
However, t h e r e  i s  w id e sp re a d  d is a g re e m e n t among s c h o la r s  and p r a c ­
t i t i o n e r s  a s  to  who sh o u ld  le a d  th e  c h an n e l by e x e r c i s in g  a u t h o r i t y  
a n d /o r  p o w er.^  The d is a g re e m e n t i s  ro o te d  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  ch an n e l 
l e a d e r s h ip  in v o lv e s  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l .
T h is ,  th e n ,  i s  th e  dilem m a w hich o r g a n iz a t io n s  in  a d i s t r i ­
b u tio n  c h an n e l f a c e .  Member o r g a n iz a t io n s  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e  t o t a l  
p r o f i t s  ( o r  p a y o f f )  f o r  a l l  may be g r e a t e r  i f  th e  in d iv id u a l  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s  s u b je c t  th e m se lv e s  t o  in c re a s e d  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  by some 
o th e r  o r g a n iz a t io n  in  th e  c h a n n e l .  T h is  would c o n t r i b u te  to  th e  
ach iev em en t o f  one o f  th e  fu n d am e n ta l o b j e c t iv e s  o f  a  b u s in e s s  e n t e r ­
p r i s e ;  i . e .  v i a b i l i t y  th ro u g h  econom ic p r o f i t s .  Member o r g a n iz a t io n s  
have a n o th e r  o b j e c t i v e ,  how ever. T hat i s ,  th e y  p r e f e r  to  e x e r c is e  
more r a t h e r  th a n  l e s s  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e i r  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  
v a r i a b l e s .  Any m odel o f  c o n t r o l  in  ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n s  m ust d e p ic t  
th e s e  two c o n f l i c t i n g  o b je c t iv e s  o f  ch a n n e l m em bers. T h is  dilem m a 
s e rv e s  a s  an  u n d e r ly in g  a ssu m p tio n  f o r  th e  c o n c e p tu a l m odel w hich 
fo l lo w s .
The B a s ic  R e la t io n s h ip s  o f  a  C hannel C o n tro l Model
A c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  in  th e  second  c h a p te r  o f  B u c k l in 's  
p ro p o sed  model o f  c o n t r o l  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  r e s u l t e d  in  
s e v e r a l  c o n c lu s io n s .  The fo l lo w in g  th r e e  c o n c lu s io n s  a r e  c r u c i a l  to
^See f o r  exam ple R o b e rt W. L i t t l e ,  "The M ark e tin g  C hannels 
Who Should  Lead T h is  E x tra -C o rp o ra te  O rg a n iz a tio n ? "  and M a lle n ,
I b i d . ,  p p . 24-32  and 51.
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e f f i c i e n c y  won a t  th e  p r i c e  o f  in d iv id u a l  freed o m j on th e  
o th e r ,  in d iv id u a l  freedom  e q u a l ly  f r u s t r a t e d  by c o l l e c t i v e  
a n a rc h y . Those who b e l i e v e  i n  a  m id d le  way w hich i s  more 
th a n  a  com prom ise do so  in  th e  f a i t h  t h a t  human b e in g s  a r e  
c a p a b le  o r  can  become c a p a b le  o f  s o c i a l  o r g a n iz a t io n  w hich 
i s  b o th  i n d i v id u a l ly  s a t i s f y i n g  and c o l l e c t i v e l y  e f f e c t i v e ;  
and th e y  have  p le n ty  o f  e v id e n c e  f o r  t h e i r  f a i t h .  On th e  
o th e r  h an d , o u r know ledge o f  th e  law s in v o lv e d  i s  s t i l l  
ru d im e n ta ry .
T here  i s  an  ab u n d an t am ount o f  s o c i a l  s c ie n c e  l i t e r a t u r e
t h a t  s u p p o r ts  th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  o r g a n iz a t io n  members d e s i r e  more
3
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  r a t h e r  th a n  l e s s  c o n t r o l .  T h ere  seems to  be 
l i t t l e  d a n g e r  in  a p p ly in g  th e s e  i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f in d in g s  to  a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l sy stem  co m p rised  o f  in te rd e p e n d e n t  e n t e r p r i s e s .  
The c o n c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  o r g a n iz a t io n s  in  c h a n n e l sy stem s  p r e f e r  more 
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e s .
I n c r e a s in g ly ,  how ever, m a rk e tin g  t h e o r i s t s  and b u s in e s s
m anagers a r e  r e c o g n iz in g  th e  econom ic a d v a n ta g e s  o f  c o o p e ra t io n
among o r g a n iz a t io n s  on d i f f e r e n t  c h a n n e l l e v e l s .  In  sum, ch a n n e l
members a r e  r e c o g n iz in g  t h a t  " a  team  e f f o r t  to  m a rk e t a  p ro d u c e r* s
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p ro d u c t w i l l  p ro b a b ly  h e lp  a l l  in v o lv e d .”
2
G e o ffre y  V ic k e r s ,  " C o n tro l ,  S t a b i l i t y  and C h o ic e ,"  in  
Ludwig Von B e r t a l a n f f y  and A n a to l R ap o p o rt ( e d s . ) ,  G e n e ra l System s 
Y earbook o f  th e  S o c ie ty  f o r  G e n e ra l System s R e s e a rc h , V o l. I I  (Ann 
A rb o ri S o c ie ty  f o r  G e n e ra l S ystem s R e se a rc h , 1 9 5 7 ) , p .  3 .
3
See f o r  exam ple D a n ie l K a tz , " S a t i s f a c t i o n s  and D e p r iv a t io n s  
in  I n d u s t r i a l  L i f e , "  in  A. K o m h a u se r , R . Dub in  and A. Ross ( e d s . ) ,  
I n d u s t r i a l  C o n f l i c t , (New Y ork i M cG raw -H ill, 1 9 5 4 ) , p p . 8 6 -1 0 6 ;
L . W. P o r t e r ,  " Jo b  A t t i tu d e s  in  Managements I .  P e rc e iv e d  D e f i­
c i e n c ie s  in  Need F u l f i l lm e n t  a s  a F u n c tio n  o f  Jo b  L e v e l ,"  J o u rn a l  o f  
A p p lied  P sy c h o lo g y , V o l. 4 6 , No. 6 (1 9 6 2 ) , p p . 3 7 5 -3 8 4 ; C. G. Sm ith  
and A. Tannenbaum, " O rg a n iz a t io n  C o n tro l S t r u c tu r e s  A C om para tive  
A n a ly s i s ,"  Human R e l a t i o n s , V o l. 1 6 , No. 4 (1 9 6 3 ) ,  p p . 299 -3 1 6 .
4
B ruce  M a lle n , "A T heory  o f  R e t a i l e r - S u p p l i e r  C o n f l i c t ,  
C o n tro l and C o o p e ra t io n ,"  p .  2 7 .
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th e  model o f  c o n t r o l  p r e s e n te d  below .
1 . C o n tro l in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  i s  m ore a p p r o p r ia t e l y  
v iew ed a s  a m u tual r a t h e r  th a n  a  u n i l a t e r a l  p r o c e s s .
2 .  T here  i s  no j u s t i f i a b l e  re a s o n  to  assum e t h a t  s u p p l i e r  
d o m in a tio n  i s  a p p r o p r ia te  in  a l l  ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
3 . Power and c o n t ro l  a r e  i s s u e  s p e c i f i c .
The model o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l  p r e s e n te d  below  in c o r p o r a te s  th e  
fo l lo w in g  th r e e  f e a t u r e s .
1 .  C o n tro l in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  i s  b e s t  d e p ic te d  a s  a  m u tual 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The t o t a l  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  i s  v a r i a b l e .
2 . G re a te r  sy stem  p r o f i t s  may be a c h ie v e d  i f  m iddlem en h ave  more 
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e s  th a n  su p ­
p l i e r s .
3 . C o n tro l in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  i s  i s s u e  s p e c i f i c .  A sup ­
p l i e r  may p o s s e s s  more r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  th a n  a  m iddlem an o v e r  
th e  le n g th  o f  o rd e r  c y c le  v a r i a b l e  w h ile  th e  m iddlem an 
p o s s e s s e s  more r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e t a i l  s h e l f  sp a c e  
a l l o c a t i o n  v a r i a b l e .
These f e a t u r e s  a r e  in c o rp o ra te d  below  in  th e  form  o f  fo u r  f u n c t io n a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p s !  a  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n ,  a  m iddlem an p a y o f f
f u n c t io n ,  a  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  and a s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n .
M iddleman T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n . A m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  fu n c ­
t i o n  i s  d e p ic te d  in  F ig u re  3 .1 .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  r e p r e s e n t s  a 
ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  p o s s e s s e d  by a  s i n g l e  m iddlem an and a 
s in g l e  s u p p l i e r  o v e r a  s p e c i f i c  m a rk e tin g  i s s u e  o r  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  
( i . e .  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  o r  m edia s e l e c t i o n  f o r  m iddlem an a d v e r t i s i n g ) .
The l i m i t s  o f  th e  h o r iz o n ta l  a x i s  a r e  co m p le te  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  
and co m p le te  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The ra n g e  betw een th e  l i m i t s  r e p r e ­
s e n ts  a l l  th e  c o m b in a tio n s  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r  









F ig u re  3 .1
Middleman T oleran ce Function
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p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  o r  p r o f i t s  from  en g ag in g  in  an  e n t e r p r i s e  
ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p .
The m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) shown in  F ig u re  3 .1m
r e p r e s e n t s  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  
r e l e v a n t  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  m iddlem an a t  each  
l e v e l  o f  p e rc e iv e d  m iddlem an p a y o f f .  P e rc e iv e d  p a y o f f  i s  th e  in d e p en ­
d e n t  v a r i a b l e  and th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  a t  each  
l e v e l  o f  p e rc e iv e d  p a y o f f  i s  th e  d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e .  A t a  p e rc e iv e d  
l e v e l  o f  p a y o f f  e q u a l to  P ^ , th e  m iddlem an would t o l e r a t e  a  maximum 
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  e q u iv a le n t  t o  C^. I f  th e  p e r ­
c e iv e d  p a y o f f  w ere in c re a s e d  to  ? 2 » how ever, t h i s  m iddlem an would 
t o l e r a t e  a  much h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ,  C2 »
The m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) in  F ig u re  3 .1  i sm
p o s i t i v e l y  s lo p e d  to  th e  l e f t  o f  C^« Up to  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l ,  th e  m iddlem an t o l e r a t e s  in c re a s e d  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  th e  i s s u e  a s  h i s  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  in c r e a s e .  H owever, a t  
th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  d e f in e d  a s  C j, th e  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  
f u n c t io n  becomes v e r t i c a l .  A c c o rd in g ly , i s  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t h a t  t h i s  m iddlem an w i l l  t o l e r a t e .  No m a t te r  w hat 
a d d i t i o n a l  p a y o f f  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a r e  p e rc e iv e d  by th e  m iddlem an, he 
w i l l  n o t  t o l e r a t e  a  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e l e v a n t  i s s u e  
h ig h e r  th a n  C^.
M iddleman P a y o ff  F u n c t io n . The m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (Pm) 
in  F ig u re  3 .2  i s  p la c e d  upon two ax e s  w hich a r e  i d e n t i c a l  to  th o s e  







F ig u re  3 .2
Middleman P ayoff F unction
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t i o n s  o f  h i s  p a y o f f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -su p p lie r  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  s i n g l e  m a rk e tin g  is su e *
The f u n c t io n  shown in  F ig u re  3 .2  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  m id d le ­
man b e l ie v e s  t h a t  h i s  p a y o f f  would in c r e a s e  w ith  a d d i t i o n a l  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  i s s u e  up to  C^. T h is  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  arg u m en ts  t h a t  in c re a s e d  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  would 
r e s u l t  in  in c re a s e d  c o o r d in a t io n ,  e f f i c i e n c y  and m iddlem an p r o f i t s .  
Beyond C^, how ever, t h i s  m iddlem an b e l ie v e s  t h a t  h i s  p a y o f f  would 
d e c re a s e  a t  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  T h is  f e a t u r e  
i s  p ro b a b le  in  c a s e s  in  w hich l o c a l  m a rk e t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  th e  m iddlem an e x h i b i t  a r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e l e v a n t  i s s u e .
When p la c e d  on th e  same a x e s  in  F ig u re  3 .3 ,  th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n
o f  th e  m iddlem an p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  s p e c i f i e s  th e  u p p er
l i m i t  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t h a t  t h i s  m iddlem an w i l l  a c c e p t
g iv e n  th e s e  f u n c t io n s .  The two f u n c t io n s  i n t e r s e c t  in  F ig u re  3 .3
a t  a  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  e q u a l t o  At l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  h ig h e r  th a n  C ^ t  t h i s  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n
(P  ) l i e s  below  h i s  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) .  He w i l l  n o t  a c c e p t m m
any l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  g r e a t e r  th a n  C I t  was 
n o te d  e a r l i e r  t h a t  th e  v e r t i c a l  p o r t i o n  o f  th e  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  
f u n c t io n  d e f in e s  th e  a b s o lu te  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t ro l  t h a t  t h i s  m iddlem an would t o l e r a t e .  The i n t e r s e c t i o n  in  
F ig u re  3 .3  o c c u rs  a t  a  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  l e s s  th a n  
C^. T hus, th e  maximum r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t ro l  t o l e r a t e d  by t h i s  
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a lo n e .  A cco rd in g  to  th e s e  f u n c t i o n s ,  t h i s  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  i s
m axim ized a t  a l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  o f  C^.
I t  m ust be n o te d  t h a t  th e  two f u n c t io n s  (T and P ) needm m
n e v e r  i n t e r s e c t .  The m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (Pm) may l i e  com­
p l e t e l y  above o r  below  th e  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  th ro u g h o u t 
th e  e n t i r e  ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  
i s s u e .
I f  th e  m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P  ) l i e s  above th e  ra id d le -m
man to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e rm
th e  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e ,  th e n  an  a c c e p ta b le  p a y o f f  l e v e l  would e x i s t  f o r
th e  m iddlem an a t  each  p o s s i b l e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  On th e  o th e r  h a n d , i f  th e  m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n
(P ) l i e s  below  th e  m iddlem an t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) a t  a l l  l e v e l s  m m
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e ,  th e n  no a c c e p ta b le  
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  e x i s t s .  A t each  p o s s i b le  l e v e l  o f  r e l a ­
t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  th e  m iddlem an would p e r c e iv e  h i s  p a y o f f  t o  be l e s s  
th a n  th e  minimum p a y o f f  a c c e p ta b le  a s  d e f in e d  by h i s  t o l e r a n c e
fu n c t io n  (T ) .m
The m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (Pm) i s  a  t e c h n ic a l  f u n c t io n .
T hat i s ,  i t  d e p i c t s  th e  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  t h a t  t h i s  m iddlem an b e l ie v e s
would a c c ru e  to  him  a t  each  p o s s i b l e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro l  o v e r
a s in g l e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  The m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  fu n c t io n
(T ) ,  on th e  o th e r  h an d , i s  a  b e h a v io ra l  f u n c t io n .  I t  d e p i c t s  th e  m
m id d lem an 's  f e e l i n g  o f  b u rd en  o r  s a c r i f i c e  from  a c c e d in g  to  v a r io u s  
l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  th ro u g h o u t th e  e n t i r e  ra n g e  o f
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r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .
The m iddlem an p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  (P and T )m m
to g e th e r  co m p rise  o n e - h a l f  o f  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  m odel o f  ch a n n e l con­
t r o l .  As was d e m o n s tra te d  e a r l i e r , th e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e s e  two 
f u n c t io n s  d e f in e s  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
t h a t  i s  a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  m iddlem an. The h ig h e s t  p o in t  on th e
m iddlem an f u n c t io n  (P  ) s p e c i f i e s  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro lm
o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  i s  p e rc e iv e d  by th e  
m iddlem an to  y ie ld  th e  h ig h e s t  l e v e l  o f  m iddlem an p a y o f f .  To c o m ­
p l e t e  th e  m odel, how ever, i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  in c o r p o r a te  f u n c t io n s  
t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  th e  s u p p l i e r  s id e  o f  th e  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
S u p p l ie r  T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n . A s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n
(T ) i s  d e p ic te d  in  F ig u re  3 .4  on ax e s  t h a t  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  th o s e  s
in  F ig u re s  3 .1 ,  3 .2 ,  and 3 .3 .  The h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  r e p r e s e n t s  a ra n g e
o f  r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -su p p lie r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a  s i n g l e  m a rk e tin g
s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e .  The v e r t i c a l  a x i s  r e p r e s e n t s  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f
s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f .  The s u p p l i e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) i s  th e  lo c u ss
o f  p o in t s  w hich r e p r e s e n t  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  t h a t  t h i s  s u p p l i e r  would
t o l e r a t e  a t  each  p o s s i b le  l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f .
In  F ig u re  3 .4 ,  th e  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) i s  shown
8
to  be n e g a t iv e ly  s lo p e d  to  th e  r i g h t  o f  C^. T h is  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
th e r e  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  and i n ­
c r e a s in g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  
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s u p p l i e r  would t o l e r a t e  a  v e ry  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an 
c o n t r o l ,  C^, o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  However, a t  a 
lo w er p a y o f f  l e v e l  e q u a l to  ? 2 > th e  s u p p l i e r  would t o l e r a t e  o n ly  a 
v e ry  low  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l ,  C2 » o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  T h is  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  becom es v e r t i c a l  
a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o f  C^. T hus, no m a t te r  
w hat s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  e x i s t  a t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  g r e a t e r  th a n  C^, 
t h i s  s u p p l i e r  would n o t  t o l e r a t e  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  g r e a t e r  
th a n  C^.
S u p p l ie r  P a y o ff  F u n c t io n . F ig u re  3 .5  d e p i c t s  a s u p p l i e r  
p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P g ) a lo n g  two a x e s  w hich a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  th o s e  in  
th e  p re c e d in g  f i g u r e s .  T h is  f u n c t io n  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  lo c u s  o f  p o in t s  
w hich d e f in e  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  each  p o s s ib le  
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -s u p p lie r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  A cco rd in g  t o  th e  f u n c t io n  in  F ig u re  3 .5 ,  t h i s  
s u p p l i e r  f e e l s  t h a t  h e  would e n jo y  a  p a y o f f  e q u iv a le n t  t o  P j a t  a 
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  e q u a l to  C^. H owever, a t  a 
h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  e q u a l to  > th e  s u p p l i e r  
b e l ie v e s  t h a t  h e  would r e c e iv e  a  p a y o f f  e q u a l t o  A t l e v e l s  o f
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  h ig h e r  th a n  C2 » th e  s u p p l i e r  f e e l s  t h a t  
h i s  p a y o f f  would d e c l in e  from  h i s  p e rc e iv e d  maximum p o s s i b l e  p a y o f f  
o f  P2 a t  C2 * The s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P g ) shown in  F ig u re  3 .5  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  s u p p l i e r  f e e l s  t h a t  h i s  p a y o f f  would be m axim ized 
a t  a v e ry  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  
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By p la c in g  th e  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) and th es
s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P ) upon th e  same a x e s ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le
8
to  i d e n t i f y  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o v e r
th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  t h a t  i s  a c c e p ta b le  to  t h i s  s u p p l i e r .
When p la c e d  upon th e  same a x e s ,  i t  becomes a p p a re n t  t h a t  a  p o r t io n
o f  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P ) i s  n o t  a c c e p ta b le  to  t h i ss
s u p p l i e r .  A t a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  to  th e  l e f t  o f
C_ in  F ig u re  3 .6 ,  th e  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P  ) l i e s  below  th e  ^ s
s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) .  A t each  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  co n -s
t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  t o  th e  l e f t  o f  C2 » th e
s u p p l i e r  p e r c e iv e s  h i s  p a y o f f  to  be l e s s  th a n  th e  minimum a c c e p ta b le
p a y o f f  a s  d e f in e d  by h i s  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) .  T hus, a l th o u g hs
th e  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) d e f in e s  th e  a b s o lu te  maximum
8
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  m iddlem an c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by t h i s  s u p p l i e r  a s
CL, t h i s  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P ) makes a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  1 s
c o n t r o l  to  th e  l e f t  o f  C2 u n a c c e p ta b le  t o  t h i s  s u p p l i e r .  In  an 
e f f o r t  t o  m axim ize h i s  p a y o f f ,  t h i s  s u p p l i e r  would seek  to  m a in ta in  
a  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  
e q u iv a le n t  to  C^*
A g ain , i t  i s  a p p r o p r ia te  to  r e c o g n iz e  t h a t  th e  s u p p l i e r  
to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) and th e  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P ) need
S  6
n e v e r  i n t e r s e c t .  The s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P ) may l i e  aboves
o r  below  th e  s u p p l i e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) th ro u g h o u t th e  e n t i r e
8
ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .
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A ls o , th e  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (P  ) i s  d e f in e d  a s  a
8
t e c h n ic a l  f u n c t i o n .  I t  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  t h a t  th e  
s u p p l i e r  f e e l s  would a c c ru e  to  him  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  The s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  
(T _) i s  a  b e h a v io r a l  f u n c t io n .  I t  d e p i c t s  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  f e e l i n g  
o f  b u rd en  o r  s a c r i f i c e  from  a c c e d in g  to  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  th ro u g h o u t th e  e n t i r e  ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .
The s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  r e p r e s e n t  th e  
second  h a l f  o f  th e  co m p le te  c o n c e p tu a l  m odel o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l .  
Combined w ith  th e  m iddlem an p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  upon a 
s in g l e  s e t  o f  a x e s ,  th e  fo u r  f u n c t io n s  d e f in e  th e  a b s o lu te  l i m i t s  
o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  and m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o v e r  a  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  
i s s u e  and th e  ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  w i th in  w hich th e  m iddlem an 
and s u p p l i e r  would b a rg a in  t o  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  p r o f i t  and c o n t r o l  
o b j e c t i v e s .
The C om plete Model o f  C o n tro l i n  an  
E n te r p r i s e  M a rk e tin g  C hannel
When com bined on a  s i n g l e  s e t  o f  a x e s ,  th e  fo u r  f u n c t io n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  d e s c r ib e d  above f o r  a  m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r  and a 
s p e c i f i c  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  co m p rise  th e  c o m p le te  m odel o f  
c o n t r o l  in  an  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  c h a n n e l.  The co m p le te  model i s  
shown in  F ig u re  3 .7 .  The fo u r  f u n c t io n s  d e p ic te d  in  th e  model 
d e f in e  th e  a b s o lu te  l i m i t s  o f  r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -s u p p lie r  c o n t r o l  
and th e  ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  w i th in  w hich th e  two p a r t i e s  
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The v e r t i c a l  p o r t i o n s  o f  th e  m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  fu n c t io n
(T ) and th e  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) in  F ig u re  3 .7  d e f in e  
m 3
th e  a b s o lu t e  l i m i t s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  m iddlem an
and s u p p l i e r  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .
A cco rd in g  to  h i s  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (Tm) ,  th e  m iddlem an w i l l  n o t
t o l e r a t e  any l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  w hich f a l l s  t o  th e  r i g h t  o f
Cg a lo n g  th e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s .  A ls o , th e  s u p p l i e r  w i l l  n o t  t o l e r a t e
any l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t h a t  f a l l s  to  th e  l e f t  o f  a lo n g
th e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s .
The p a y o f f  f u n c t io n s  o f  th e  s u p p l i e r  and m iddlem an f u r t h e r
r e s t r i c t  th e  r e l e v a n t  ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  The s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f
f u n c t io n  (P ) l i e s  below  h i s  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T  ) a t  a l l  l e v e l s  s s
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  to  th e  l e f t  o f  C2 * T h e re fo re ,  b e c a u se  h i s  p e r ­
c e iv e d  p a y o f f  i s  l e s s  th a n  th e  minimum r e q u i r e d  a c c o rd in g  to  h i s  
to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n ,  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t o  th e  l e f t  o f  
C2 a r e  c l e a r l y  u n a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  s u p p l i e r .
S im i l a r l y ,  th e  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  (Pm) f a l l s  below
h i s  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  tom
th e  r i g h t  o f  C^. A ll  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  to  th e  r i g h t  o f
a r e  u n a c c e p ta b le  to  th e  m iddlem an s in c e  h i s  p e rc e iv e d  p a y o f f  w ith in
t h a t  ra n g e  i s  l e s s  th a n  th e  minimum l e v e l  r e q u i r e d  a c c o rd in g  to
h i s  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  (T ) .m
A cco rd in g  to  th e  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n s  shown in  F ig u re  3 .7  (P
and P ) ,  th e  m iddlem an p e r c e iv e s  h i s  p a y o f f  to  be m axim ized a t  as
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  e q u a l to  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  
i s s u e  and th e  s u p p l i e r  p e r c e iv e s  h i s  p a y o f f  to  be m axim ized a t  a
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l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o f  C^. W ith t h e i r  p e r c e iv e d  r e s p e c t iv e  
p a y o f f s  m axim ized a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r th e  
m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e ,  th e  m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r  may b a rg a in  t o  
re a c h  a com prom ise l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  and p a y o f f ,  o r ,  th e  
p a r t i e s  may engage in  a t te m p ts  to  s h i f t  t h e i r  own o r  th e  o th e r  
p a r t y 's  p a y o f f  a n d /o r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s .
A s t r a ig h t f o r w a r d  m id d le m a n -su p p lie r  b a r g a in in g  s e s s io n  
m ig h t r e s u l t  in  th e  two p a r t i e s  a g re e in g  to  a l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  t h a t  i s  betw een  and 
on th e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a x i s  o f  F ig u re  3 .7 .  T h is  ag reem en t would 
y i e ld  l e s s  th a n  maximum p a y o f f s  to  b o th  th e  m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r .
A second  g roup  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  m iddlem an 
and s u p p l i e r .  Each o r  b o th  o f  th e  members o f  th e  e n t e r p r i s e  m ar­
k e t in g  c h a n n e l co u ld  u n d e r ta k e  any one o f  s e v e r a l  s t r a t e g i e s  d e s ig n e d  
to  a l t e r  th e  h e ig h ts  a n d /o r  s lo p e s  o f  th e  o t h e r ' s  p a y o f f  o r  t o l e r a n c e  
f u n c t io n .  The o b j e c t i v e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  o f  such  s t r a t e g i e s  would be to  
e n a b le  th e  ch a n n e l member to  a c h ie v e  h i s  p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
o b j e c t i v e s .
A l t e r i n g  th e  P a y o ff  F u n c tio n s
B u c k lin  h a s  in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e r e  a r e  t h r e e  b a s ic  s t r a t e g i e s  
a v a i l a b l e  to  s u p p l i e r s  t o  s h i f t  m iddlem an p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n s .^  The
T h is  d i s c u s s io n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  b o th  
m iddlem en and s u p p l i e r s  t o  a l t e r  th e  h e ig h ts  and s lo p e s  o f  th e  o t h e r ' s  
p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  i s  an  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  s t r a t e g i e s  
su g g e s te d  by L o u is  P. B u c k lin , "A T heory o f  C hannel C o n t r o l ,"  pp . 
4 3 -4 6 .
^ I b i d . , p.  43.
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s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  rev iew ed  below  and i t  i s  n o te d  in  each  c a s e  t h a t  th e  
s t r a t e g i e s  may be u sed  by a  m iddlem an to  a f f e c t  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  
p a y o f f  f u n c t io n .
R e d u c tio n  o f  C o m p e tit io n . B u c k lin  n o te d  t h a t  a  " . . . r e d u c t i o n  
o f  c o m p e ti t io n  among a s u p p l i e r 's  m iddlem en p e rm its  each  to  ta k e  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  b r a n d 's  m a rk e t pow er in  h i s  in d iv id u a l  t e r r i t o r y ,
g
s h i f t i n g  th e  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  h i g h e r . "  T h is  r e d u c t io n  
o f  in t r a s y s t e m ic  c o m p e ti t io n  may be a c h ie v e d  by r e s t r a i n i n g  m iddlem en 
to  s p e c i f i c  g e o g ra p h ic  t e r r i t o r i e s  o r  by m a in ta in in g  a common r e s a l e  
p r i c e  among a l l  m iddlem en.
A com plem entary  s t r a t e g y  i s  a v a i l a b l e  to  a m iddlem an s e e k in g  
to  s h i f t  a s u p p l i e r 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  upw ard to  a l lo w  th e  m iddlem an 
to  a c h ie v e  a  h ig h e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l  a n d /o r  a h ig h e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro l  
l e v e l .  The m iddlem an may re d u c e  in t e r s y s t e m ic  c o m p e ti t io n  by d i s ­
c o n t in u in g  com peting  s u p p l i e r s '  b ra n d s  o r  by g iv in g  in c re a s e d  a t t e n ­
t i o n  to  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  b ra n d s  whose p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  i s  to  be  s h i f t e d  
upw ard .
Enhancem ent o f  th e  D em an d -g en era tin g  Power o f  th e  M ark e tin g  
P ro g ram s. T h is  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  b o th  m iddlem en and 
s u p p l i e r s  to  s h i f t  th e  o th e r  e n t e r p r i s e  c h a n n e l m em ber's p a y o f f  
f u n c t io n .  The s u p p l i e r  may s h i f t  th e  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  
upward by e i t h e r  im prov ing  h i s  own m a rk e tin g  program s o r  by o f f e r in g  
m e an in g fu l s u g g e s t io n s  to  th e  m iddlem an to  im prove h i s  m a rk e tin g
8 Ibid .
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prog ram . S im i la r ly ,  th e  m iddlem an may s h i f t  th e  s u p p l i e r  p a y o f f  
f u n c t io n  upward by im prov ing  th e  d e m a n d -g e n e ra tin g  power o f  h i s  
m a rk e tin g  program  o r  by o f f e r i n g  s u g g e s t io n s  to  th e  s u p p l i e r  based  
upon l o c a l  m ark e t know ledge t h a t  would in c r e a s e  th e  d e m a n d -g e n e ra tin g  
power o f  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  m a rk e tin g  p rog ram .
Use o f  I n c e n t iv e s . I n c e n t iv e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  s u p p l i e r s  to  
im prove m iddlem an p a y o f f  in c lu d e  m arg in  c h a n g e s , paym ents f o r  s h e l f  
sp a c e , r e t a i l e r  d e a l s  f o r  s p e c i a l  d i s p l a y s ,  s u b s i d i z a t io n  o f  r e t a i l
f i x t u r e s ,  push money, s a l e s  c o n t e s t s ,  d i s c o u n t s  f o r  advance  p u rc h a s e ,
. . 9c o o p e ra t iv e  a d v e r t i s i n g  a l lo w a n c e s ,  e t c .  T hese a l t e r n a t i v e s  p r o v id e ,
p e rh a p s ,  th e  g r e a t e s t  f l e x i b i l i t y  to  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  a b i l i t y  t o  s h i f t
th e  m id d lem an 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n .
I n c e n t iv e s  a r e  a l s o  a v a i l a b l e  t o  m iddlem en to  u se  to  s h i f t  
th e  s u p p l i e r 's  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  upw ard . S p e c ia l  s a l e s  t r a i n i n g  
p rogram s on th e  s u p p l i e r 's  p r o d u c ts ,  m a in te n a n c e  o f  an  e x c e l l e n t  
s e r v ic e  d e p a rtm e n t to  r e p a i r  m ino r p ro d u c t d e f e c t s  and s p e c i a l  
e f f o r t s  to  h e lp  a s u p p l i e r  move a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  slow  m oving ite m  a r e
o n ly  a  few o f  th e  in c e n t iv e s  t h a t  a  m iddlem an may u s e .
A l te r in g  th e  T o le ra n c e  F u n c tio n s
The m iddlem an and s u p p l i e r  may a l s o  u t i l i z e  any  one o r  
s e v e r a l  o f  many s t r a t e g i e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  s h i f t  th e  o t h e r ' s  t o l e r a n c e
f u n c t io n .  F iv e  s t r a t e g i e s  t h a t  a s u p p l i e r  m ig h t u se  to  s h i f t  a
m id d lem an 's  to le r a n c e  fu n c t io n  have  been  p r e v io u s ly  in d ic a te d  by
9 I b id . ,  p . 44.
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B u c k l i n . H o w e v e r ,  a s i x t h  s t r a t e g y  m ust be  r e c o g n iz e d .
The Use o f  R a t io n a l  A p p e a ls . O f te n tim e s , a  m iddlem an and a 
s u p p l i e r  do n o t a g re e  to  engage in  an  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  c h an n e l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  s im p ly  b e c a u se  th e y  a r e  n o t  aw are  o f  th e  p a y o f f  o p p o r­
t u n i t i e s .  Such a s i t u a t i o n  was r e p r e s e n te d  in  g ro c e ry  su p e rm a rk e ts  
and d ru g  m a n u fa c tu re rs  b e f o r e  th e  two g ro u p s  e n te r e d  i n t o  e n t e r p r i s e  
c h an n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  U n t i l  th e  p a y o f f  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  w ere acknow­
le d g ed  by b o th  g ro u p s , t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  p ro ­
h i b i t e d  them from  e n g ag in g  in  a  ch a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Once aw are 
o f  th e  p a y o f f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  th e  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  o f  th e  s u p p l i e r s  
a n d /o r  m a n u fa c tu re rs  s h i f t e d  to  a l lo w  an e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  ch a n n e l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .
R e c o g n itio n  o f  th e  M u tu a l i ty  o f  C o n tr o l . B u c k lin  su g g e s te d  
th a t  a  s u p p l i e r  may s h i f t  a  m id d lem an 's  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  to  th e  
r i g h t  by g iv in g  th e  m iddlem an g r e a t e r  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  some p o l ic y  
d ev e lo p m en ts  t h a t  a f f e c t  h i s  b e h a v io r .** T h is  s u g g e s t io n  i s  based
12upon e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h  w hich s u p p o r ts  th e  m u tu a l i ty  v iew  o f  c o n t r o l .
The same e v id e n c e  s u p p o r ts  th e  v iew  t h a t  a m iddlem an co u ld  
s h i f t  a s u p p l i e r 's  to l e r a n c e  c u rv e  to  th e  l e f t  by a l lo w in g  him to  
e x e r c i s e  g r e a t e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  p o l i c y  d e c i s io n s  w hich g o v ern  h i s
10I b i d . , p p . 4 4 -4 6 .
11I b i d . ,  p .  46 .
12J e r a ld  G. Bachman, C la g e t t  G. Sm ith  and J o n a th a n  A.
S le s in g e r ,  " C o n tro l ,  P erfo rm an ce  and S a t i s f a c t i o n s  An A n a ly s is  o f  
S t r u c t u r a l  and I n d iv id u a l  E f f e c t s . "
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b e h a v io r .  S in c e  th e  t o t a l  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r c is e d  i s  v a r i a b l e ,  
e i t h e r  th e  s u p p l i e r  o r  m iddlem an co u ld  a l lo w  th e  o th e r  p a r ty  to  
in c r e a s e  h i s  a b s o lu te  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  an  i s s u e  w h ile  d e c r e a s in g  
h i s  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l .
R e d u c tio n  o f  th e  Humber and Q u a l i ty  o f  A l t e r n a t i v e s . A 
m id d lem an 's  d ependence  upon a  p a r t i c u l a r  s u p p l i e r  i s  a  f u n c t io n  o f
13th e  number and q u a l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  th e  m iddlem an.
A s u p p l ie r  co u ld  s h i f t  a  m id d le m a n 's  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  to  th e  r i g h t  
by re d u c in g  th e  number a n d /o r  q u a l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  
th e  m iddlem an. T h is  co u ld  be a c c o m p lish e d , f o r  exam ple , by d r iv in g  
com peting  s u p p l i e r s  o u t  o f  th e  m a rk e t.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  th e  m iddlem an can  s h i f t  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  t o l e r ­
an ce  f u n c t io n  to  th e  l e f t  by r e d u c in g  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  
th e  s u p p l i e r .  T h is  can  be acc o m p lish e d  by a c q u i r in g  a  dom inan t 
p o s i t i o n  among a l l  m iddlem en in  th e  m a rk e t a r e a  o r  by d r iv i n g  com­
p e t in g  m iddlem en o u t o f  th e  m a rk e t .
The Im provem ent o f  R e la t i v e  S t a t u s . R esea rc h  by Massy and
F rank  s u p p o r ts  th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  m iddlem an a c q u ie s c e n c e  to  s u p p l i e r
commands i s  g r e a t e s t  when th e  s u p p l i e r  o c c u p ie s  a  much h ig h e r  s t a t u s
14p o s i t i o n  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  m iddlem an. In  o th e r  w ords, m iddlem an
13F re d e r ic k  J .  B e ie r  and L o u is  W. S t e r n ,  "Power in  th e  C hannel 
o f  D i s t r i b u t i o n , "  in  S te m  ( e d . ) ,  D i s t r i b u t i o n  C h a n n e ls« B e h a v io ra l 
D im en sio n s , p .  97 .
14 .W illiam  F. Massy and R onald  E. F ra n k , " A n a ly s is  o f  R e t a i l  
A d v e r t is in g  B e h a v io r ,"  J o u r n a l  o f  M a rk e tin g  R e s e a rc h , V o l. 3 (Novem­
b e r ,  1 9 6 6 ), p .  381.
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t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  w i l l  be g r e a t e s t  when a  l a r g e  and 
s u c c e s s f u l  s u p p l i e r  d e a l s  w ith  a  sm a ll and commonplace m idd lem an . 15
By im prov ing  h i s  s t a t u s  p o s i t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  a  m iddlem an a s  
th e  second  member o f  a tw o - le v e l  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  c h a n n e l , a 
s u p p l i e r  can  in c r e a s e  t h a t  m id d lem an 's  to l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The same e v id e n c e  s u p p o r ts  th e  c o n te n t io n  t h a t  a 
m iddlem an may in c r e a s e  th e  s u p p l i e r 's  to l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  m id d le ­
man c o n t r o l  by im p ro v in g  h i s  ( t h e  m id d le m a n 's )  own s t a t u s  p o s i t i o n  
v i s - a - v i s  th e  s u p p l i e r .  S u c c e s s ,  g row th  and im age im provem ent w i l l  
h e lp  b o th  m iddlem en and s u p p l i e r s  to  in c r e a s e  o t h e r s '  to l e r a n c e  f o r  
t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o f  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .
The D evelopm ent o f  S tro n g  R o le - ta s k  Norms* B u c k lin  h y p o th e ­
s iz e d  t h a t  th e  s t r o n g e r  th e  r o l e - t a s k  norms o f  m iddlem an b e h a v io r ,  
th e  s t e e p e r  th e  s lo p e  o f  th e  m id d lem an 's  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n .  T hat 
i s ,  v e ry  l a r g e  in c r e a s e s  in  p r o f i t s  would be demanded by th e  m id d le ­
man to  e n co u ra g e  him to  a c c e d e  to  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .  W hile s t r o n g  norms le a d  to  a n o n re s p o n s iv e  m iddlem an 
to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n ,  th e y  a l s o  o f f e r  th e  s u p p l i e r  " . . . a  means o f  
a f f e c t i n g  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  th ro u g h  a p p e a ls  t o  s p e c i f i c  s t e r e o t y p e s . " 1**
T h is  same h y p o th e s is  can  be r e v e r s e d  to  a p p ly  t o  th e  s lo p e  
o f  th e  s u p p l i e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n .  In  i n d u s t r i e s  in  w hich  s t r o n g  
r o l e - t a s k  norms o f  s u p p l i e r  b e h a v io r  e x i s t ,  th e  m iddlem an can  u se
15B u ck lin ,  op . c i t . , p . 45.
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th e  norms to  a f f e c t  in c re a s e d  s u p p l i e r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  m id d le ­
man c o n t r o l  o v e r s p e c i f i c  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  by a p p e a l in g  to  
s u p p l i e r  s t e r e o t y p e s .
The E s ta b lis h m e n t o f  P a t t e r n s  o f  S o c i a l i z a t i o n . A s u p p l i e r  
may o b ta in  m iddlem an l o y a l ty  and g o o d w ill a s  w e ll  a s  in c re a s e d  
m iddlem an to l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  
by p e rfo rm in g  sm a ll f a v o r s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  r e t u r n  b e n e f i t s .* ^  S im i­
l a r l y ,  a m iddlem an may in c r e a s e  h i s  s u p p l i e r 's  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
m iddlem an c o n t r o l  o v e r  one o r  s e v e r a l  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  by 
p e rfo rm in g  f a v o r s  f o r  th e  s u p p l i e r .  F av o rs  in  t h i s  s e n s e  may ra n g e  
from  p ro v id in g  " c o c k ta i l  p a r t i e s "  f o r  v i s i t i n g  s u p p l i e r  e x e c u t iv e s  to  
g iv in g  e x t r a  p ro m o tio n a l s u p p o r t  to  h e lp  a  s u p p l i e r  r e d u c e  h i s  s to c k  
o f  slow -m oving  ite m s .
The p r e c e d in g  s e c t io n s  have in d i c a te d  s e v e r a l  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  may be u sed  by m iddlem en and s u p p l i e r s  t o  a l t e r  t h e  h e ig h t  and 
s lo p e s  o f  th e  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  o f  th e  o th e r  member in  
t h e i r  tw o - le v e l  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  c h a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T hese 
s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  n e i t h e r  m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e  n o r  c o l l e c t i v e l y  ex h au s­
t i v e .  They do p ro v id e ,  how ever, am ple e v id e n c e  to  s u p p o r t  th e  con­
t e n t io n  t h a t  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  may be a f f e c t e d  by a 
m iddlem an o r  s u p p l i e r  s e e k in g  to  a c h ie v e  in d iv id u a l  p a y o f f  a n d /o r  
c o n t r o l  o b j e c t i v e s .
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I m p l ic a t io n s  f o r  D ec is io n -M ak e rs
Thus f a r ,  th e  model o f  c o n t r o l  h as  r e f l e c t e d  f u n c t io n a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  th e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  and f e e l in g s  
a b o u t r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  o f  a  s in g l e  m iddlem an and a s in g le  
s u p p l i e r  f o r  a s in g l e  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e .  I t  w i l l  be shown 
below  t h a t  t h i s  m odel can be u t i l i z e d  to  d e a l  w ith  a t  l e a s t  an 
a p p ro x im a tio n  o f  r e l a t i v e  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  and w ith  m ore c h a n n e l mem­
b e rs  th a n  a s in g le  m iddlem an and a  s i n g l e  s u p p l i e r .
S im o n 's  p ro p o sed  m ethodo logy  f o r  m e a su rin g  a u t h o r i t y  p ro v id e s
g u id e l in e s  f o r  e x te n d in g  t h i s  m odel beyond a s i n g l e  i s s u e  co n cep - 
18t i o n .  Simon s u g g e s ts  t h a t  a  m easu re  o f  A 's  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  B can 
be s t a t e d  a s  an in d e x  o r  a u t h o r i t y  r a t i o .  I f  V d e n o te s  th e  s e t  o f  
a l l  p o s s i b le  b e h a v io rs  t h a t  B can  p e rfo rm  and S i s  th e  s u b s e t  o f  V 
t h a t  B w i l l  p e rfo rm  a t  A 's  command, th e n  th e  r a t i o  o f  S t o  V r e p r e ­
s e n ts  a m easu re  o f  A 's  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  B.
E l-A n sa ry  h a s  su g g e s te d  t h a t  V can  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  f i n i t e
19s e t  o f  m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .  E x te n d in g  S im o n 's  m easurem ent 
s u g g e s t io n ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  w e ig h t th e  f i n i t e  s e t  o f  m a rk e tin g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s  in  te rm s o f  t h e i r  im p o rta n c e  and th e n  com pute a 
w e ig h ted  in d e x  o f  A 's  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  B.
U sing  th e  same lo g i c  a s  s u g g e s te d  by Simon and E l-A n sa ry ,
H e rb e r t  Sim on, "N otes on th e  O b se rv a tio n  and M easurem ent o f  
P o w er,"  J o u rn a l  o f  P o l i t i c s , Volume 15 (N ovem ber, 1 9 5 3 ) , p p . 500-516 .
19
A del I .  E l-A n sa ry , "Power M easurem ent in  th e  D i s t r i b u t io n  
C hanneli An E m p ir ic a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n , "  p . 52.
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th e  p ro p o sed  c o n c e p tu a l m odel o f  c h an n e l c o n t r o l  in  an e n t e r p r i s e  
m a rk e tin g  ch an n e l can  a p p ly  to  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a l l  r e l e v a n t  
m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s .  By w e ig h tin g  th e  i s s u e s  and a g g re g a t in g  
th e  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  a c ro s s  th e s e  i s s u e s ,  a  model w hich 
a p p ro x im a te s  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  p e rc e iv e d  p a y o f f  and f e e l in g s
a b o u t r e l a t i v e  m id d le m a n -su p p lie r  c o n t r o l  f o r  a l l  i s s u e s  can  be
^  20 d e v e lo p e d .
As d is c u s s e d  in  a l l  p re v io u s  s e c t i o n s ,  th e  p ro p o sed  model o f  
ch an n e l c o n t r o l  i s  d y a d ic ;  i . e .  i t  r e l a t e s  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n s  and 
to l e r a n c e  fu n c t io n s  f o r  two e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  c h a n n e l m em bers.
Even a s  a d y a d ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  th e  model can  be u sed  by a  m id d le ­
man o r  s u p p l i e r  to  a c h ie v e  in d iv id u a l  p a y o f f  o r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
o b j e c t i v e s .  However, a  s u p p l i e r  co u ld  d e v e lo p  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  
f u n c t io n s  t h a t  a r e  a v e ra g e s  f o r  a l l  o r  s p e c i f i c  g ro u p s  o f  h i s  m id d le ­
men (T and P ) .  By in d i c a t i n g  h i s  own p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c em-avg m -avg 1 °  J
f u n c t io n s  and a n a ly z in g  th e  fo u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  (T , P , T , ands s m -avg
P ) ,  th e  s u p p l i e r  co u ld  i d e n t i f y  th e  a v e ra g e  u p p e r  and lo w er m -avg
b o u n d a r ie s  o f  t o l e r a b l e  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and d e s ig n  h i s
b a rg a in in g  s t r a t e g y  to  a c h ie v e  h i s  p r o f i t  a n d /o r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
21o b j e c t i v e s .  I t  i s  p ro p o sed  t h a t  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  a v e ra g e  m id d le ­
man p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  f o r  a  s i n g l e ,  im p o r ta n t m a rk e tin g  
s t r a t e g y  i s s u e  o f f e r s  g r e a t e r  b e n e f i t  to  an  in d iv id u a l  s u p p l i e r
20
El-Ansary and Robicheaux, op . c i t . , p .  20 .
21 I b id .
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th a n  d o es  an  e s t im a te  o f  th e  r e l a t i v e  t o t a l  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
w hich a g g re g a te s  a f i n i t e  l i s t  o f  w e ig h ted  i s s u e s .
A Review o f  th e  C o n tro l Model C oncep ts
The m a jo r p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  was to  d e v e lo p  and e x p l i c a t e  
th e  c o n c e p tu a l model w hich form s th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  e m p ir ic a l  p o r t io n  
o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  In  summary, i t  i s  a p p r o p r ia te  to  re v ie w  th e  b a s ic  
c o n c e p ts  t h a t  w ere i n i t i a l l y  d e f in e d  in  th e  f i r s t  c h a p te r  and in c o r ­
p o ra te d  in  th e  model th ro u g h o u t t h i s  t h i r d  c h a p te r .  T ab le  3 .1  sum­
m a riz e s  th e  im p o r ta n t c o n c e p ts  and in d i c a te s  th e  s o u rc e s  whose 
e a r l i e r  w orks s e rv e d  a s  b a s e s  f o r  th e  c o n c e p tu a l d e f i n i t i o n s .
The model o f  c o n t r o l  in  an  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  ch a n n e l in c o r ­
p o r a te s  th e  fo l lo w in g  f e a t u r e s  w hich w ere a b s e n t  from  e a r l i e r  m odels 
o f  ch a n n e l c o n t r o l t
1 . th e  m odel was d e s ig n e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  r e p r e s e n t  th e  n a tu r e  
o f  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p !
2 . th e  model i s  e a sy  to  o p e r a t i o n a l i z e ;
3 . th e  m odel r e f l e c t s  m odem  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s '  c o n c e p tio n s  o f
c o n t r o l  w hich in c lu d e s
a . )  c o n t r o l  i s  a  m u tua l p r o c e s s ,
b . )  th e  t o t a l  am ount o f  sy stem  c o n t r o l  i s  v a r i a b l e ,
c . )  c o n t ro l  i s  i s s u e  s p e c i f i c ;
4 . th e  model can  r e a d i l y  b e  e x ten d ed  a c r o s s  a  w ide ra n g e  o f  
m a rk e tin g  s t r a t e g y  i s s u e s ;
5 . th e  model p ro v id e s  f o r  th e  a g g re g a t io n  o f  p a y o f f  and t o l e r ­
an ce  fu n c t io n s  f o r  a  g roup  o f  c h an n e l members on th e  same
c h an n e l l e v e l .
C h a p te r  4 p r e s e n ts  th e  m e th o d o lo g ic a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  
s tu d y .  The n a tu r e  o f  f i e l d  s tu d i e s  i s  d is c u s s e d  and th e  o p e r a t io n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  a r e  p r e s e n te d .  The sam ple 
d e s ig n  and th e  method o f  d a ta  c o l l e c t i o n  u t i l i z e d  a r e  a l s o  p r e s e n te d .
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Table 3 .1
A Summary o f  th e  Key C o n tro l Model C oncep ts
CONCEPT CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION SOURCE
C o n tro l a ch a n n e l m em ber's  a b i l i t y  
to  p r e d i c t  e v e n ts  and 
a c h ie v e  d e s i r e d  outcom es
K atz  and Kahn, 
S t e r n ,  B a l ig h , 
B u c k lin
R e la t iv e
C o n tro l
th e  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  
e x e rc is e d  by a s in g le  
ch a n n e l member r e l a t i v e  
to  th e  t o t a l  amount o f  
c o n t r o l  e x e r c is e d  in  th e  
ch an n e l sy stem
Homans, 
Tannenbaum, 
D e u tsc h , L ik e r t  
P a rs o n s , 
Tannenbaum and 
Kahn
P a y o ff th e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  a r e  
p e rc e iv e d  t o  a c c ru e  to  
an  in d iv id u a l  f i rm  o r  
g roup  o f  f irm s  a s  a  
r e s u l t  o f  en g a g in g  in  
an  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e tin g  
c h a n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p
B u c k lin
T o le ra n c e th e  in d iv id u a l  f i r m 's  o r  
g roup  o f  f i r m s ' f e e l i n g  
o f  b u rd en  and s a c r i f i c e  
in c u r r e d  from  a c c e d in g  
to  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  by 
a n o th e r  f i rm  o r  g ro u p  o f  
f irm s  on a n o th e r  ch an n e l 
l e v e l
B u c k lin
I l l
The m a jo r p o r t i o n  o f  th e  f o u r th  c h a p te r  i s  d e v o te d  to  th e  d e t a i l e d  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  s t a t i s t i c s  u sed  to  a n a ly z e  th e  d a ta  c o l l e c t e d .  
C h ap te r  4 c o n c lu d e s  w ith  a  d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e  v a l i d i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  in s tru m e n t and an  a, p r i o r i  a s s e s sm e n t o f  some p e r ­
c e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  s tu d y .
Chapter 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The c o n c e p tu a l m odel p r e s e n te d  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p te r  s e rv e d  
a s  th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  h y p o th e se s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  in  t h i s  s tu d y .  In  t h i s  
f o u r th  c h a p te r ,  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  i s  d is c u s s e d  and th e  
o p e r a t io n a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  th e  te rm s u sed  in  th e  h y p o th e se s  a r e  
i d e n t i f i e d .
The sam p lin g  and d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  p ro c e d u re s  a r e  p re s e n te d  
and e v a lu a te d .  A lso , th e  s i x  h y p o th e s e s  e v a lu a te d  and th e  s p e c i f i c  
p ro c e d u re s  used  to  a n a ly z e  th e  h y p o th e se s  a r e  i n d i c a t e d .  F in a l ly ,  
th e  v a l i d i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  f in d in g s  and th e  p e r ­
c e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  a r e  d is c u s s e d .
N a tu re  o f  th e  R esea rc h
T h is  r e s e a r c h  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a  f i e l d  s tu d y .  " F ie ld  
s tu d i e s  a r e  ex p o s t  f a c t o  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r i e s  aim ed a t  d is c o v e r in g  
th e  r e l a t i o n s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  among s o c i o l o g i c a l ,  p s y c h o lo g ic a l ,  
and e d u c a t io n a l  v a r i a b l e s  in  r e a l  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s . " *  F ie ld  
s tu d i e s  can  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from  la b o r a to r y  e x p e r im e n ts  and f i e l d  
e x p e r im e n ts .
A la b o r a to r y  ex p e rim e n t i s  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by a  h ig h  l e v e l  o f
*Fred  N. K e r l in g e r ,  F o u n d a tio n s  o f  B e h a v io ra l R esea rch  
(New Y ork i H o lt ,  R in e h a r t  and W inston , 1 ^ 6 4 ), p .  387.
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c o n t r o l  o f  a l l  o r  a lm o s t a l l  o f  th e  p o s s i b l e  in d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b le s  
deemed im p e r t in e n t  to  th e  p ro b lem  b e in g  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  In  a l a b o r a ­
to r y  e x p e r im e n t, th e  r e s e a r c h  s i t u a t i o n  i s  i s o l a t e d  from  th e  r e a l  
w orld  en v iro n m e n t.
"A f i e l d  ex p e rim en t i s  a  r e s e a r c h  s tu d y  in  a r e a l i s t i c  
s i t u a t i o n  in  w hich one o r  more in d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s  a r e  m a n ip u la te d
by th e  e x p e r im e n te r  u n d er a s  c a r e f u l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  c o n d i t io n s  a s  th e
2
s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  p e r m i t . "  The d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  a l a b o r a to r y  
ex p e rim e n t and a  f i e l d  e x p e rim e n t i s  a  m a t te r  o f  d e g re e .  A f i e l d  
e x p e rim e n t i s  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by l e s s  c o n t r o l  th a n  l a b o r a to r y  e x p e r i ­
m ents .
In  com parison  to  l a b o r a to r y  e x p e r im e n ts  and f i e l d  e x p e r i ­
m e n ts , f i e l d  s tu d i e s  a r e  c h a r a c te r i z e d  by a l e s s e r  d e g re e  o f  c o n t r o l  
o f  p o s s i b le  in d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s .  K atz in d i c a te d  t h a t  f i e l d
s tu d ie s  may be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  e i t h e r  e x p lo r a to r y  o r  h y p o th e s i s -  
3
t e s t i n g .  However, S c o t t  a rg u ed  t h a t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een e x p lo r -
4
a to r y  and h y p o t h e s i s - t e s t i n g  s tu d i e s  i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y .
Most f i e l d  r e s e a r c h  in v o lv e s  c o n c u r r e n t  e x p lo r a t io n  and 
h y p o th e s is  t e s t i n g .  S c o t t  en co u rag ed  r e s e a r c h e r s  t o  d e v e lo p  
t h e o r e t i c a l  m odels w hich g u id e  f i e l d  r e s e a r c h .
2 I b i d . ,  p .  382.
3
D. K a tz , " F ie ld  S t u d i e s , "  in  L . F e s t in g e r  and D. K atz 
( e d s . ) ,  R esea rc h  M ethods i n  th e  B e h a v io ra l S c ie n c e s  (New Y orki 
H o l t ,  R in e h a r t  and W inston , 1 ^ 5 3 ) , p p . ^ - 8 3 .
4
W. R ich ard  S c o t t ,  " F ie ld  M ethods in  th e  S tu d y  o f  O rg an i­
z a t i o n , "  in  March ( e d . ) ,  Handbook o f  O r g a n iz a t io n s , p p . 268 -2 6 9 .
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O p e ra tio n a l  D e f in i t io n  o f  Terms
For th e  p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  p a y o f f  was d e f in e d  a s  th e  
a n n u a l n e t  p r o f i t s  t h a t  a r e  p e rc e iv e d  to  a c c ru e  to  an  in d iv id u a l  
m iddlem an o r  d e a l e r  a s  th e  r e s u l t  o f  en g ag in g  in  an e n t e r p r i s e  m ar­
k e t in g  ch an n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p .  To o p e r a t i o n a l i z e  t h i s  te rm  f o r  
e m p ir ic a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  w ere s p e c i f i e d .
R e tu rn  L ev e l 1_. The n e t  p r o f i t s  o r  p a y o f f  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r
makes d e c re a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t .
R e tu rn  L ev e l 2 .  The n e t  p r o f i t s  o r  p a y o f f  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r
makes d e c re a s e  5 to  15 p e rc e n t*
R e tu rn  L ev e l 3 . The n e t  p r o f i t s  o r  p a y o f f  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r
makes rem a in  a b o u t th e  same a s  th e y  p r e s e n t l y  a r e .
R e tu rn  L ev e l 4̂ . The n e t  p r o f i t s  o r  p a y o f f  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r
makes in c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t .
R e tu rn  L ev e l _5. The n e t  p r o f i t s  o r  p a y o f f  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r
makes in c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t .
The f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  r e p r e s e n t  f i v e  p o in t s  a lo n g  th e  
v e r t i c a l  a x i s  o f  th e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  m odel shown in  F ig u re s  1 to  7 
o f  th e  p re c e d in g  c h a p te r .
R e la t iv e  c o n t r o l  was d e f in e d  a s  th e  am ount o f  c o n t r o l  
e x e r c is e d  by a s in g l e  ch a n n e l member com pared to  th e  t o t a l  amount 
o f  c o n t r o l  e x e r c is e d  in  th e  e n t e r p r i s e  ch a n n e l sy stem  by th e  two 
members o v e r  some c h an n e l i s s u e .  F iv e  s p e c i f i c  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
m id d le m a n -su p p lie r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  w ere d e f in e d  to  o p e ra ­
t i o n a l i z e  th e  co n c e p t o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  T h u r s to n e 's  law  o f  com­
p a r a t iv e  judgem ent was used  to  a s s ig n  n u m e ric a l v a lu e s  to  each  o f  
th e  f i v e  s ta te m e n ts  and th u s  g e n e ra te  an  i n t e r v a l  s c a le  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .
No a t te m p t was made to  i d e n t i f y  com ponent p a r t s  o f  c o n t r o l !
115
e . g . ,  l e g i t i m a t e  a u t h o r i t y ,  p e r s u a s io n ,  o r  c o e r c io n .  Each o f  th e  
f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  was d e f in e d  in  
te rm s t h a t  a r e  m e a n in g fu l to  th e  r e t a i l  d e a l e r s  in c lu d e d  in  th e  
s tu d y .  Each s ta te m e n t  r e p r e s e n t s  a  s u p p l i e r 's  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  
t h a t  i s  a p p l ic a b l e  to  a l l  d e a l e r s .  The f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  w ere s t a t e d  a s  fo llo w s
C o n tro l L eve l 1_. O r ig in a l  W ho lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  o f f e r s  
no su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  c h a rg e  
y o u r c u s to m ers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  B rand X 
c a r p e t .
C o n tro l L eve l 2 .  O r ig in a l  W ho lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  o f f e r s  
a  su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  b u t  you may f r e e l y  d e v i a te  
up o r  down from  t h a t  s u g g e s t io n  in  s e t t i n g  y o u r r e t a i l  
p r i c e  on th e  Brand X c a r p e t .
C o n tro l L ev e l 3 ,  O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  u rg e s  
you to  s e t  y o u r r e t a i l  p r i c e  w i th in  a  ra n g e  o f  20 to  
80 p e r c e n t  markup o v e r  th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you 
pay f o r  B rand X c a r p e t ,  b u t you may som etim es d e v i a te  
up o r  down from  t h a t  ra n g e .
C o n tro l L ev e l 4 . O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , Inc* s e t s  a 
ra n g e  o f  35 to  60 p e r c e n t  m arkup o v e r  th e  d e l iv e r e d  
c o s t  t h a t  you pay  f o r  B rand X c a r p e t  w i th in  w hich you 
m ust s e t  y o u r r e t a i l  p r i c e .
C o n tro l L eve l 5 . O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  h as  a 
p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  m ust s e t  y o u r r e t a i l  
p r i c e  on B rand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above th e
d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  th o s e  p r o d u c ts .
D e a le r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g
r e f l e c t s  an  in d iv id u a l  d e a l e r ' s  f e e l i n g  o f  b u rd en  and s a c r i f i c e
in c u r r e d  from  a c c e d in g  to  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l .  An
O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  and Brand X a r e  two 
pseudonym s used  th ro u g h o u t t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  f o r  th e  a c t u a l  names 
o f  th e  c a r p e t  d i s t r i b u t o r  and n a t io n a l  c a r p e t  b rand  u sed  in  t h i s  
s tu d y .
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in d iv id u a l  d e a l e r 's  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  maximum l e v e l  
o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  d e a l e r  
a t  each  p o s s ib le  l e v e l  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .  An a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r ­
a n c e  f u n c t io n  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  a v e ra g e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by a g ro u p  o f  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  
d e a l e r s .
A g e n e ra l iz e d  a t t i t u d e  m easurem ent te c h n iq u e ,  th e  se m a n tic  
d i f f e r e n t i a l ,  was s e le c te d  to  m easu re  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  a b o u t 
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and d e a l e r  p a y o f f  c o m b in a tio n s .  T h is  
te c h n iq u e  was u t i l i z e d  f o r  t h r e e  m a jo r r e a s o n s .
F i r s t ,  B u ck lin  su g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  m easurem ent o f  a t t i t u d e s  
co u ld  be r e l a t e d  to  a  ch a n n e l m em ber's  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l . 8 
Second , O sgood 's  r e s e a r c h  in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  m ost f r e q u e n t ly  u sed  
s c a l e s  a r e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e d .^  T h ird ,  Osgood h a s  in d ic a te d  t h a t  
e v a lu a t iv e  a d j e c t i v e  p a i r s  a lo n e  can  be e f f e c t i v e l y  u sed  to
g
m easu re  a t t i t u d e s .
Sam ple D esign
A p u rp o s iv e  (n o n p r o b a b i l i ty ) s a m p lin g  p ro c e d u re  was u t i l i z e d .  
T h ere  a r e  num erous exam ples o f  th e  u se  o f  p u rp o s iv e  sam p lin g  in
^ B u c k lin , o p . c i t . , p .  47 .
^ C h a rle s  E. Osgood, G eorge J .  S u c i ,  and P e rc y  H. Tannenbaum,
The M easurem ent o f  M eaning, (U rb an a i U n iv e r s i ty  o f  I l l i n o i s  P r e s s ,
T T ?7 ), p .  146 .
8I b id . ,  p . 195 .
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m a rk e tin g . The e n t i r e  p o p u la t io n  o f  ru g  and c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  who 
c a r r i e d  one m a n u fa c tu r e r 's  p ro d u c t l i n e  w ith  th e  n a t io n a l  b rand  and 
who w ere lo c a te d  w ith in  th e  g e o g ra p h ic  sco p e  o f  th e  s tu d y  (New 
O rle a n s  and B aton  Rouge, L o u is ia n a )  was s u rv e y e d .
The m a jo r l i m i t a t i o n  o f  a n o n p r o b a b i l i ty  sam ple i s  a  r e ­
s u l t i n g  i n a b i l i t y  to  g e n e r a l iz e  r e s e a r c h  f in d in g s  beyond th e  
s e l e c t e d  sam p le . In  t h i s  r e s e a r c h ,  how ever, t h i s  i s  n o t  a  l i m i t a t i o n .  
The p rim a ry  o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  was to  d e te rm in e  th e  d i r e c t i o n s  
and sh ap es  o f  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  chan ­
n e l  g ro u p . G iven t h a t  th e  u n iv e r s e  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  was co m prised  o f  
New O rle a n s  and B aton  Rouge c a r p e t  and ru g  r e t a i l e r s  s u p p l ie d  by a 
s i n g l e  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r ,  th e n  th e  i s s u e  o f  g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y  beyond 
t h a t  u n iv e r s e  i s  m oot.
Method o f  D ata  C o l le c t io n
A p e r s o n a l ly  a d m in is te re d  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  was 
u sed  to  c o l l e c t  d a ta  from  th e  d e a l e r  r e s p o n d e n ts .  The r e t a i l  s t o r e  
ow ner o r  m anager was in te rv ie w e d .  The one w ith  th e  g r e a t e s t  i n t e r ­
a c t io n  w ith  th e  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r  was s e l e c t e d .  S in c e  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  
was l im i t e d  to  a sm a ll p o p u la t io n ,  i t  was f e a s i b l e  f o r  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  
to  p e r s o n a l ly  a d m in is te r  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  to  a l l  r e s p o n d e n ts .  A lso , 
s in c e  th e  tim e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  th e  re s p o n d e n t to  co m p le te  th e  q u e s t io n ­
n a i r e  was c o n s id e r a b le ,  th e  p e r s o n a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  was n e c e s s a ry
9
P au l E. G reen and D onald S . T u l l ,  R esea rc h  f o r  M ark e tin g  
D e c is io n s ,  (2d e d . ;  Englewood C l i f f s i  P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1 9 7 0 ) , p .
75TI-------
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to  m in im ize  n o n re sp o n se  b i a s .  A s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
was u t i l i z e d  b eca u se  th e  in fo rm a tio n  so u g h t was r e l a t i v e l y  com plex 
and t h i s  m ethod in s u re d  t h a t  each  d e a l e r  r e c e iv e d  th e  same q u e s t io n  
fo rm a t .  A lso , t h i s  ty p e  o f  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  t a b u l a t i o n  
o f  c o l l e c t e d  d a t a .
T here  a r e  fo u r  m a jo r p ro b lem s g e n e r a l ly  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  th e  
u se  o f  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s tio n n a ire s .* * *  Use o f  su ch  q u e s t io n ­
n a i r e s  r e q u i r e s  th e  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  th e  words u sed  mean th e  same to  
a l l  r e s p o n d e n ts .  The p e r s o n a l  a d m in i s t r a t io n  o f  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  
by th e  r e s e a r c h e r  m in im ized  th e  d a n g e r  o f  v i o l a t i n g  t h i s  a s s u m p tio n .
A second  n e c e s s a ry  a s su m p tio n  i s  t h a t  th e  r e s p o n s e s  o b ta in e d  
a r e  r e s p o n s e s  to  th e  in te n d e d  q u e s t io n .  In  o th e r  w o rd s, t h e r e  i s  a 
d a n g e r  t h a t  re s p o n s e s  may be t r i g g e r e d  by c e r t a i n  w ords and th o s e  
r e s p o n s e s  may n o t be a c c u r a te  f o r  th e  r e a l  q u e s t i o n .  A g a in , p e r s o n a l  
a d m in i s t r a t io n  and th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  t o  answ er r e s p o n d e n t r e q u e s t s  f o r  
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  m in im ized  t h i s  d a n g e r .
T h ird ,  th e  a ssu m p tio n  m ust be made t h a t  th e  re s p o n d e n t 
r e a c t i o n s  can  be n e a t ly  c a te g o r iz e d  in t o  th e  c a t e g o r ie s  ch o sen  by 
th e  r e s e a r c h e r .  Only c a r e f u l  p la n n in g  o f  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  and 
know ledge o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  can  r e s u l t  i n  a  q u e s t io n n a i r e  
t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  t h i s  a s s u m p tio n . P re l im in a ry  in te r v ie w s  w ere co n d u c ted  
to  m in im ize  th e  d a n g e rs  in h e r e n t  in  v i o l a t i n g  t h i s  a s su m p tio n .
F i n a l l y ,  th e  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t io n n a i r e  assum es t h a t
10C. R. W asson, R e se a rc h  A n a ly s is  f o r  M a rk e tin g  D e c is io n , 
(New Y orki A p p le to n , C e n tu ry , C r o f t s ,  1 9 6 ^ ), p p . ^ 0 -7 2 .
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a l l  im p o r ta n t r e a c t io n s  can  be a s c e r t a in e d  by r a t i o n a l ,  c o n s c io u s ,  
and v e r b a l iz e d  r e s p o n s e s  t o  d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n s .  H ie p re s e n c e  o f  th e  
r e s e a r c h e r  in  a l l  in te r v ie w  s i t u a t i o n s  p ro v id e d  an  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  
w itn e s s  any  r e a c t io n s  by th e  re s p o n d e n ts  t h a t  w ere n o t re c o g n iz e d  
in  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e .
I n te rv ie w s  w ith  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  
S u p p ly , I n c .  and w ith  some B rand X c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  w ere co n d u c ted  in  
an  e f f o r t  to  m in im ize  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  v i o l a t i n g  th e  a s su m p tio n s  
d is c u s s e d  ab o v e . No d e a l e r s  in c lu d e d  in  th e  p r e l im in a r y  in te r v ie w s  
w ere in c lu d e d  in  th e  f i n a l  g ro u p  o f  d e a l e r s  s u rv e y e d .
P a r t  I o f  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  ( s e e  A ppendix  A) was d e s ig n e d  to  
o b ta in  d a t a  t h a t  e n a b le d  th e  e s t im a t io n  o f  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  f o r  
th e  f i v e  p o s s i b l e  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  For te n  p a i r s  o f  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s ,  each  d e a l e r  was ask ed  to  i n d i c a t e  w hich 
p o l i c y  was i n d i c a t i v e  o f  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
r e s a l e  p r i c i n g .  T h u rs to n e * s  law  o f  c o m p a ra tiv e  judgem ent was u sed  
to  g e n e r a te  th e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s .
An i n d i r e c t  ap p ro ac h  was ta k e n  to  o b ta in  an e s t im a te  o f  th e  
d e a l e r  to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n .  In  o p e r a t i o n a l ly  d e f in i n g  t o l e r a n c e  
ab o v e , i t  was in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  se m a n tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  te c h n iq u e  
was u sed  to  m easure  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  a b o u t r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
l e v e l  and p a y o f f  l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n s .
The se m a n tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  te c h n iq u e  m e asu re s  c o n c e p t 
m eaning  f o r  an  in d iv id u a l  in  an  o b je c t iv e  m anner. In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  a 
c o n c e p t was a c o m b in a tio n  o f  a  s i n g l e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  and a 
l e v e l  o f  change in  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .  Each d e a l e r  re s p o n d e n t was g iv e n
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a  c o n c e p t to  be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  and a  s e t  o f  b ip o l a r  a d j e c t i v a l  s c a le s  
on w hich to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e .  The re s p o n d e n t in d i c a te d  f o r  each  a d je c ­
t i v a l  p a i r  f o r  each  c o n c e p t th e  d i r e c t i o n  and i n t e n s i t y  o f  h i s  
a s s o c i a t i o n  on a s e v e n -p o in t  s c a l e .
The seven  s c a le  p o s i t i o n s  w ere d e f in e d  a s  fo llo w s  i 
P o la r  Term A i i t i i i P o la r  Term Bm m m m m m vn
( 1 ) Very A
( 2 ) Q u ite  A
(3 ) S l i g h t l y  A
(4 ) N e ith e r  A n o r  B o r  e q u a l ly  A and B
(5 ) S l i g h t l y  B
( 6 ) Q u ite  B
(7 ) V ery B
A sev en  p o in t  s c a l e  was s e l e c t e d  b e c a u se  O sg o o d 's  r e s e a r c h  found  t h i s  
to  be m ost e f f e c t i v e  in  d i s c r im in a t in g .* *
P a r t  I I  o f  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  ( r e f e r  t o  A ppendix  A) c o n ta in e d  
th e  tw e n ty -o n e  c o n c e p ts  t e s t e d  u s in g  s i x  s e t s  o f  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  
w ith  e v a lu a t iv e  f a c t o r  lo a d in g s .  The b ip o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  w ere 
s e l e c t e d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  f a c t o r  lo a d in g s  and t h e i r  a p p ro ­
p r i a t e n e s s  f o r  th e  c o n c e p ts  b e in g  e v a lu a te d .  The tw e n ty -o n e  c o n c e p ts  
w ere each  s t a t e d  on a s e p a r a t e  page to  d is c o u ra g e  com p ariso n  by th e  
re s p o n d e n ts .  The s ix  s c a le s  a p p e a re d  below  each  s ta te m e n t .  The 
c o n c e p ts  w ere a r ra n g e d  in  a c o m p le te ly  random fa s h io n  to  e l im in a te
**0sgood, e t .  a l . , op . c i t . , p .  85.
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o rd e r  b i a s .  A lso , th e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  some o f  th e  b ip o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s
was r e v e r s e d  to  m in im ize  r e s p o n s e  b ia s  t e n d e n c ie s .  TVo exam ples
a r e  p r e s e n te d  below .
O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  o f f e r s  no s u g g e s te d  r e t a i l  
p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  c h a rg e  y o u r cu s to m e rs  any  p r i c e  
t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  th e  Brand X c a r p e t .  A ls o , y o u r n e t  
p r o f i t s  rem ain  a b o u t w hat th e y  a r e  now.
U n p l e a s a n t ________ ____ ____ ____ _________ P le a s a n t
Good_________ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ _________ Bad
V a l u a b l e ________ ____ ________ ________  W o rth le ss
A w f u l _________________ ________ _ N ice
F a i r     U n fa ir
Sad _______________________________ Happy
A d e a l e r  r e s p o n d e n t in d i c a te d  h i s  f e e l i n g s  a b o u t s e l l i n g
th e  Brand X c a r p e t  w ith  t h i s  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  and n e t  p r o f i t s
re m a in in g  a b o u t w hat th e y  a r e  now. A n o th e r exam ple i s i
O r ig in a l  W h o lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  s e t s  a  ra n g e  o f  30 to  60 
p e r c e n t  m arkup o v e r  th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t  w ith in  w hich you m ust s e t  y o u r  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
A lso , y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  5 t o  15 p e r c e n t  o v e r  y o u r 
p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U n p le a sa n t ________________________________  P le a s a n t
Good ______________________ _________ Bad
V a lu a b le  ___ _____________ _ _________ W o rth le ss
A w f u l ________ _____________ ________  N ice
F a i r  ________________________________ U n fa ir
Sad ________________________________ Happy
N in e te e n  o th e r  c o m b in a tio n s  o f  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  and 
d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ap p e a re d  in  th e  d e a l e r  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  Each 
c o m b in a tio n  was i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a c o n c e p t .
The d a t a  r e l e v a n t  f o r  th e  e s t im a t io n  o f  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  
f u n c t io n  w ere o b ta in e d  from  a  s e r i e s  o f  f i v e  fo rc e d  c h o ic e  q u e s t io n s  
( s e e  A ppendix  A, P a r t  I I I ) .  A d i r e c t  q u e s t io n  ap p ro ac h  was u t i l i z e d  
b e c a u se  th e  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  
p a y o f f  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  How th e  d e a l e r s
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th in k  t h e i r  p a y o f f  o r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  a t  each  l e v e l
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  g u id e s  t h e i r  b e h a v io r .  An exam ple o f  th e  ty p e
o f  q u e s t io n  u sed  to  d is c o v e r  th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  e f f e c t s
o f  v a r io u s  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  i s  p r e s e n te d  h e r e .
O r ig in a l  W ho lesa le  S u p p ly , I n c .  o f f e r s  no su f i^ e s te d  r e t a i l  
p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  c h a rg e  y o u r cu s to m e rs  any  p r i c e  
t h a t  y o j  d e s i r e  f o r  th e  Brand X c a r p e t .
  y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t
  y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  rem a in  a b o u t w hat th e y  a r e  now
  y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  in c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  y o u r n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  in c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t
A n a ly s is  o f  D ata  C o lle c te d
P a ra m e tr ic  s t a t i s t i c a l  te c h n iq u e s  w ere u sed  to  a n a ly z e  th e
d a ta  c o l l e c t e d  by th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s .  Osgood, S u c i and Tannenbaum
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  f r e q u e n t ly  u sed  s e m a n tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  b ip o l a r
12a d j e c t i v e s  a r e  i n t e r v a l  s c a le d .  T h u r s to n e 's  law  o f  c o m p a ra tiv e  
judgem ent was u sed  to  g e n e ra te  i n t e r v a l  s c a le d  v a lu e s  f o r  th e  f i v e  
l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  The f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  d e f in e d  
above a r e  o r d i n a l - s c a l e d .  T hese l e v e l s  w ere u p g rad ed  to  i n t e r v a l -  
s c a le  l e v e l  to  a l lo w  th e  u se  o f  p a r a m e tr ic  s t a t i s t i c a l  te c h n iq u e s .
T ab le  4 .1  p r e s e n ts  in  summary form  th e  ty p e  o f  d a ta  c o l l e c t e d  
from  re s p o n d e n ts  o r  com puted from  t h e i r  r e s p o n s e s ,  th e  n o ta t io n  
u t i l i z e d ,  th e  e x a c t  so u rc e  o f  th e  d a t a ,  and th e  o p e r a t io n  u t i l i z e d  
to  g e n e ra te  th e  d a ta  (w here a p p r o p r i a t e ) .
In  P a r t  I o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  in s tru m e n t ,  each  s u b je c t  in d ic a te d  
w hich r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  he f e l t  was i n d i c a t i v e  o f  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e
12I b i d . , p .  146.
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Table 4 .1
Summary T ab le  o f  D ata T ypes, N o ta t io n ,  S o u rces  and O p e ra tio n s
Type o f  D ata
D ata
N o ta t io n

















O p e ra tio n
D e a le r  e v a lu a ­
t i o n s  o f  th e  
r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro l  
in d i c a te d  by th e  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s
POk ,k *
k « c o n t r o l  
l e v e l s
X
R e sp o n d e n ts ' 
p e r c e p t io n s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  su p ­
p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
im p lie d  by f i v e  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s .  
( R e s u l t s  a r e  
p r e s e n te d  in  
A ppendix  B .)
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  
d e a l e r  r e s p o n s e s  
to  r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c y  p a i r e d  
co m p ariso n s
PTk ,k *
k = c o n t r o l  
l e v e l s
X
g  ? V ’
n
n » number o f  
d e a l e r s  
su rv ey ed
Z -s c o re s  f o r  
T h u rs to n e  Law o f  
C o m para tive  
Judgem ents
ZSCk ,k * X
Taken from  a 
s ta n d a rd  norm al 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t a b l e
Sum o f  Z -s c o re s  
f o r  each  r e s a l e  
p r i c e  p o l i c y
SUMZr X
SUMZR = 2  (Z - 
s c o re s  
f o r  each  
p o l i c y  k )
R e la t iv e  c o n t ro l  
l e v e l  i n t e r v a l  
s c a le
Vk X Vk “  W  dn - l , n
Table 4 .1  (co n t in u e d )
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Type o f  D ata
D ata
N o ta t io n I II I I I Gen.
O p e ra tio n
D e a le r  e v a lu a ­
t i o n s  o f  con­
t r o l  and p a y o fi 
l e v e l  com bina­
t i o n s
Si> j» k » l
i= d e a le r  
j= p a y o f f  
k = c o n tro l  
l= s c a le
X
I n d iv id u a l  
d e a l e r  compos­
i t e  e v a lu a ­
t i o n s  f o r  each  
c o n c e p t
“ i . j . k X
6
ES. . , , J »k f 1
CS. . ,=1=1 i . J . k  6
A verage d e a l e r  
co m p o site  
e v a lu a t io n  f o r  
each  co n c e p t
ACSj , k X
"  ”  “ h
ECSi , j , k  
ACS. . = i= l  
J,K  n
Maximum r e l a ­
t i v e  c o n t r o l  
l e v e l  t o l e r ­
a te d  by a 
d e a l e r  a t  each  
p a y o f f  l e v e l
M C i , j
X M a tr ix  C heck o ff 
P ro c e d u re
D e a le r  p e rc e p ­
t i o n  o f  change 
in  p a y o f f p p i , k
X
A verage d e a l e r  
p e r c e p t io n  o f  
change in  pay­
o f f  a t  each  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l
APPk X
n
^ i k  
APPk= i= l  ’
n
D e a le r  p a y o f f
fu n c t io n
e q u a t io n Pm * f ( k )
X
R e g re s s io n i  _ 
PP. =a+bk+ck
1  j K
P P l j k - a + b k
T ab le  4 .1  ( c o n t in u e d )
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Type o f  D ata D ataN o ta tio n I I I I I I Gen. O p e ra tio n
R e g re s s io n  o f  
c o n c e p t 
e v a lu a t io n s  
a g a i n s t  p a y o ff  
l e v e l s
CSi , j , k = f ( j ) X
R e g re s s io n  
“ i . j . k = a  + bJ
R e g re s s io n  o f  
c o n c e p t 
e v a lu a t io n s  
a g a i n s t  con­
t r o l  l e v e l s
CSi , j , k = f ( k ) X
R e g re s s io n s
c s i , j ,k * * +b{vk )
D e a le r
to le r a n c e
f u n c t io n
Tm = f ( j , k ) X
R e g re s s io n s  
VR = a  + b j  
VR = a  + b j  + c j 2
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s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  f o r  te n  p a i r s  o f  such  p o l i c i e s .  A s im p le  f re q u e n c y  
t a b u la t i o n  y ie ld e d  th e  d a ta  needed  to  com pute i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  
f o r  th e  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  u sed  in  th e  s tu d y .
In  P a r t  I I  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  in s t r u m e n t ,  each  s u b je c t  re sp o n d ed  
to  tw e n ty -o n e  c o n c e p ts  by c h e c k in g  one o f  se v e n  p o in t s  on each  o f  s ix  
b ip o la r  s c a l e s .  The checks w ere c o n v e r te d  i n t o  n u m e ric a l v a lu e s  by 
a s s ig n in g  th e  l e a s t  f a v o r a b le  l o c a t i o n  a  v a lu e  o f  1 . th e  n e x t  l e a s t
f a v o r a b le  a  v a lu e  o f  2 , e t c .  The m ost f a v o r a b le  p o s i t i o n  was
a s s ig n e d  a v a lu e  o f  7 .
In  P a r t  I I I  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  in s t r u m e n t ,  e ach  s u b je c t  i n d i ­
c a te d  h i s  p e r c e p t io n  o f  th e  im p ac t each  o f  th e  f i v e  p o s s i b le  s u p p l i e r  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  would h av e  upon h i s  p a y o f f  o r  n e t  p r o f i t s .  An 
in d i c a t i o n  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i c y  would r e s u l t  in  a  15 to  25 p e r c e n t  
d e c re a s e  in  d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  was a s s ig n e d  a  n u m e ric a l v a lu e  o f  1 ; 
a check  in d i c a t i n g  a  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  n e t  p r o f i t  d e c r e a s e  r e c e iv e d  a
v a lu e  o f  2 ; e t c .  A check  in d i c a t i n g  a  15 to  25 p e r c e n t  n e t  p r o f i t
in c r e a s e  was a s s ig n e d  a  v a lu e  o f  5 .
From th e s e  th r e e  s e t s  o f  d a t a ,  a l l  o th e r  d a t a  n e c e s s a ry  to
t e s t  th e  h y p o th e se s  w ere g e n e r a te d .  T ab le  4 .1  in d i c a t e s  th e  a p p ro ­
p r i a t e  n o ta t io n  and th e  o p e r a t io n s  r e q u i r e d .  D e ta i l s  o f  th e  compu­
t a t i o n s  a r e  d is c u s s e d  below  w here a p p r o p r i a t e .  The fo l lo w in g  
h y p o th e se s  w ere exam ined .
H y p o th e s is  One
HQ1 T here  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  m easu res  o f
d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  each  o f  f i v e  l e v e l s
o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
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The o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  f i r s t  h y p o th e s is  was t o  d e te rm in e  i f  
t h e r e  was any s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p e rc e p ­
t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  o r  change in  n e t  p r o f i t s  f o r  each  o f  f i v e  s u p p l i e r  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  To t e s t  t h i s  h y p o th e s i s ,  a t r e a tm e n ts - b y -  
s u b je c t s ,  o r  r e p e a te d  m e a su re s , d e s ig n  and one-w ay a n a l y s i s  o f  
v a r ia n c e  was p e rfo rm ed  upon th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  
each  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  (PP. . ) .  The fo rm a t f o r  th e  d a t a  i s  shown1,K
in  T ab le  4 .2 .
The n u l l  h y p o th e s is  (Hq^ )  was r e j e c t e d  i f  th e  F -v a lu e
com puted co u ld  have o c c u rre d  by ch an ce  f i v e  o r  l e s s  t im e s  in  one
hundred  c a s e s  ( i . e .  a  .0 5  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ) .  I f  th e  f i r s t
h y p o th e s is  was r e j e c t e d ,  th e n  th e  c o n c lu s io n  was draw n t h a t  th e
d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a t  d i f f e r e n t
r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  T hus, th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n
(P ) was n o t  h o r i z o n t a l .  I f ,  on th e  o th e r  h an d , th e  com puted F - m-avg
v a lu e  co u ld  have o c c u rre d  by ch an ce  more th a n  f i v e  t im e s  in  one 
hundred  c a s e s ,  th e n  th e  f i r s t  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was n o t  r e j e c t e d .
H y p o th e s is  Two
2
A q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  form  y = a  + bx + cx 
d o es  n o t  d e s c r ib e  th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  
p a y o f f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  
th a n  a  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  form  y = a  + bx .
The o b je c t iv e  o f  t h i s  h y p o th e s is  was to  d e te rm in e  i f  th e
d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  had a  c o n s ta n t  s lo p e  o r  was c u r v i l i n e a r .  The
c o n c e p tu a l m odel in  F ig u re  2 .7  d e p i c t s  th e  m iddlem an ( d e a l e r )  p a y o f f
fu n c t io n  a s  n o n l in e a r .  T h is  h y p o th e s is  so u g h t to  v e r i f y  t h a t  d e p ic ­
t i o n .
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Table 4 .2
D is p la y  Form at f o r  D e a le r  P e rc e p t io n s  o f  P a y o ff  a t  D i f f e r e n t  
L e v e ls  o f  R e la t i v e  S u p p l ie r  C o n tro l
„  ,  R e la t iv e  C o n tro l L e v e lsD e a le r
R esponden t 1 2  3 4 5
1 PP1 ,1
PP r  1 ,2 PP1 ,3 PPr  1 ,4 PP1 ,5
2 PP2 ,1 PP2 , 2 PP2 ,3 PP- . 2 ,4 ?P2 ,5
3 PP3 ,1 PP3 ,2 PP3 ,3 PP3 ,4 PP3 ,5
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
• • • • • •
n PP . n , l PP _ n , 2 PPn 1n ,3 PP , n ,4 pP - n ,5
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To t e s t  t h i s  h y p o th e s i s ,  two r e g r e s s io n  e q u a t io n s  w ere com­
p u te d .  The in d iv id u a l  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  ch an g es in  p a y o f f  a t  
each  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  (PP^ k ) w ere r e g r e s s e d  a g a i n s t  th e  
v a lu e s  com puted f o r  th e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  ( t h e  i n t e r v a l  
s c a l e  v a lu e s  com puted f o r  th e  k r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s ) .  The 
f i r s t  e q u a t io n  form  u sed  was l i n e a r t  PP^ k = a  + b (V ^ ). S econd , 
a c u r v i l i n e a r  e q u a t io n  was u sed  in  th e  r e g r e s s io n i  PP. .=  a  + b(V. )
1 | K  K
+ c(VR) 2 .
The s e l e c t i o n  o f  th e  e q u a t io n  form  w hich b e t t e r  e x p la in e d
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  and l e v e l s  o f
r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro l  ( i . e . ,  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t io n )  was based  upon
2
th e  com puted v a lu e  o f  R in  th e  two r e g r e s s i o n s .  W hichever e q u a t io n
2
form  y ie ld e d  th e  l a r g e s t  R and was d e te rm in e d  to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  ( F - t e s t )  was a c c e p te d .
2
I f  th e  e q u a t io n  form  y = a  + bx y ie ld e d  a  h ig h e r  R t h a t
was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e n  th e  second  h y p o th e s is  was n o t
2 2 r e j e c t e d .  I f  th e  e q u a t io n  form  y *= a  + bx + cx y ie ld e d  a  h ig h e r  R
t h a t  was s t a t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e n  th e  second  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was
r e j e c t e d .  I f  th e  second  h y p o th e s is  was r e j e c t e d ,  th e n  th e  d e a l e r
p a y o f f  f u n c t io n  f o r  t h i s  g roup  o f  d e a l e r s  was d e te rm in e d  to  be
c u r v i l i n e a r .  In  o th e r  w o rd s, d e a l e r  p r o f i t s  w ere p e r c e iv e d  to
in c r e a s e  w ith  a d d i t i o n a l  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  w ith in  some ra n g e  and
th e n  to  d e c re a s e  w ith  a d d i t i o n a l  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
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H y p o th e s is  T hree
Hq3 T here  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  among th e  m easu res 
o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  c o m b in a tio n s  
o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .
The t h i r d  h y p o th e s is  was d e s ig n e d  to  d e te rm in e  i f  th e r e  was 
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  each  o f  
tw en ty  p a y o f f  ( l e v e l s  2 to  5 ) and c o n t r o l  ( l e v e l s  1 to  5 ) com bi­
n a t io n s .  A t r e a tm e n ts - b y - t r e a tm e n ts - b y - s u b je c t s  d e s ig n  and tw o- 
f a c t o r  a n a ly s i s  o f  v a r ia n c e  was u sed  to  t e s t  t h i s  h y p o th e s is  ( s e e  
d a t a  fo rm a t in  T ab le  4 . 3 ) .  The d e a le r s *  co m p o site  a t t i t u d e  s c o re s  
(CSj f o r  each  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n  w ere a n a ly z e d .  
The a n a ly s i s  o f  v a r ia n c e  p ro c e d u re  in d ic a te d  w h e th e r o r  n o t  th e  
d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e  s c o re s  d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a c r o s s  th e  tw en ty  
p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n s .
An F -v a lu e  was com puted f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een  t r e a t ­
m ents ( i . e .  th e  tw en ty  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n s ) .  I f  
th e  com puted F -v a lu e  co u ld  have o c c u rre d  by ch ance  more th a n  f i v e  
tim e s  in  o n e-h u n d red  c a s e s  ( i . e .  a .0 5  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ) ,  th e n  
th e  t h i r d  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was n o t  r e j e c t e d .  I f ,  on th e  o th e r  h an d , 
th e  com puted F -v a lu e  co u ld  have o c c u rre d  by ch an ce  o n ly  f i v e  o r  l e s s  
tim e s  in  o n e-h u n d red  c a s e s  ( i . e .  a .0 5  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e ) ,  th e n  
th e  t h i r d  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  was r e j e c t e d .  T h is  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
th e  d e a l e r s '  e v a lu a t io n s  d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a c r o s s  th e  tw en ty  
p a y o f f  and c o n t ro l  l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n s .
The f o u r th ,  f i f t h  and s i x t h  h y p o th e se s  in d ic a te d  th e  n a tu r e  
o f  th e  d e a l e r  to le r a n c e  f u n c t io n .
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Table 4 .3
D ata  Form at f o r  A n a ly s is  o f  HQ3i To T e s t f o r  S i g n i f i c a n t  
D if f e r e n c e s  in  D e a le r  A t t i t u d e s  Toward Twenty 
P a y o ff  and C o n tro l L ev e l C om binations
R e la t i v e  S u p p l ie r  C o n tro l L e v e ls
D e a le r
P a y o ff
L e v e ls
c s .  . .i , j , k 1 2 3 4 5
2 “ i» 2 , l “ 1 , 2 ,2 “ i , 2 , 3
c s .1 ,2 ,4 “ 1 .2 .5
3 “ i , 3 , l “ 1 ,3 ,2 “ i» 3 ,3 c s  • ,  , 1 ,3 ,4 “ 1 ,3 ,5
4 “ i , 4 , l “ 1 ,4 ,2 “ i . 4 . 3 c s .  . ,1 ,4 ,4 “ 1 ,4 ,5
5
“ 1 .5 .1 “ i ,  5 ,2 “ i . 5 . 3
CS. _ . i , 5 , 4 “ 1 ,5 ,5
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H y p o th e s is  Four
HQ4 The m easu res  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  
c o m b in a tio n s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  a r e  n o t  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  
to  in c r e a s in g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
The f o u r th  h y p o th e s is  was t e s t e d  to  i s o l a t e  th e  e f f e c t  o f  
in c r e a s in g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  upon m easu re s  o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard 
co m b in a tio n s  o f  m iddlem an p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .  The 
c o n c e p tu a l model p r e s e n te d  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p te r  was based  upon th e  
s u p p o s i t io n  t h a t  c h an n e l m iddlem en p r e f e r  more r a t h e r  th a n  l e s s  
econom ic p a y o f f .  I f  t h i s  s u p p o s i t io n  was c o r r e c t ,  th e n  th e  m easu res  
o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  c o m b in a tio n s  o f  f o u r  p a y o f f  and 
f i v e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t ro l  l e v e l s  sh o u ld  have  been p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  to  
in c r e a s in g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
To t e s t  t h i s  f o u r th  h y p o th e s i s ,  th e  m e asu re s  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  
d e a l e r s '  co m p o site  e v a lu a t io n s  f o r  each  o f  tw en ty  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  
l e v e l  c o m b in a tio n s  w ere r e g r e s s e d  a g a i n s t  n u m e ric a l v a lu e s  a s s ig n e d  
to  th e  f i v e  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( j  = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) .  A v a lu e  o f  j  = 1 was 
a s s ig n e d  to  th e  p a y o f f  l e v e l  d e s c r ib e d  a s  a  f i f t e e n  to  tw e n ty - f iv e  
p e r c e n t  d e c re a s e  in  d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s .  A v a lu e  o f  j  = 5 was 
a s s ig n e d  to  th e  f i f t e e n  to  tw e n ty - f iv e  p e r c e n t  n e t - p r o f i t - i n c r e a s e  
l e v e l .  A r e g r e s s io n  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  form  was com puted .
“ i . j . k  = > +
w here i i  = d e a l e r  re sp o n d e n t
j  = p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( j  = 2 , 3 , 4 , o r  5) 
k = r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .
T ab le  4 .4  p r e s e n ts  th e  fo rm a t f o r  th e  d a t a  u sed  in  th e
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Table 4 .4
Form at f o r  D e te rm in in g  th e  E f f e c t  o f  P a y o ff  L e v e ls  
upon D e a le r  A t t i tu d e s  Toward R e la t iv e  C o n tro l 
and P a y o ff  L ev e l C om binations
I n d iv id u a l  D e a le r
C om posite E v a lu a tio n
S c o re s  (CS. . . )
*-> J»K
P a y o ff  L e v e ls  
( j  = 1 to  5)
c s , „ , 21 , 2 ,1
CS, ,  „ 21 , 2 ,2
CS, „ „ 21 ,2 ,3
CS, ,  , 21 ,2 ,4
c s , „ 21 ,2 ,5








CS c # 5n , 5 ,4
CS r r 5n , 5 ,5
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r e g r e s s io n .
The d e c i s io n  to  r e j e c t  o r  n o t r e j e c t  th e  f o u r th  h y p o th e s is  
was based  upon th e  fo l lo w in g  c r i t e r i a i
( 1 . )  an F - t e s t  to  d e te rm in e  i f  th e  r e g r e s s io n  e q u a t io n  ^
was s i g n i f i c a n t  ( i . e .  r e j e c t  th e  h y p o th e s is  t h a t  R =0 ) ;
( 2 . )  th e  s ig n  o f  th e  b e ta  c o e f f i c i e n t  com puted f o r  th e  
p a y o f f  l e v e l  in d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e  ( j ) j
( 3 . )  a t - t e s t  f o r  s ig n i f i c a n c e  f o r  th e  b e ta  c o e f f i c i e n t  
( i . e .  r e j e c t  th e  h y p o th e s is  t h a t  b = 0 ) .
The f o u r th  h y p o th e s is  was r e j e c t e d  i f  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
. . 2s i g n i f i c a n t  R was com puted , th e  b e ta  c o e f f i c i e n t  on j  (p a y o f f  
l e v e l s )  was g r e a t e r  th a n  z e r o ,  and th e  com puted b e ta  c o e f f i c i e n t  was 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  R e je c t io n  o f  th e  f o u r th  h y p o th e s is  would 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  m easu re s  o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  th e  tw en ty  
co m b in a tio n s  o f  p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  w ere p o s i t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  to  in c r e a s in g  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .
H y p o th e s is  F iv e
HQ5 The m easu re s  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  
c o m b in a tio n s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  a r e  n o t  n e g a t iv e ly  r e l a t e d  
to  in c r e a s in g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
The o b je c t iv e  o f  th e  f i f t h  h y p o th e s is  was com plem entary  to  
t h a t  o f  th e  f o u r th  h y p o th e s i s .  T h is  h y p o th e s is  was t e s t e d  to  
i d e n t i f y  th e  e f f e c t  o f  in c r e a s in g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t ro l  
upon m easu res  o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  d i f f e r e n t  c o m b in a tio n s  o f  
p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .  The c o n c e p tu a l m odel o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  p re s e n te d  in  c h a p te r  t h r e e  p o s i te d  t h a t  ch a n n e l m iddlem en 
p r e f e r  l e s s  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  to  more r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r
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c o n t r o l .  I f  t h i s  was c o r r e c t ,  th e n  th e  m easu re s  o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  
tow ard tw en ty  co m b in a t io n s  o f  f o u r  p a y o f f  and f i v e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
l e v e l s  s h o u ld  have  been n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
The f i f t h  h y p o th e s i s  was t e s t e d  by r e g r e s s i n g  th e  m easu res  
o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r s '  c o m p o s i te  e v a l u a t i o n s  f o r  each  o f  th e  
tw en ty  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l  c o m b in a t io n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  v a lu e s  
a s s ig n e d  to  th e  f i v e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .  A r e g r e s s i o n  e q u a t io n  
o f  th e  f o l lo w in g  form  was computed i
c s i , j , k  = a + b(vk)
w here t i  = d e a l e r  r e s p o n d e n t
j  = p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( j  = 2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  o r  5)
k = r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s
= i n t e r v a l  s c a l e d  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  v a l u e s .
T ab le  4 .5  p r e s e n t s  th e  fo rm a t  f o r  t h e  d a t a  used  i n  th e  r e g r e s s i o n .
The v a lu e s  f o r  V^, where k = 1 , 2 ,  3, 4 , o r  5, were g e n e r a te d  by
a p p ly in g  T h u r s t o n e 's  la w  o f  c o m p a r a t iv e  ju d g e m en t .
The same c r i t e r i a  used  to  a c c e p t  o r  r e j e c t  th e  f o u r t h
h y p o th e s i s  were u sed  f o r  th e  f i f t h  h y p o t h e s i s .  The f i f t h  h y p o th e s i s
2
was r e j e c t e d  i f  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  R was com puted, th e  b e ta  
c o e f f i c i e n t  on ( r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s )  was l e s s  th a n  z e r o ,  and
th e  computed b e t a  c o e f f i c i e n t  was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  R e je c ­
t i o n  o f  th e  f i f t h  h y p o th e s i s  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  m e asu re s  o f  
d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  th e  tw en ty  c o m b in a t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  were n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  to  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
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Table 4 . 5
Format f o r  D ata  Used in  R e g re s s io n  t o  D ete rm ine  th e  E f f e c t  
o f  R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L e v e ls  upon D e a le r  A t t i t u d e s  
Toward P a y o f f  and R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  
Leve l C om binations
I n d i v i d u a l  D e a le r R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l
Composite E v a lu a t io n S c a le  V a lues
S c o re s  (CS. . , ) 
i . J . k <v
“ 1 , 2 ,1 V1
“ 1 , 2 ,2 V2
“ l , 2 , 3 V3
“ l , 2 ,<. V4
“ l , 2 , 5 V5












CS c . n* 5 ,4
•
V4
CS c _ n ,  5, 5 V5
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H y p o th e s is  S ix
2HQ6 A q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  form y = a + bx + cx does  
n o t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  d e a l e r s '  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  th a n  a  s t r a i g h t  l i n e  e q u a t io n  
o f  th e  form y = a + bx .
The o b j e c t i v e  o f  th e  s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  was t o  d e te r m in e  i f  
t h e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  had a c o n s t a n t  s lo p e  o r  was c u r v i l i n e a r .  
The c o n c e p tu a l  model in  F ig u re  2 .7  d e p i c t e d  th e  m iddlem an ( d e a l e r )  
t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  to  be k in k e d  — c o n s i s t i n g  o f  two l i n e a r  p o r t i o n s .  
I t  was shown to  have  a c o n s t a n t ,  p o s i t i v e  s lo p e  th ro u g h o u t  a ra n g e  
o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  and th e n  t o  become v e r t i c a l .  T h is  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
can be b e t t e r  e x p la in e d  by a c u r v i l i n e a r  e q u a t io n  th a n  by a  c o n s t a n t  
s lo p e  o r  l i n e a r  e q u a t io n .
The i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  i s  t h e  lo c u s  o f  
p o i n t s  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  d e a l e r  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  p e r c e iv e d  
d e a l e r  p a y o f f .  The a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  was d e te rm in e d  
by a n a ly z in g  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  v a r i o u s  c o m b in a t io n s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  changes  in  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  o r  p r o f i t s .
Each d e a l e r  su rv ey ed  e v a l u a te d  and r e p o r t e d  h i s  f e e l i n g s  tow ard  each  
c o m b in a t io n  o f  a s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  ( a  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
l e v e l )  and a  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l  ( l e v e l  o f  change in  d e a l e r  p r o f i t s ) .
The d e a l e r  e v a l u a t i o n s  were s t a t e d  in  r e s p o n s e s  t o  s i x  
se m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  f o r  each  o f  tw e n ty -o n e  
c o n c e p ts  (c o m b in a t io n s  o f  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  and p a y o f f  l e v e l s ) .  A 
v a lu e  o f  one ( 1 ) was a s s ig n e d  to  th e  l e a s t  f a v o r a b l e  end o f  th e  
b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e  s c a l e s  and a  v a l u e  o f  seven  (7 )  was a s s ig n e d  to
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t h e  m ost f a v o r a b l e  end o f  t h e  s c a l e s .  A c o m p o s i te  s c o r e  was d e t e r ­
mined by com puting an a v e ra g e  o f  th e  s i x  v a lu e s  a c r o s s  th e  s i x  
a d j e c t i v a l  s c a l e s  f o r  each  c o n c e p t .  The r e s u l t a n t  c o m p o s i te  o r  
a v e ra g e  s c o r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  a d e a l e r ' s  a v e ra g e  e v a l u a t i o n  o r  " f e e l i n g "  
a b o u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o m b in a t io n  o f  a  p a y o f f  and a c o n t r o l  l e v e l .
The maximum l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  a t  each  
p a y o f f  l e v e l  by a d e a l e r  was d e te rm in e d  in  t h e  f o l l o w in g  m anner.  A 
m a t r ix  o f  co m p o si te  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c o r e s  f o r  tw e n ty -o n e  
c o m b in a t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  was computed as  
shown in  T ab le  4 .6 .
T a b le  4 .6
Format f o r  a Com posite S em a n tic  D i f f e r e n t i a l  S c o re  M a tr ix  
f o r  an I n d i v i d u a l  D ea le r*  D e a le r  i
R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L e v e ls  ( k )
1 2 3 4 5
P a y o f f
1
“ i . l t l
L e v e ls
( j )
2 CS i  > 2 ,1 CSi , 2 ,2 “ i , 2 , 3 cs  i ,  .1 , 2 ,4 “ 1 . 2 . 5
3 ^ i ,  3 ,1 C S i , 3 , 2 “ i . 3 , 3 CS. .  i , 3 , 4 “ 1 . 3 ,5
4 CSi » 4 , l “ 1 ,4 ,2 CS i  > 4 ,3 cs.i , 4 , 4 “ i , 4 , 5
5 ^ i »  5 ,1 CS i »5 , 2 CSk, 5 ,3 CS 2 , 1 , 5 ,4 “ l , 5 , 5
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C o n tro l  l e v e l s  1 t o  5 and p a y o f f  l e v e l s  1 t o  5 w ere d e f in e d
ab o v e .  Each CS. . . i s  an a v e ra g e  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c o r e  f o r  
J »K
a c o m b in a t io n  o f  p a y o f f  l e v e l  j  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l  k .  CS. i s1 ,1 , 1
one d e a l e r ' s  co m p o s i te  s c o r e  f o r  a s i t u a t i o n  in  w hich t h e  d e a l e r
h a s  p r i c i n g  autonomy b u t  a g r e a t  d e c r e a s e  in  h i s  p r o f i t s  (15  to  25
p e r c e n t  d e c r e a s e ) .  I t  was assumed t h a t  due t o  th e  ex trem e l o s s  o f
p r o f i t s ,  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  would c l e a r l y  n o t  be t o l e r a t e d  by any d e a l e r .
T h is  s c o r e ,  CS. , s e rv e d  a s  an  i n d i c a t o r  o f  a l e v e l  o f  e v a l u a t i o n  1, 1 , 1
t h a t  was u n a c c e p ta b l e  t o  th e  d e a l e r .  At each  p a y o f f  l e v e l  ( 2 ,  3 , 4 , 
and 5 ) ,  a l l  s c o r e s  (CS. . . ) t h a t  w ere e q u a l  t o  o r  l e s s  th a n  CS. .. ..
1,J,K 1, 1,1
r e p r e s e n t e d  l e v e l s  o f  c o n t r o l  t h a t  were n o t  t o l e r a b l e .  Thus, i f
CS. _ was l e s s  th a n  CS. _ » b u t  g r e a t e r  th a n  CS. _ th e n  th e1 , 1 , 1  1 ,£,Z 1 » / , J
maximum l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  a t  p a y o f f  l e v e l  2 was
d e te rm in e d  to  be r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  2 .  The same a n a l y s i s  was
cond u c ted  f o r  each  m a t r ix  row t o  d e te rm in e  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  a t  each  p a y o f f  l e v e l  f o r  an i n d i v i d u a l
d e a l e r .  T h is  p ro c e d u re  was te rm ed  th e  m a t r ix  c h e c k o f f  p r o c e d u r e .
T ab le  4 .7  i n d i c a t e s  th e  fo rm a t  f o r  p r e s e n t i n g  in  summary
form a l l  d e a l e r  r e s p o n d e n t s '  c o m p o s i te  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c o r e s
f o r  each  c o m b in a t io n  o f  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  (CS. . , ) .  Thei , J, k
Maximum R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L eve l (MC. . )  t o l e r a t e d  by each  d e a l e r  a t
1 »J
each p a y o f f  l e v e l  was d e te rm in e d  by com paring each  d e a l e r ' s  i n d i c a t o r  
s c o r e  (CS. , , )  w ith  h i s  o t h e r  tw en ty  com p o si te  s c o r e s .  G iven th e
m 1 | 1
maximum r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  t o l e r a t e d  by each  d e a l e r  a t  each 
p a y o f f  l e v e l ,  i t  was a s im p le  t a s k  t o  compute a r e g r e s s i o n  e q u a t io n  
from th e  d a t a .  The fo rm a t  f o r  t h e  d a t a  n e c e s s a r y  to  compute th e
Table  4 . 7
F orm at f o r  D e te rm in in g  t h e  Maximum R e l a t i v e  C o n t r o l  L e v e l  
T o l e r a t e d  by Each D e a le r  a t  Each P a y o f f  L ev e l
D e a l e r
V a l u e  o f
P a y o f f
L e v e l s
( j )
R e l a t i v e C o n t r o l L e v e l s Maximum
R e l a t i v e
C o n t r o l
L e v e l
T o l e r a t e d
S c o r e
“ i . 1 . 1
1 2 3 4 5
1





“ 1 . 2 , 1
“ 1 . 3 . 1
“ 1 . 4 . 1
“ l . S . l
“ l , 2 , 2
“ l , 3 . 2
“ l , 4 , 2
“ l . 5 . 2
“ l , 2 , 3
“ l , 3 , 3
“ 1 , 4 , 3
“ 1 . 5 . 3
cs, , ,1 . 2 . 4
cs, , ,1 . 3 . 4
cs, ,  ,1 . 4 . 4  
“ 1 . 5 . 4
“ l , 2 , 5
“ 1 , 3 , 5
“ l , 4 , 5









“ 2 , 2 , 1
“ 2 , 3 . 1
“ 2 , 4 , 1
“ 2 . 5 , 1
“ 2 , 2 , 2
“ 2 , 3 , 2
C S ,  . ,  2 , 4 , 2
“ 2 , 5 , 2
“ 2 . 2 , 3
“ 2 . 3 , 3
“ 2 , 4 , 3
“ 2 , 5 , 3
“ 2 , 2 , 4
cs, , ,2 . 3 . 4
cs, ,  ,2 . 4 . 4
cs, -  ,2 . 5 . 4
“ 2 , 2 , 5
“ 2 , 3 , 5
“ 2 , 4 , 5





e • e • • e e • •
e e e e • e • e e
• e e e • • • • •




“ n . 2 , 1  
“ n ,  3 , 1  
“ n . 4 . 1  
“ n ,  5 , 1
cs ,  ,n , 2 , 2
CS ,  ,  n , 3 , 2
CS . ,  
n , *4 ,2
CS c ,  n , 5 , 2
“ n , 2 . 3
“ n . 3 . 3
CS . ,  
n , 4 , 3
CS -  ,  n , 5 , 3
cs , ,n , 2 , 4
cs„ , , n , 3 , 4
cs . ,n , 4 , 4
CS c . n , 5 , 4
“ n , 2 , 5
CS ,  ,  
n » 3 » 5
cs , cn , 4 , 5
CS c c n , 5 , 5
MC ,  
n , 2




MC , n , 5
*MC, . ■ 1,2 >3»4V or 5; i*e .  the f ive  r e la t iv e  control leve ls
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a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  (T ) i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  T a b le  4 . 8 .m-avg
The a p p r o p r i a t e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  s c a l e  v a l u e s  (V^) t h a t  were 
computed f o r  each  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  w ere r e g r e s s e d  a g a i n s t  th e  
f o u r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( j  = 2 , 3 , 4 ,  o r  5 ) .  Two e q u a t io n s  o f  t h e  f o l lo w in g  
form w ere g e n e r a t e d »
( 1 . )  VR » a  + b j
( 2 . )  VR = a + b j  + c j 2
w h e re « Vk = r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  s c a l e  v a l u e s
j  = p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( j  = 2 , 3 , 4 ,  o r  5)
The s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  e q u a t io n  form  which b e t t e r  e x p l a i n s  th e
r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l
2
and l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  was based  upon th e  computed v a l u e  o f  R
2
i n  th e  two e q u a t i o n s .  W hichever e q u a t io n  y i e ld e d  t h e  l a r g e r  R t h a t
was d e te rm in e d  to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  ( F - t e s t )  was a c c e p te d .
2
I f  th e  e q u a t io n  form Vk = a  + b j  y i e ld e d  a  h i g h e r  R t h a t
was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e n  t h e  s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  was n o t
r e j e c t e d .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  was a c o n s t a n t  s lo p e  to  t h e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e
2
f u n c t i o n .  I f  t h e  c u r v i l i n e a r  e q u a t io n  fo rm , Vk e  a + b j  + c j  ,
2
y ie l d e d  a h ig h e r  R t h a t  was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e n  th e  
s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  was r e j e c t e d .  T h is  would i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  d e a l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  was c u r v i l i n e a r  and th e  r a t e  o f  change in  d e a l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  v a r i e d  o v e r  th e  r a n g e  o f  
d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
T ab le  4 .9  p r e s e n t s  in  summary form  th e  im p o r ta n t  s t a t i s t i c a l  
o p e r a t i o n s  and t e s t s  t h a t  were u t i l i z e d  i n  th e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  each 
o f  th e  s i x  h y p o th e s e s .  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  f o r e g o in g  a n a l y s i s ,  two
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Table 4 .8
Format f o r  D ata  Needed t o  G e n e ra te  t h e  A verage 
C a rp e t  D e a le r  (M iddleman) T o le ra n c e  E q u a t io n
P a y o f f Maximum R e l a t i v e
D e a le r L ev e ls C o n tro l  Level R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l
( j ) T o l e r a t e d
(MCi , j )
S c a le  V alues
<v
1 2 MC1 ,2 vk
3 MC1 ,3 vk
4 MC1 ,4 vk
5 MC1 ,5 vk
2 2 MC1 ,2 vk
3 MC1 ,3 vk

















MC - n »2
•
vk
3 MC ,  n ,  3 vk
4 MC . n ,4 vk
5 MC c n ,  5 vk
Table 4 .9
Summary o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  T e s t s  and O p e ra t io n s  f o r  Each H y p o th es is
H ypotheses S t a t i s t i c a l  O p e ra t io n s  and T e s t s
HQ1 T here  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  th e  
m easu res  o f  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  
a t  each o f  f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l
1 .  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r i a n c e  —
t r e a t m e n t s - b y - s u b j e c t s  d e s ig n  
Compute F v a lu e
2
Hq2 a  q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  t h e  form y=a+bx+cx 
d oes  n o t  d e s c r i b e  th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  
o f  p a y o f f  a t  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  th a n  a s t r a i g h t  
l i n e  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  form y=a+bx.
1 . R e g re s s io n  w ith  two e q u a t io n  
forms
2
2 . Computet a . )  R
b . )  F - t e s t  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e
Hq j  There  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  among 
th e  m easu re s  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r s '  
a t t i t u d e s  tow ard tw en ty  c o m b in a t io n s  o f  
d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  r e l a ­
t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
1 .  A n a ly s is  o f  v a r i a n c e  —
t r e a t m e n t s - b y - t r e a t m e n t s - b y -  
s u b j e c t s  d e s ig n  and f a c t o r i a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  
Compute F -v a lu e
HQ4 The m easu res  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  
tow ard tw en ty  co m b in a t io n s  o f  d e a l e r  
p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  a r e  n o t  p o s i t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  to  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
1 .  R e g re s s io n !  CS. . = a + b j
i »J »*t
2
2 . Compute! a . )  R
b . )  F - t e s t  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e
c . )  t - t e s t s  on b e t a s
Table 4 .9  (con t in u ed )
H ypotheses S t a t i s t i c a l  O p e ra t io n s  and T e s t s
HQ5 The m easu res  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  
tow ard  tw enty  co m b in a t io n s  o f  d e a l e r  
p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  a r e  n o t  n e g a t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o r  r e l a ­
t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
1 .  R e g re s s io n :  CS. . = a + bV.1 , j ,K  k
2 . Compute: a . )
b . )  F - t e s t  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e
c . )  t - t e s t s  on b e t a  
c o e f f i c i e n t s
HQ6 A q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  t h e  form 
y=a+bx+cx2 does  n o t  d e s c r i b e  th e  
d e a l e r s ’ t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  th a n  a 
s t r a i g h t  l i n e  e q u a t io n  o f  t h e  form 
y=a+bx.
1 .  R e g re s s io n  w ith  two e q u a t io n  
forms
2
2 . Compute: a . )  R
b . )  F - t e s t  f o r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e
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im p o r ta n t  e q u a t io n s  w ere  g e n e r a te d !
1 .  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  (P  ) im-avg
a . )  FPl  k = a  + b(VR) ,  o r
b *) PPi>k = a  + b(Vk ) + c(VR) 2
2. t h e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  (T ) im-avg
a . ) Vk = a + b j ,  o r
b . )  VR = a + b j  + c j 2 .
These two e q u a t io n s  c o m p rise  th e  d e a l e r  o r  middleman p o r t i o n  o f  th e  
c o m p le te  model o f  c h a n n e l  c o n t r o l .  P lacem en t o f  th e  two e q u a t io n s  
upon a s e t  o f  ax es  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  maximum 
l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by t h e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  
and i d e n t i f i e d  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  a t  which t h e  a v e ra g e  
d e a l e r  p e r c e iv e d  h i s  p r o f i t s  t o  be  m ax im ized . T h is  was th e  e m p i r i c a l  
d e p i c t i o n  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  shown in  F ig u re  3 . 3 .
V a l i d i t y  and R e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  R e s e a rc h  I n s t ru m e n t
T here  a r e  no p r e v io u s  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  m easurem ent o f  c o n t r o l  
in  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l .  T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  v a l i d i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  
o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s  a r e  im p o r ta n t  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  to  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e .
V a l i d i t y . A m e a su r in g  in s t r u m e n t  i s  v a l i d  t o  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t
13i t  m easu res  what i t  i s  p u r p o r te d  to  m e asu re .  The e v a l u a t i o n  o f  
th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  m e a su r in g  in s t r u m e n t  i s  d e p e n d e n t  upon
13K e r l in g er ,  op.  c i t . , p.  444 .
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t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  some e x t e r n a l  c r i t e r i o n .  As m e asu re s  o f  m ean ing , 
s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c o r e s  s h o u ld  be c o r r e l a t e d  w i th  some in d e p e n ­
d e n t  c r i t e r i a  o f  m ean ing . However, t h e r e  a r e  no such  c r i t e r i a .
Ample e v id e n c e  e x i s t s ,  how ever,  t o  s u p p o r t  th e  c o n t e n t io n  
t h a t  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s c a l e s  y i e l d  v a l i d  m e asu re s  o f  m eaning . 
F u r th e rm o re ,  Osgood, S u c i  and Tannenbaum c o n c lu d e  t h a t  th e  a d j e c t i v e  
p a i r s  t e s t e d  i n  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  p o s s e s s  a h ig h  d e g re e  o f  " f a c e
v a l i d i t y ” ; t h a t  i s ,  th e y  y i e l d  d i s t i n c t i o n s  t h a t  c o r re s p o n d  w ith
14th o s e  t h a t  most o b s e r v e r s  would make w i th o u t  t h e  in s t r u m e n t .
T hree  ty p e s  o f  v a l i d i t y  can be i d e n t i f i e d . 1 ^ C o n te n t  
v a l i d i t y  r e f e r s  t o  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  t e s t  i tem s  to  th e  
f i e l d  b e in g  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  M a rk e t in g  a c a d e m ic ia n s  a d v i s i n g  th e  
r e s e a r c h e r  s e rv e d  a s  a p a n e l  o f  e x p e r t s  ju d g in g  t h e  c o n t e n t  v a l i d i t y  
o f  th e  in s t r u m e n t  i t e m s .  A lso ,  p r e l i m i n a r y  in t e r v i e w s  w i th  ru g  and 
c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  and d i s t r i b u t o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  th e  
c o n te n t  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  i n s t r u m e n t .
An in s t r u m e n t  has  p r e d i c t i v e  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  
"w orks” o r  e n a b le s  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  t o  p r e d i c t .  T e s t in g  f o r  p r e d i c t i v e  
v a l i d i t y  r e q u i r e s  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  t o  d e v e lo p  o r  o b t a i n  an  e x t e r n a l  
c r i t e r i o n  a g a i n s t  which th e  t e s t  r e s u l t s  can  be m a tch ed .  The
14 For e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  commonly used  b i p o l a r  
a d j e c t i v a l  s c a l e s  s e e i  Osgood, e t . a l . , o p . c i t . , p p .  140-166 ; and 
George S t r i c h k e r ,  "The Use o f  t h e  S em an tic  D i f f e r e n t i a l  t o  P r e d i c t  
V o tin g  B e h a v i o r , ” J o u r n a l  o f  S o c i a l  P s y c h o lo g y , V o l .  59 (F e b ru a ry ,  
1 9 6 3 ) ,  p p .  159-167 .
15See Paul E. Green and Donald S.  T u l l ,  o£ .  c i t . , pp. 200-
201.
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r e s e a r c h  in s t r u m e n t  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  s h o u ld  have  y i e ld e d  r e s u l t s  t h a t  
i n d i c a t e  h i g h e r  d e a l e r  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  h ig h  p r o f i t  and 
autonomy and lo w er  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  low p r o f i t  and autonomy s i t u a t i o n s .  
The in s t r u m e n t  was c o n s id e r e d  t o  have  f a c e  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  were fo u n d .
C o n s t r u c t  v a l i d i t y  o f  an  in s t r u m e n t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g  o f  why a  r e s e a r c h  in s t r u m e n t  w orks.  G reen and T u l l  s u g g e s t  
t h a t  w h i le  c o n s t r u c t  v a l i d a t i o n  i s  v e ry  im p o r ta n t  i t  i s  o f t e n  d i f f i ­
c u l t  t o  a c h i e v e . 16 I t  was conc luded  t h a t  r e p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
m ethodo logy  in  s e v e r a l  ch an n e l  g ro u p s  i s  r e q u i r e d  b e f o r e  i t  i s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  a t t r i b u t e  c o n s t r u c t  v a l i d i t y  t o  t h e  in s t r u m e n t .
R e l i a b i l i t y . A m e asu r in g  in s t r u m e n t  i s  r e l i a b l e  t o  th e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  f r e e  from e x p e r im e n ta l  e r r o r . 11 Osgood, S u c i  and
Tannenbaum i n d i c a t e  t h a t  th e  a d j e c t i v a l  s c a l e s  used  in  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h
, . 18 a r e  q u i t e  r e l i a b l e .
I t  was n o t  f e a s i b l e  t o  ju d g e  t h e  te m p o ra l  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  
th e  r e s e a r c h  in s t r u m e n t  in  t h i s  s tu d y ,  b u t  a s p l i t - h a l v e s  r e l i a b i l i t y  
m easu re  was computed to  e s t i m a t e  i n t e r n a l  r e l i a b i l i t y .  The one 
hundred  and tw e n t y - s i x  (1 2 6 )  s c o r e s  ( s i x  s c a l e s  t im es  tw e n ty -o n e  
c o n c e p ts )  w ere d iv i d e d  i n t o  two e q u a l  g roups  t o  compute th e  s p l i t -  
h a lv e s  r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t .
16 I b i d . , p .  2 01 .
1 7 I b i d . ,  p p .  201- 202 .
18 Osgood, e t . a l . ,  op . c i t . , pp.  126-140 .
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L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  R e se a rc h  M ethodology
At th e  o u t s e t ,  t h e r e  ap p e a re d  t o  be no s e v e r e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  
t h i s  s tu d y .  Each o f  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  rev iew ed  below  was d i s c u s s e d  in  
i t s  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n t e x t  th ro u g h o u t  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  Given th e  s t a t e d  
p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  to  t e s t  f o r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h y p o th e s iz e d  in  
th e  c o n c e p tu a l  m odel, t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  f o r  th e  most p a r t  seem i n s i g ­
n i f i c a n t .
One l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h e  sm a l l  sam ple  s i z e  and th e  n o n p r o b a b i l i t y  
s am p l in g  t e c h n iq u e  p ro p o s e d .  W hile t h i s  may l i m i t  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  
g e n e r a l i z e  th e  f i n d i n g s  t o  a l l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s ,  i t  i s  t o t a l l y  con­
s i s t e n t  w ith  a s t a t e d  p u rp o s e  o f  t h e  s t u d y ;  i . e .  t o  h e lp  a s u p p l i e r  
o r  group  o f  d e a l e r s  t o  r e c o g n i z e  th e  p a y o f f - c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and 
to  b e t t e r  d e s ig n  ch a n n e l  b a r g a i n in g  s t r a t e g y .  In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  th e  
d e a l e r  group  was n e c e s s a r i l y  l i m i t e d  by f i n a n c i a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  a s  w e ll  
a s  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  p e r s o n a l  i n t e r v i e w s  w ith  d e a l e r s .
A second  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h e  u s e  o f  o n ly  e v a l u a t i v e  s c a l e s  in  
t h e  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  T h is  p rob lem  was d i s c u s s e d  in  th e  s e c t i o n  
on d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  t e c h n iq u e s .  A more s i g n i f i c a n t  q u e s t i o n  i s  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  m easured  w ith  th e  e v a l u a t i v e  s c a l e s  
have  a d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  b e h a v i o r .
A t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  i n d i c a t e  o n ly  a d i s p o s i t i o n  tow ard c e r t a i n
c l a s s e s  o f  b e h a v io r .  An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  r e s p o n s e  to  a r e a l - l i f e
19s i t u a t i o n  depends  upon f a c t o r s  o t h e r  th a n  a t t i t u d e  a l o n e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
19 I b i d . , pp . 198-199 ; and G. David Hughes, A t t i t u d e  M easure­
ment f o r  M ark e t in g  S t r a t e g i e s , (G lenv iew i S c o t t ,  Foresm an, 1971 )̂,
p p .  11 - 1 2 .
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i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  co n c lu d e  o n ly  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p tu a l  model u n d e r ly in g  
t h i s  r e s e a r c h  r e p r e s e n t s  o n ly  how d e a l e r s  and s u p p l i e r s  w ere d is p o s e d  
tow ard p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l s .  The model d o e s  n o t  a l lo w  f o r  a 
one hundred  p e r c e n t  a c c u r a t e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  b e h a v io r .
A f i n a l  p e r c e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n  i s  t h a t  th e  s tu d y  was l i m i t e d  
to  th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a  s i n g l e  i s s u e  in  a ch an n e l  
g ro u p .  As was i n d i c a t e d  above ,  how ever,  i f  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model i s  
sound and th e  m ethodology g e n e r a t e s  v a l i d  and r e l i a b l e  r e s u l t s ,  th e n  
th e  t a s k  o f  expand ing  th e  s tu d y  t o  i n c lu d e  s e v e r a l  im p o r ta n t  i s s u e s  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s im p le .
Summary
The f o u r t h  c h a p t e r  in c lu d e d  a p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e thodo log­
i c a l  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  I n i t i a l l y ,  l a b o r a t o r y  e x p e r im e n ts ,  
f i e l d  e x p e r im e n ts  and f i e l d  s t u d i e s  w ere d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  To a l lo w  
f o r  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  t h e  h y p o th e s e s  t o  be t e s t e d ,  p a y o f f  
and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  were o p e r a t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d .
I t  was i n d i c a t e d  in  th e  f o u r t h  c h a p t e r  t h a t  a p u r p o s iv e  ty p e  
sam p lin g  p ro c e d u re  and a  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  w ere used  
to  c o l l e c t  th e  d a t a  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  th e  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e s e  su rv e y  p r o c e d u re s  w ere i n d i c a t e d  and t h e  l i m i t a ­
t i o n s  imposed upon th e  r e s e a r c h e r  by th e s e  p r o c e d u re s  were r e c o g n iz e d .  
Examples o f  th e  ty p e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  were 
p r e s e n te d .
The m ajo r p o r t i o n  o f  C h a p te r  4 was d e v o te d  to  a d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  a n a l y t i c a l  p ro c e d u re s  used  to  e v a l u a t e  each  o f
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th e  s i x  h y p o th e s e s .  P a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n  was g iv e n  to  th e  s p e c i f i ­
c a t i o n  o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  used  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  to  r e j e c t  
th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s e s .  C h ap te r  4 co n c lu d ed  w ith  a b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  and r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s .  A ls o ,  th e  
p e r c e iv e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h  were i n d i c a t e d  and t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  was e v a l u a te d .
The f i f t h  c h a p t e r  i s  composed o f  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  d a t a  
c o l l e c t e d  from th e  su rv e y  r e s p o n d e n ts  in  te rm s o f  t h e  s i x  h y p o th e s e s .  
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  in  te rm s o f  s t r a t e g i c  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r s  and d e a l e r s .  F i n a l l y ,  some i m p l i ­
c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  deve lopm en t o f  m a rk e t in g  th e o ry  
a r e  c i t e d  in  th e  c o n c lu s io n  o f  t h e  f i f t h  c h a p t e r .
Chapter 5
CARPET INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS, STUDY 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
Some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  and th e  f i n d i n g s  
and i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  a r e  p r e s e n te d  in  t h i s  f i f t h  c h a p t e r .  
D ata were c o l l e c t e d  from tw en ty  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  in  t h e  Baton 
Rouge and New O rlean s  m arke t  a r e a s  w i th  a  p e r s o n a l l y  a d m in is te r e d  
s t r u c t u r e d  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  The d a t a  were s u b j e c t e d  to  s im p le  l i n e a r  
and q u a d r a t i c  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  and one and two-way f a c t o r i a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e .  The r e s u l t s  o f  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  
in  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
This  c h a p t e r  b e g in s  w i th  a b r i e f  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  t u f t e d  c a r p e t  and ru g  i n d u s t r y  a t  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  
and d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l s .  S econd , t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  m easu re s  o f  
th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard h y p o t h e t i c a l  e n t e r p r i s e  ch a n n e l  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p s  i s  i n d i c a t e d .  The g e n e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  
f o r  t h e  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  ( r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s )  i s  th e  
t h i r d  m a jo r  t o p i c  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
C o n s id e r a t io n  i s  th e n  g iv e n  to  each  o f  th e  s i x  n u l l  h y p o th ­
e s e s  examined in  t h i s  s tu d y .  The a c c e p ta n c e  o r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  each 
n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  i s  based  upon th e  s t a t i s t i c a l  c r i t e r i a  s p e c i f i e d  
in  C h a p te r  4 .  T h is  c h a p t e r  c o n c lu d e s  w i th  an a s s e s s m e n t  o f  th e  
im p l i c a t io n s  o f  th e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  f o r  members o f
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t h e  ch an n e l  group s tu d i e d  and f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  deve lopm en t o f  m a rk e t in g  
t h e o r y .
Some C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  C a rp e t  I n d u s t r y
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  sh o u ld  be b r i e f l y  
r e c o g n iz e d  b e f o r e  th e  d a t a  a n a l y s i s  and i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  
can be m e a n in g fu l ly  p r e s e n t e d .  T h is  s tu d y  fo c u se d  upon r e t a i l  
c a r p e t  d e a l e r s '  p r o f i t  p e r c e p t i o n s  and t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  
h y p o t h e t i c a l  ch an n e l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  
r e q u i r e s  an u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  th e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  a t  
b o th  p r o d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l s .
C a rp e t  P r o d u c e r s . The c a r p e t  and ru g  i n d u s t r y  i s  com prised  
o f  f i rm s  engaged in  w eaving c a r p e t s  and ru g s  from t e x t i l e  y a rn  
(S ta n d a rd  I n d u s t r i a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  Code 2271) and f i rm s  p ro d u c in g  
t u f t e d  p ro d u c t s  from t e x t i l e  f i b e r  (S ta n d a rd  I n d u s t r i a l  C l a s s i f i ­
c a t i o n  Code 2 2 7 2 ) .  The t u f t e d  c a r p e t  p o r t i o n  o f  th e  i n d u s t r y  (SIC 
2272) a c c o u n te d  f o r  o v e r  90 p e r c e n t  o f  broadloom  c a r p e t  sh ip m e n ts  
in  1968 .^  R e l a t i v e l y  few f i r m s  have  rem ained  in  th e  woven c a r p e t  
segment and th e  d i s c u s s i o n  below  c e n t e r s  upon th e  t u f t e d  c a r p e t  
b u s i n e s s .
D uring  th e  1 9 6 0 's ,  s a l e s  i n  th e  i n d u s t r y  grew a t  a r a p id  
p a c e .  T ab le  5 .1  shows t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  v a lu e  o f  t u f t e d  c a r p e t  and
^ R o b e r t  W. K irk ,  The C a rp e t  I n d u s t r y i P r e s e n t  S t a t u s  and
F u tu re  P r o s p e c t s , I n d u s t r i a l  R e se a rc h  R e p o r t s ,  M is c e l la n e o u s  S e r i e s
R ep o r t  Number 17 ( P h i l a d e l p h i a !  I n d u s t r i a l  R esea rc h  U n i t ,  D e p a r t ­
ment o f  I n d u s t r y ,  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  1 9 7 0 ) ,  p .  16.
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and ru g  i n d u s t r y  sh ip m e n ts  more th a n  d o u b le d  betw een 1963 and 1970.
T hat grow th  was f u e le d  in  l a r g e  m easure  by an i n d u s t r y  t e c h n o lo g ic a l
r e v o l u t i o n .  D uring  th e  1 9 7 0 's  and 1 9 8 0 's ,  in fo rm ed  s o u rc e s  e x p e c t
th e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  t o  grow e v e r  more d e p e n d e n t  upon th e  m a rk e t in g
f u n c t i o n  to  p r o v id e  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  c o n t in u e d  grow th  and h ig h  p e r f o r -  
2mance.
T a b le  5 .1
C o n c e n t r a t i o n  R a t io s  f o r  th e  T u f te d  
C a rp e t  and Rug In d u s t ry *





V alue o f  I n d u s t r y  S h ipm ents
T o ta l  
D o l l a r s  
( 0 0 0 *s )
Four
L a r g e s t
F irms
E ig h t
L a r g e s t
Firms
1970 NA $1898 .3 252 402
1967 210 1426 .9 262 412
1966 NA 120 6 .4 262 432
1963 167 80 1 .8 252 412
Source* U. S. D epartm ent o f  Commerce, Bureau o f  t h e  C ensus ,  Annual 
Survey  o f  M anu fac tu res*  1970, V alue  o f  Shipm ent C o n c e n t ra ­
t i o n  R a t i o s , M70(AS)-9 (W ash ing ton ,  D. C.« U n ite d  S t a t e s  
Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 7 2 ) ,  p .  10.
Three  p e r t i n e n t  m arke t s t r u c t u r e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e
^ I b i d . ,  p. 196.
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i n d u s t r y  a r e i  s e l l e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and 
b a r r i e r s  to  e n t r y .  M arket c o n c e n t r a t i o n  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e  th e  p ro p o r ­
t i o n  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r y ' s  s a l e s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  by th e  l a r g e s t  
f i r m s .  S e l l e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  a t  t h e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  l e v e l  i n  th e  c a r p e t
in d u s t r y  i s  q u i t e  low. The i n d u s t r y  " . . . i s  h ig h l y  c o m p e t i t iv e  and
3
no f i r m  e n jo y s  a dom inan t p o s i t i o n . "  T ab le  5 .1  shows t h a t  t h e
l a r g e s t  f o u r  f i rm s  a c c o u n ted  f o r  25 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  o f
1970 i n d u s t r y  s h ip m e n ts .  The l a r g e s t  e i g h t  f i rm s  ac c o u n te d  f o r  o n ly
40 p e r c e n t  o f  sh ipm en t v a l u e .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e s e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  f i g u r e s
have n o t  changed much s in c e  1963 w h i le  s a l e s  have grown d r a m a t i c a l l y .
The e x t e n t  o f  p ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and consumer p r e f e r e n c e
f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  b ra n d s  in  th e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  i s  a l s o  v e ry  low.
C arp e t  m i l l s  have f a i l e d  to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h e i r  b ra n d s  f o r  a number
o f  r e a s o n s .  A heavy in c id e n c e  o f  p r i v a t e  o r  d i s t r i b u t o r  b ra n d s ,
r e t a i l e r s '  te n d e n c y  to  fo c u s  upon f i n a l  p r i c e  a s  opposed to  p ro d u c t
q u a l i t y  and a  low l e v e l  o f  n a t i o n a l  b ran d  p ro m o tio n  have a l l  se rv e d
4to  r e t a r d  p ro d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
The American C a rp e t  I n s t i t u t e ,  how ever, h as  s t a t e d  t h a t  con­
sumer aw aren ess  o f  and p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  n a t i o n a l  c a r p e t  b ra n d s  has 
been  g ro w in g . 3 The a v e ra g e  consumer o f  th e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 's i s  a t  l e a s t  
aw are o f  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n a l  b r a n d s .  In  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  in c r e a s e d  consumer
3 I b i d .
4
I b i d . ,  p .  6 8 .
3The American C arp e t  I n s t i t u t e ,  "How R e t a i l  R esea rc h  Can
I n c r e a s e  Your A d v e r t i s i n g  E f f e c t i v e n e s s "  (New Yorkj The I n s t i t u t e ,  
I n c . ,  J u n e ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p .  11.
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n a t i o n a l  b rand  a w a re n e s s ,  in fo rm ed  i n d u s t r y  s o u rc e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e  r e t a i l  d e a l e r  s t i l l  h as  th e  g r e a t e s t  in f l u e n c e  upon th e  con ­
s u m e r 's  p u rc h a s e  d e c i s i o n . ^
The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  t u f t i n g  p r o c e s s  to  th e  c a r p e t  in d u s ­
t r y  a f t e r  th e  second w orld  war r e v o l u t i o n i z e d  th e  i n d u s t r y  and 
e l im i n a te d  most b a r r i e r s  to  e n t r y .  D uring  th e  1 9 5 0 's  and 1 9 6 0 's ,  
f i rm s  cou ld  and d id  e n t e r  th e  t u f t e d  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  w i th  c a p i t a l  
in v e s tm e n ts  o f  un d er  one m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  P r e d i c t i o n s  a r e ,  how ever, 
t h a t  grow ing p l a n t  s i z e s  and r e s u l t i n g  econom ies o f  s c a l e  a lo n g  w ith  
grow ing m a rk e t in g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  in  th e  i n d u s t r y  w i l l  e r e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e n t r y  b a r r i e r s  a t  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  l e v e l  in  th e  1 9 7 0 's and 1 9 8 0 ' s . ^
g
C a rp e t  D i s t r i b u t o r s . C a rp e t  p ro d u c e r s  have used  two con­
v e n t i o n a l  m a rk e t in g  ch a n n e l  t y p e s » d i r e c t  s a l e s  t o  r e t a i l e r s  and 
s a l e s  to  r e t a i l e r s  th ro u g h  w h o l e s a l e r s .  In 1969, c a r p e t  s p e c i a l t y  
s t o r e s  ac c o u n te d  f o r  a b o u t  39 p e r c e n t  o f  r e t a i l  s a l e s  w ith  f u r n i t u r e
s t o r e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  33 p e r c e n t  and d e p a r tm e n t  s t o r e s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  12
9
p e r c e n t  o f  s a l e s .  New ty p e s  o f  r e t a i l e r s  have  e n t e r e d  th e  c a r p e t  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  sy s tem , how ever. Some lum ber y a r d s ,  f o r  exam ple , have 
become "C om plete  Home C e n te r s "  t h a t  s e l l  and i n s t a l l  c a r p e t .
^ K irk ,  l o c .  c i t .
^ I b i d . , p . 59.
0
The fo l lo w in g  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  n a t u r e  o f  c a r p e t  d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  i s  b ased  upon C h ap te r  V I I ,  " A sp e c ts  o f  th e  Changing D i s t r i b u t i o n /  
S e l l i n g  P a t t e r n "  in  K irk ,  i b i d . ,  p p .  85 -97 .
9C arp e t  and Rug I n s t i t u t e ,  I n c . ,  B a s ic  F a c t s  About th e  C arp e t  
and Rug I n d u s t r y , 1969 E d i t i o n  (New Yorki The I n s t i t u t e ,  1 9 6 9 ) ,  p .  18.
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Most t u f t e d  c a r p e t  p ro d u c e r s  l o c a t e d  in  th e  s o u th e r n  U nited  
S t a t e s  have r e l i e d  h e a v i ly  upon w h o le s a le r s  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e i r  
b randed  p r o d u c ts  to  r e t a i l e r s #  The w h o le s a le r s  f o r  t h e  most p a r t  
have  n o t  had m a rk e t in g  program s which w ere c o o r d in a te d  w ith  th e  
program s o f  th e  p r o d u c e r s ,  how ever.  The w h o le s a le r s  t y p i c a l l y  
em phasized p r i c e  t o  th e  r e t a i l e r s  and t h i s  has  l e d  t o  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
c o m p e t i t io n  and red u c e d  r e t a i l  m a rg in s .
While c a r p e t  p ro d u c e r s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  em phasized  b ra n d in g  and 
n a t i o n a l  p rom otion  o f  t h e i r  p r o d u c t s '  f u n c t i o n a l  and s t y l i n g  c h a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c s ,  r e t a i l e r s  c o n t in u e d  t o  fo c u s  upon p r i c e  t o  g e n e r a te  
s a l e s .  The m a rk e t in g  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  a t  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  l e v e l  o f  
th e  i n d u s t r y  was n o t  t r a n s m i t t e d  to  th e  d i s t r i b u t o r s .  In a n a t i o n a l  
s u rv e y  o f  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s ,  Home F u r n i s h in g s  D a i ly  found t h a t  
th e  r e t a i l e r s  d e s i r e d  s u p p l i e r  a s s i s t a n c e  in  many m a rk e t in g  a r e a s .
S in c e  most s o u th e rn  t u f t e d  c a r p e t  p ro d u c e r s  have  r e l i e d  
h e a v i l y  upon w h o le s a l e r s ,  th e  s o u th e r n  d i s t r i b u t o r  i s  a l i k e l y  c a n d i ­
d a t e  t o  p ro v id e  th e  d e s i r e d  m a rk e t in g  a s s i s t a n c e  to  th e  r e t a i l e r s .  
S e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  s o u th e r n  d i s t r i b u t o r s  to  
a c h ie v e  th e  c o o r d in a t io n  o f  m a rk e t in g  program s t h a t  i s  needed to  
im prove th e  p e rfo rm a n ce  o f  c a r p e t  p ro d u c e r s  and d i s t r i b u t o r s .  C o n tro l  
c o u ld  be a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h !  ( 1 . )  o w n ersh ip  o f  c a r p e t  p ro d u c e r s  an d /  
o r  r e t a i l e r s ;  ( 2 . )  c o n t r a c t u a l  ag ree m en ts  w ith  p ro d u c e r s  a n d /o r  
r e t a i l e r s ;  o r  ( 3 . )  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  in d e p e n d e n t  p ro d u c e r s  a n d / o r
^ " D e a l e r s  U rg e n t ly  Demand More S e r v i c e  by M a k e rs ,"  Home 
F u r n i s h in g s  D a i l y , (May 22 , 1 9 6 9 ) ,  p .  1.
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r e t a i l e r s .
The s t r a t e g y  most l i k e l y  t o  a c h ie v e  ch a n n e l  m a rk e t in g  program 
c o o r d i n a t i o n  in  th e  s h o r t  ru n  i s  th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  w h o le s a l e r  power to  
a c h ie v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  c r u c i a l  ch a n n e l  i s s u e s ;  e . g . ,  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  
and c o o p e r a t iv e  a d v e r t i s i n g  p ro g ram s .  Such c o o r d i n a t i o n  c o u ld  le a d  
to  th e  developm ent o f  s t r o n g  i n t e r - c h a n n e l  c o m p e t i t io n  and g r e a t e r  
i n d u s t r y  e f f i c i e n c y .
The c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  in  th e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 's  can  be d e s c r ib e d  as  
one o f  low m arke t  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  a t  p r o d u c t io n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  l e v e l s .  
E f f o r t s  by m a n u fa c tu r e r s  o r  o t h e r  ch an n e l  members i n  low c o n c e n t r a ­
t i o n  i n d u s t r i e s  to  c o n t r o l  r e t a i l  p r i c e s  in  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  s t r o n g  
r e t a i l e r  c o o p e r a t io n  a n d /o r  c o e r c iv e  t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  a r e  u s u a l l y  
i n e f f e c t i v e .  These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  sh o u ld  be r e c a l l e d  th ro u g h o u t  
th e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  th e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  B e fo re  th o s e  f i n d i n g s  
a r e  d i s c u s s e d ,  a t t e n t i o n  i s  fo c u s e d  in  th e  f o l l o w in g  s e c t i o n  upon 
th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  m easu res  o f  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  t o  t e s t  
f o r  t h e i r  r e l i a b i l i t y .
R e l i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  A t t i t u d e  M easures
In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw e n ty -o n e  combi­
n a t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  were m easured  by t h e i r  r e s p o n s e s  
to  s i x  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  t h a t  w ere s c a le d  in  a s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
f o rm a t .  T h e i r  r e s p o n s e s  a r e  r e c o rd e d  in  Appendix B. The s i x  b i p o l a r  
a d j e c t i v e s  were s e l e c t e d  b eca u se  o f  t h e i r  h ig h  e v a l u a t i v e  d im ens ion  
f a c t o r  lo a d in g s  and t h e i r  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  f o r  th e  ch a n n e l  s i t u a t i o n .
R e l i a b i l i t y  r e f e r s  t o  th e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich t e s t  r e s u l t s  a r e  
f r e e  from e x p e r im e n ta l  e r r o r .  I f  a l l  s i x  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  m easured
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t h e  same d im en s io n  o f  each d e a l e r ' s  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard t h e  tw en ty -o n e  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  th e n  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  r e s p o n s e s  a lo n g  th e  seven  
s c a l e  p o s i t i o n s  sh o u ld  have been h ig h l y  c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  each  s i t u a ­
t i o n .  A s p l i t - h a l v e s  r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  was computed to  m easure  
th e  e x t e n t  t o  w hich th e  d e a l e r s  re sp o n d ed  in  a  c o n s i s t e n t  manner to  
th e  s i x  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  f o r  each  s i t u a t i o n .  Each d e a l e r ' s  r e ­
s p o n se s  t o  th e  s i x  a d j e c t i v e s  f o r  each  s i t u a t i o n  were d iv i d e d  i n t o  
two g roups  — th e  f i r s t  t h r e e  a d j e c t i v e s '  s c o r e s  and th e  second 
t h r e e  a d j e c t i v e s '  s c o r e s .
A s im p le  c o r r e l a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  r e s u l t i n g  two g roups  o f  
s c o r e s  y i e l d e d  a c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  ( r )  o f  0 .9 2 6 .  To compute 
t h i s  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  th e  t e s t  s c o r e s  w ere d iv id e d  in  h a l f .  When a 
t e s t  i s  l e n g th e n e d ,  r e l i a b i l i t y  i n c r e a s e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  was 
n e c e s s a r y  to  " c o r r e c t "  th e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  t o  make i t  r e l e v a n t  
f o r  th e  whole t e s t  r a t h e r  th a n  f o r  j u s t  h a l f  o f  th e  t e s t . ^  The 
c o r r e c t e d  s p l i t  h a lv e s  r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  computed f o r  th e  
d e a l e r s '  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e  s i x  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  i s  0 .9 6 1 .
The c o r r e c t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  t e s t  was r e l i a b l e .  
T ha t i s ,  t h e  s i x  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  r e l i a b l y  m easured  th e  e v a l u a t i v e  
d im en s io n  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard th e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  and 
p a y o f f  l e v e l  c o m b in a t io n s .
^ T h e  fo rm u la  f o r  com puting  th e  c o r r e c t e d  s p l i t - h a l v e s  
r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  ( r x 2 ) / ( r + l ) .  A v a lu e  o f  0 .7 0  o r  h ig h e r  
i s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a c c e p te d  a s  an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y .  For a 
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  t e c h n iq u e ,  s e e  James J .  B run ing  and B. L. K in tz ,  
C o m p u ta tio n a l  Handbook o f  S t a t i s t i c s  (G lenv iew i S c o t t ,  Foresman, 
1 9 6 8 ) ,  pp . 187-188 .
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12G e n e ra t io n  o f  th e  I n t e r v a l  L ev e l  C o n tro l  S c a le
T h is  s tu d y  was b ased  upon a  c o n c e p tu a l  model t h a t  d e p i c t e d  a
ra n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  from co m p le te  r e l a t i v e  middleman c o n t r o l
to  com ple te  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  S u p p l i e r  p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t s
d e f in e d  p o i n t s  a lo n g  th e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  s c a l e .  I t  was im p ro p e r ,
how ever, t o  a s s i g n  ji p r i o r i  v a l u e s  o f  0 , 1 , 2 , e t c .  t o  t h e  p o l i c y
s ta t e m e n t s  and t o  assume t h a t  th e  s t a t e m e n t s  f e l l  n e a t l y  a lo n g  an
i n t e r v a l  s c a l e .  T h u r s t o n e 's  law  o f  c o m p a ra t iv e  judgem ent was used
to  g e n e r a t e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a l u e s .
The law  o f  c o m p a ra t iv e  judgem ent r e l a t e s  " t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f
t im es  any g iv e n  s t im u lu s  k i s  ju d g ed  g r e a t e r  on a g iv e n  a t t r i b u t e
th a n  any o t h e r  s t im u lu s  j  t o  t h e  s c a l e  v a lu e s  and d i s c r i m i n a l  d i s -
13p e r s io n s  o f  th e  two s t i m u l i  on th e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  c o n t in u u m ."  The
14law i s  based  upon th e  f o l lo w in g  t h r e e  p o s t u l a t e s i
1 .  Each s t im u lu s  when p r e s e n t e d  t o  an o b s e r v e r  g iv e s  r i s e  t o  a 
d i s c r i m i n a l  p r o c e s s  which h a s  some v a lu e  on th e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  
con tinuum  o f  i n t e r e s t .
2 .  B ecause  o f  momentary f l u c t u a t i o n s  in  t h e  o rg a n ism , a  g iv e n  
s t im u lu s  does  n o t  a lw ays  e x c i t e  th e  same d i s c r i m i n a l  p r o c e s s ,  
b u t  may e x c i t e  one w i th  a h ig h e r  o r  lo w er  v a lu e  on th e  con­
t inuum . I f  any s t im u lu s  i s  p r e s e n t e d  to  an o b s e r v e r  a  l a r g e  
number o f  t im e s ,  a f r e q u e n c y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d i s c r i m i n a l  
p r o c e s s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h a t  s t im u lu s  w i l l  be g e n e r a t e d .
I t  i s  p o s t u l a t e d  t h a t  th e  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  d i s c r i m i n a l  p r o c e s s e s  
a r e  such t h a t  t h e  f r e q u e n c y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  norm al on th e
T h is  s e c t i o n  i s  b ased  upon L. L. T h u rs to n e ,  The Measurement 
o f  V alues  (C h ic ag o i  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Chicago P r e s s ,  1959)} G reen and 
T u l l ,  R esea rc h  f o r  M ark e t in g  D e c i s i o n s , p p .  1 85 -190 ; and Warren S . 
T o rg e rso n ,  Theory and Methods o f  S c a l in g  (New Y orki John  W iley and 
Sons , 1 9 6 7 ) ,  p p .  159-204 .
13 T o rg e rso n ,  i b i d . ,  p .  159.
14I b i d . , pp. 159-160 .
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p s y c h o lo g i c a l  con tinuum . Each s t im u lu s  th u s  h a s  a s s o c i a t e d  
w ith  i t  a norm al d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d i s c r i m i n a l  p r o c e s s e s .
3 . The mean and s ta n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s s o ­
c i a t e d  w ith  a s t im u lu s  a r e  ta k e n  as  i t s  s c a l e  v a l u e  and 
d i s c r i m i n a l  d i s p e r s i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
One common v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  T h u rs to n e  te c h n iq u e  in v o lv e s  
r e p l i c a t i o n  o v e r  i n d i v i d u a l s .  I n s t e a d  o f  a s k in g  a s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l  
t o  e v a l u a t e  a p a i r  o f  s t i m u l i  a l a r g e  number o f  t im e s  ( s e e  P o s t u l a t e  
2 a b o v e ) ,  each  p a i r  o f  s t i m u l i  i s  compared once  by s e v e r a l  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
T h is  v a r i a t i o n  i s  based  upon th e  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  " . . . t h e  d i s c r i m i n a l  
p r o c e s s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  any g iv e n  s t im u lu s  f o r  a l a r g e  number o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s  form a norm al d i s t r i b u t i o n  on th e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  con­
t i n u u m . . . . " ^  This  v a r i a t i o n  was u sed  in  t h i s  s tu d y .
T h u rs to n e * s  law  o f  c o m p a ra t iv e  judgem ent i s  s t a t e d  a s i
S -  = Z . ( s 2 + s?  -  2 r s  s j 1a  b ab  a b a b
wherei
Sa -  = a l i n e a r  d i s t a n c e  on th e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  s c a l e
betw een s t im u lu s  a and s t im u lu s  b ,
Zab = sigma v a lu e  ( f ro m  a  s t a n d a r d  u n i t  norm al
c u r v e )  o f  th e  o b se rv e d  p r o p o r t i o n  in  which 
s t im u lu s  a i s  p r e f e r r e d  to  s t im u lu s  b ,
2 2s a> s fa = d i s c r i m i n a l  d i s p e r s ' . o n s  o f  s t i m u l i  a and b,
r e s p e c t i v e l y
r  = c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n  f o r  t h e  d i s c r i m i n a l
d e v i a t i o n s  in  each  o f  th e  s t im u lu s  a v e r s u s  
s t im u lu s  b ju d g e m en ts .
I f  one assum es equa l d i s c r i m i n a l  d i s p e r s i o n s  ( s  = s a  = sb )
and no c o r r e l a t i o n  betw een th e  d i s c r i m i n a l  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  th e  same
judgement ( r  = 0 ) ,  th e n  a v e ry  s im p le  form o f  T h u r s t o n e 's  law
1 5 I b i d . , p. 162.
r e s u l t s .
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S - S. = Z s U )*5 a b ab
When p a i r e d  com parison  s t i m u l i  e v a l u a t i o n s  a r e  made by 
s e v e r a l  ju d g e s ,  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t s  t h a t  a l l  ju d g e s  w i l l  judge  
one s t im u lu s  a to  be g r e a t e r  on th e  g iv e n  a t t r i b u t e  th a n  a n o th e r  
s t im u lu s  b . In  t h i s  c a s e ,  th e  d i s c r i m i n a l  d i s p e r s i o n s  o f  s t i m u l i  a 
and b would be z e r o .  In  t h i s  s tu d y ,  a l l  o f  th e  d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  
e v a lu a te d  some o f  th e  p a i r e d  p o l i c y  com parisons  in  th e  same m anner.
In  o t h e r  w ords, th e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  d e a l e r s  who p e r c e iv e d  some P o l i c y  
X t o  r e f l e c t  g r e a t e r  s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  th a n  a P o l i c y  Y was 
1 .0 0 .  P r o p o r t i o n s  o f  1 .0 0  and 0 .0 0  ca n n o t  be used  b e c a u se  th e  u n i t  
normal d e v i a t e s  which c o r re s p o n d  to  t h e s e  p r o p o r t i o n s  a r e  unbounded ly  
l a r g e .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  p ro c e d u re  f o r  com puting  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  
when t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  o c c u r s  was d e s c r ib e d  by T o rg e rso n  and i s  e x p la in e d
K  1 1 7below .
F iv e  d i f f e r e n t  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  w ere used  in  
th e  s tu d y  to  r e p r e s e n t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  a c r u c i a l  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e  o f  th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s .  The f i v e  
p o l i c i e s  ran g ed  from a l e v e l  o f  no s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
th e  p r i c i n g  o f  c a r p e t  a t  th e  r e t a i l  l e v e l  to  a l e v e l  o f  co m p le te  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ,  r e s a l e  p r i c e  m a in te n a n c e .
F red  M o s t e l l e r ,  "Remarks on th e  Method o f  P a i r e d  Compar­
i s o n s , "  P s y c h o m e t r ik a , V ol. 16 (M arch, 1951 ) ,  pp . 3 -9 ;  T o rg e rso n ,  
i b i d . , p p .  163-165 ; Green and T u l l ,  op . c i t . , p .  186.
^ T o r g e r s o n ,  op.  c i t . , pp.  173-176 .
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In  P a r t  I o f  t h e  d e a l e r  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  
re sp o n d ed  to  p a i r e d  com parisons  o f  t h e  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  
Each d e a l e r  made te n  com parisons  ( f i v e  p o l i c i e s  compared two a t  a 
t im e )  and i n d i c a t e d  which p o l i c y  r e f l e c t e d  a h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  r e l a ­
t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  T ab le  5 .2  i s  a f r e q u e n c y  m a t r ix  o f  th e  
r e s u l t s  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  c o m p a r iso n s .
T ab le  5 .2
D e a l e r s '  P e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  Amount o f  R e l a t i v e  
S u p p l i e r  C o n tro l  Im p l ie d  by th e  F iv e  
R e s a le  P r i c e  P o l i c i e s 3
P o l i c y  k
P o l i c y  k '
pok , k ' 1 2 3 4 5
1 ----- 19 19 20 20
2 1 ----- 12 19 20
3 1 8 ----- 19 20
4 0 1 1 ----- 19
5 0 0 0 1 -----
PO^ = Number o f  d e a l e r s  who p e r c e iv e d  P o l i c y  k t o  r e f l e c t  
'  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  th a n  P o l i c y  k '
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The f i r s t  s t e p  in  T h u r s t o n e 's  p ro c e d u re  t o  g e n e r a t e  i n t e r v a l  
s c a l e  v a lu e s  from th e  p a i r e d  com parison  d a t a  i s  to  c o n v e r t  th e  f r e ­
quency m a t r ix  to  a m a t r ix  o f  p r o p o r t i o n s .  T ab le  5 .3  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
95 p e r c e n t  o f  th e  d e a l e r s  (19 o f  20 )  p e r c e iv e d  P o l i c y  2 t o  r e f l e c t  
more r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  th a n  P o l i c y  1 .  Each o f  th e  p ro p o r ­
t i o n s  in  T ab le  5 .3  can  be s i m i l a r l y  e x p l a in e d .
T ab le  5 .3
P r o p o r t io n  o f  D e a le r s  I n d i c a t i n g  P o l i c y  X 
( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  o r  5) a s  R e f l e c t i n g  a H igher  
L eve l o f  R e l a t i v e  S u p p l i e r  C o n tro l  
th a n  P o l i c y  Y ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  o r  5)
P o l i c y  k
PT . ab 1 2 3 4 5
1 ----------- .95 .95 1 . 0 1 . 0
2 .05 ----------- .60 .95 1 . 0
3 .05 .40 ----------- .95 1 . 0




Pab 0 .1 0 1 .3 0 1 .6 0 2 .9 5 3 .9 5
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The second s t e p  to  g e n e r a t e  th e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  i s  to
sum th e  p r o p o r t i o n s  in  each  column in  T ab le  5 .3  and a r r a n g e  th e
m a t r ix  columns in  i n c r e a s i n g  o r d e r  o f  th e  column sums. T ab le  5 .4
p l a c e s  th e  columns in  ra n k  o r d e r  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  a t t r i b u t e
c o n s id e r e d  ( i . e .  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l )  a c c o r d in g  to  th e  column sums in
T ab le  5 .3  (P . ) .ab
T ab le  5 .4
The Z -v a lu e s  (U n i t  Normal D e v ia t e s )  Which 
C orrespond  to  Each Element 
in  T ab le  5 .3
P o l i c y  X ( a )
P o l i c y  
Y ( b )
z s c  .ab 1 2 3 4 5
1 0 .000 1 .6 4 5 1 .6 4 5 --------- ---------
2 - 1 .6 4 5 0 .0 0 0 0 .253 1 .6 4 5
3 - 1 .6 4 5 - 0 .2 5 3 0 .0 0 0 1 .6 4 5
4 - 1 . 6 4 5 - 1 . 6 4 5 0 .000 1 .6 4 5
5 --------- -------- - 1 . 6 4 5 0 .0 0 0
5
2 za= l ab -3 .2 9 0 - 0 .2 5 3 0 .253 1 .645 1 .6 4 5
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The m a t r ix  c e l l s  in  T ab le  5 .4  c o n t a in  th e  Z -v a lu e s  ( u n i t
normal d e v i a t e s )  which c o r re sp o n d  t o  each p r o p o r t i o n  in  each  c e l l  
in  T ab le  5 .3 .  T ab le  5 .3  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  60 p e r c e n t  o f  th e  d e a l e r s  
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  P o l i c y  3 r e f l e c t e d  g r e a t e r  s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
th a n  P o l i c y  2 .  The u n i t  normal d e v i a t e  which c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a 
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  60 p e r c e n t  i s  Z = 0 .2 5 3 .  In  o t h e r  w ords ,  60 p e r c e n t  
o f  th e  t o t a l  a r e a  u n d e r  th e  norm al d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  betw een Z eq u a l
to  minus i n f i n i t y  and Z e q u a l  t o  0 .2 5 3 .  This  v a lu e  was e n t e r e d  in
T ab le  5 .4  f o r  th e  com parison  betw een P o l i c y  3 and P o l i c y  2 .  A l l  o f  
th e  e n t r i e s  i n  T ab le  5 .4  w ere o b ta in e d  in  t h i s  m anner. When a 
p r o p o r t i o n  in  T ab le  5 .3  was l e s s  th a n  0 .5 0 ,  a minus s ig n  ( - )  was
p r e f i x e d  to  th e  Z -v a lu e  in  T ab le  5 .3
v a lu e s  i s  to  o b t a i n  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een th e  a d j a c e n t  v a l u e s  in  
T ab le  5 .4 .  Any v a lu e s  l e s s  th a n  z e ro  a r e  d ropped  from f u t u r e  c o n s i -
T ab le  5 .5 .
E s t im a te s  o f  t h e  d i s t a n c e s  betw een th e  p o l i c i e s  were o b ta in e d  
by s u b s t i t u t i n g  th e  v a lu e s  in  th e  to p  p o r t i o n  o f  T ab le  5 .5  i n t o  th e  
f o l l o w in g  e q u a t io n
The n e x t  s t e p  in  th e  p ro c e d u re  to  i n f e r  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e
d e r a t i o n .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  (d = Z -  Z ) a r e  d i s p l a y e d  in
8D D* 1. SL t D
d b ,b + l  s b+l s b =
w herei
d b b+1 = t *ie ^ n e a r  d i s t a n c e  on th e  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  s c a l e  
* between s t im u lu s  b and s t im u lu s  b+1 ,
n
b th e  number o f  f i l l e d  c e l l s  in  each  column
I b i d . ,  p.  174.
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Table  5 .5
M a tr ix  o f  D i f f e r e n c e s  Between Columns 
in  T ab le  5 .4
d = (Z _  -  Z . )ab a , b + l  a , b
d12 d23 d 34 d 45
1 1 .6 4 5 0 .0 0 0 ----- -----
2 1 .6 4 5 0 .2 5 3 1 .3 9 2 -----
P o l i c y  Y ( a ) 3 1 .3 9 2 0 .2 5 3 1 .6 4 5 -----
4 ----- 0 .0 0 0 1 .6 4 5 1 .6 4 5
5 ----- ----- ----- -----
hb dZ a b ,  b+1 4 .682 0 .5 0 6 0 4 .6 8 2 0 1 .6 4 5 0
nb 3 4 3 1
n.
d. w = 1 7?d 1 .5600 0 .1 2 7 0 1 .5600 1 .6 4 5 0b ,b + l  a b ,b + l
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The z e ro  p o i n t  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  s c a l e  was l o c a t e d
a r b i t r a r i l y  a t  P o l i c y  1 = 0  (V^ = 0 ) .  The s c a l e  v a lu e s  f o r  each
s t im u lu s  w ere o b ta in e d  by c u m u la t in g  th e  s u c c e s s iv e  d i f f e r e n c e s





V1 + 1 .5600  = 1 .5 6 0 0
< U>
II
V2 + 0 .1 2 6 5  = 1 .6865
< II V3 + 1 .5600  = 3 .2465
< II V4 + 1 .6450  = 4 .8915
The r e s u l t s  o f  th e  p a i r e d -c o m p a r i s o n  e v a l u a t i o n s  by th e  
c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  d e m o n s t ra te d  t h a t  an a p r i o r i  a s s ig n m e n t  o f  0 , 1 , 2 , 
3 and 4 to  th e  f i v e  p o l i c i e s  would have b ia s e d  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  
a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y .
When d e p i c te d  a lo n g  a h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s ,  t h e  p o l i c i e s  a p p e a r  
a s  below :
P o l i c y  1 P o l i c y  2 P o l i c y  4 P o l i c y  5 R e l a t i v e
x x x  x x C o n tro l
I n t e r v a l
I-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- 1---------------------- 1 O p . l  «
0 1 2  3 4 5 b c a iP
P o l i c y  3
The r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  1 ,  4 and 5 were c l e a r l y  d i s t i n ­
g u ish e d  by th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s .  However, p o l i c i e s  2 and 3 were 
p e r c e iv e d  to  r e f l e c t  n e a r l y  th e  same l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .  The v a lu e s  o f  f o r  th e  k c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  1 t o  5 were 
used in  th e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a ly s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  
and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s  which a r e  d i s c u s s e d  below .
P a y o f f  P e r c e p t io n s  A cross  R e l a t i v e  
C o n tro l  L e v e ls
The f i r s t  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  was s t a t e d  t o  t e s t  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  th e  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g .  The h y p o th e s i s  t e s t e d  was«
HQ1 There  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  in  t h e  m easu res  
o f  d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  each  o f  th e  
f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
Each d e a l e r  i n d i c a t e d  i n  P a r t  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  th e  
im pact t h a t  he p e r c e iv e d  th e  a d o p t io n  o f  each r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  
would have  upon h i s  n e t  p r o f i t s .  The p a y o f f  l e v e l s ,  th e n ,  r e p r e ­
s e n te d  p e r c e iv e d  changes  in  n e t  p r o f i t s  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from 
s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  c h a n g e s .
The a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  ch an g es  t h a t  would 
o c c u r  i f  th e  w h o le s a le r  ad o p ted  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  ( c o n t r o l  
l e v e l s )  1 to  5 a r e  c i t e d  in  T ab le  5 . 6 .  I n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  
a r e  r e p o r t e d  in  Appendix C. A p p r o p r i a t e l y ,  th e  d e a l e r s  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  PoiJ.cy 1 (no  p r i c e  s u g g e s t io n  by th e  w h o le s a l e r )  would n o t  
a f f e c t  t h e i r  n e t  p r o f i t s  ( p e r c e i v e d  p a y o f f  l e v e l  3 ) .  P o l i c y  1 
r e p r e s e n t s  th e  s u p p l i e r ' s  p r e s e n t  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y .  T ab le  5 .6  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  d e a l e r s  th o u g h t  t h a t  t h e i r  n e t  p r o f i t s  would 
i n c r e a s e  s l i g h t l y  i f  t h e  s u p p l i e r  e x e r c i s e d  more i n f l u e n c e  in  th e  
r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  th e  b rand  o f  c a r p e t  s t u d i e d .
However, a one-way a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  o f  th e  p a y o f f  
p e r c e p t i o n s  by c o n t r o l  l e v e l  ( p o l i c y )  i d e n t i f i e d  no s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  a t  a 95 p e r c e n t  c o n f id e n c e  l e v e l .  T ab le  5 .7  shows t h a t  
th e  F -v a lu e  computed was much s m a l l e r  th a n  th e  c r i t i c a l  F -v a lu e
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Table 5 .6
A verage D e a le r  P e r c e p t io n s  o f  P a y o f f  a t  Each 
Level o f  R e l a t i v e  S u p p l i e r  C o n tro l
C o n tro l  Level Average P e r c e p t io n  o f  P a y o f f
P o l i c y  1 APPX = 3 .0 0
P o l i c y  2 APP2 = 2 . 9 5
P o l ic y  3 APP3 = 3 .3 0
P o l i c y  h APP. = 3 .3 5
P o l ic y  5 APP5 = 3 .25
T ab le  5 .7
T e s t  f o r  S i g n i f i c a n t  D i f f e r e n c e s  
in  D e a l e r s '  P e r c e p t io n s  o f  
P a y o ff  f o r  Each C o n tro l  
L eve l
S o u rc e  o f Computed C r i t i c a l  V alue S i g n i f i c a n t
V a r ia n c e F-V alue F. alpha=95Z 4, 76
C o n tro l  L evel
( P r i c e  P o l i c y ) 0 .9 9 2 .5 0 No
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The computed F -v a lu e  o f  .99  co u ld  have  o c c u r r e d  by chance 
more th a n  f i v e  t im e s  in  one hundred  c a s e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  f i r s t  
h y p o th e s i s  was n o t  r e j e c t e d .
The i n a b i l i t y  t o  r e j e c t  th e  f i r s t  h y p o th e s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  d id  n o t ,  on t h e  a v e r a g e ,  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
t h e i r  p r o f i t s  would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  by any o f  th e  f i v e  
r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  The p l o t  o f  t h e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r ­
c e p t io n  a t  each  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  y i e l d e d  an e s t i m a t e d  a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  
f u n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  a p p ro x im a te ly  h o r i z o n t a l  ( s e e  F ig u r e  5 . 1 ) .
P e rc e iv e d  






0 1 2 3 4 5
APP^ = A verage d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n  
a t  each  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  k
R e l a t i v e
C o n tro l
S c a le
a = APP3 





F ig u r e  5 .1
P l o t  o f  th e  A verage D e a le r  P a y o f f  P e r c e p t io n s
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The middleman p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  c o n c e p tu a l i z e d  i n  th e  t h i r d
c h a p t e r  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  would i n i t i a l l y
i n c r e a s e  w ith  i n c r e a s i n g  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b u t  would e v e n t u a l l y
19d e c l i n e  a t  v e ry  h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The m easu re s  o f  
th e  d e a l e r s '  a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  
t r u e  f o r  a l l  d e a l e r s  s u rv e y e d .
I n t e n s i v e  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i th  th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  su rv e y e d  a f t e r  
th e  co m p le t io n  o f  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  i d e n t i f i e d  some f a c t o r s  which 
o f f e r  p o t e n t i a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  th e s e  r e s u l t s .  F i r s t ,  some o f  th e  
d e a l e r s  f e l t  t h a t  i t  would be im p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  s u p p l i e r  t o  p o l i c e  
( i . e .  e n f o r c e )  th e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  im ply  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  
s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  A c a r p e t  m a n u fa c tu re r  ad o p ted  a c o o p e ra ­
t i v e  a d v e r t i s i n g  program  s e v e r a l  y e a r s  ago .  Only th o s e  d e a l e r s  who 
c o n t r i b u t e d  to  th e  program  were to  r e c e i v e  c e r t a i n  i tem s  o f  th e  t o t a l  
p ro d u c t  l i n e .  However, some p a r t i c i p a t i n g  d e a l e r s  s o ld  th e  i tem s  to  
n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g  d e a l e r s .  The m a n u fa c tu re r  e i t h e r  c o u ld  n o t  o r  
s im p ly  d id  n o t  e x e r t  any p r e s s u r e  upon th e  d e a l e r s  t o  p r e v e n t  t h i s .
As a r e s u l t ,  th e  program  was d i s c o n t i n u e d .
Second, a few d e a l e r s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  th e y  would o f f s e t  any 
n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  t h a t  th e y  m igh t e x p e r i e n c e  due t o  e f f o r t s  by th e  
s u p p l i e r  to  s e t  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  by lo w e r in g  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  th e  
c a r p e t  i n s t a l l a t i o n  s e r v i c e  and m a t e r i a l s .  C a rp e t  and i t s  i n s t a l l a ­
t i o n  i s  som eth ing  ab o u t  which most consumers know v e ry  l i t t l e  and
19Supra,  pp. 86-88 .
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t h e s e  few d e a l e r s  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  a l th o u g h  l e s s  th a n  com­
p l e t e l y  e t h i c a l ,  would a l lo w  them t o  com pensate  f o r  any n e g a t iv e  
e f f e c t s  th e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  m igh t have  upon t h e i r  p r o f i t s  in  th e  
s h o r t  r u n .
T h i r d ,  th e  d e a l e r s  were asked  in  P a r t  I I I  o f  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
t o  i n d i c a t e  o n ly  what th e y  th o u g h t  would happen to  t h e i r  n e t  p r o f i t s  
i f  t h e i r  s u p p l i e r  ad o p ted  th e  v a r i o u s  p o l i c i e s .  Some d e a l e r s  s a id  
t h a t  th e y  cou ld  r e a d i l y  sw i tc h  consum ers away from  any b rand  o f  
c a r p e t .  Thus, th e  p o l i c i e s  would n o t  a f f e c t  them b e ca u se  th e y  cou ld  
s im p ly  s e l l  o t h e r  b ran d s  t o  p r i c e  c o n s c io u s  consum ers .  Brand p r e f e r ­
ence f o r  c a r p e t  i s  n o t  t h a t  s t r o n g .
F i n a l l y ,  some o f  th e  d e a l e r s  acknow ledged t h a t  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  
p e r c e n ta g e  markup o v e r  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  on th e  c a r p e t  brand  s tu d ie d  
was w i th in  th e  r a n g e s  s p e c i f i e d  by a l l  f i v e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  The 
p o l i c i e s  w ould, t h u s ,  have l i t t l e  o r  no e f f e c t  upon t h e i r  p r i c e  
d e c i s i o n s .
I f  a l l  d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  would be
u n a f f e c t e d  by any o f  th e  f i v e  p o l i c i e s ,  th e n  th e  r e g r e s s i o n  o f
d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  a c r o s s  th e  f i v e  p o l i c i e s  would y i e l d  a
. . 2l i n e a r  f i t  w i th  a h ig h  and s i g n i f i c a n t  R . T h is  a n a l y s i s  was con­
d u c te d  to  t e s t  th e  second h y p o t h e s i s .
A verage R e t a i l e r  P a y o ff  F u n c t io n
The second h y p o th e s i s  was d e s ig n e d  t o  d e te rm in e  i f  th e  
a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  h a s  a c o n s t a n t  s lo p e  o r  i s  c u r v i ­
l i n e a r .  The second h y p o th e s i s  wasi
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A q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  t h e  form y * a  + bx + a  does  
n o t  d e s c r i b e  Lhe d e a l e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  
v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  th a n  a 
s t r a i g h t  l i n e  e q u a t io n  o f  th e  form y = a + bx .
Two r e g r e s s i o n  e q u a t io n s  were com putedi
( 1 )  P e r c e iv e d  _ ^  9405 + 0 0740 Re^a t ^ve  C o n tro l
P a y o f f  ‘  • (o!l527) V alue
R = 0 .0 2 0 6  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F 1  0 .1527
(2 )  P e rc e iv e d  .  2-9421 + 0 . 722 R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  + 0-0002l ^ “ o l '
Pay0«  ( 0 .6 8 0 3 )  V alue  ( 0 .9 8 9 6 )  V alue*
R = 0 .0208  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F = 0 .3628
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I f  th e  q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  form  y i e l d e d  a h ig h e r  R t h a t  was
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th e n  t h e  second  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  was t o  be
2r e j e c t e d .  However, b o th  r e g r e s s i o n s  p roduced  e x t re m e ly  low R ' s  
(0 .0 2 0 8  in  b o th  c a s e s )  and n e i t h e r  e q u a t io n  form was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
t h e  .0 5  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  ( a  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F o f  15 p e r c e n t  f o r
t h e  l i n e a r  and 36 p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  q u a d r a t i c  e x p r e s s i o n s ) .  The b e t a
c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  ( r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y )  were 
a l l  a p p ro x im a te ly  z e ro  ( t h i s  s u g g e s t s  a p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  w i th  a z e ro  
s l o p e ) .  However, none o f  th e  b e t a  c o e f f i c i e n t s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
t h e  .05  l e v e l  ( a  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t  o f  15 p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  l i n e a r  b e t a
and 68 and 98 p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  q u a d r a t i c  b e t a s ) .
The r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s  shows t h a t  t h e  second  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  
c o u ld  n o t  be r e j e c t e d .  N e i t h e r  e q u a t io n  form d id  a v e r y  good jo b  o f  
e x p l a i n i n g  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een th e  tw en ty  d e a l e r s '  p a y o f f  p e r ­
c e p t io n s  f o r  each  o f  th e  f i v e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .
The one-way a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  v a r i a n c e  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r ­
c e p t io n s  by s u p p l i e r  p o l i c i e s  ( c o n t r o l  l e v e l s )  d e m o n s t ra te d  t h a t  th e  
a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  f o r  a l l  tw en ty  d e a l e r s  d id  n o t  d i f f e r
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s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c i e s .  However, th e  i n a b i l i t y  to  
r e j e c t  th e  second n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  s u g g e s t s  th e  need f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s .
An a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  by 
d e a l e r  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w ere s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  d i f f e r e n t  
d e a l e r s '  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  T ab le  
5 .8  p r e s e n t s  th e  a v e ra g e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  p a y o f f  a c r o s s  th e  f i v e  p o l i c i e s  
by each o f  th e  tw en ty  d e a l e r s .
T ab le  5 .8
A verage P e r c e p t io n  o f  P a y o f f  A cross  A l l  C o n tro l  
L e v e ls  ( P r i c e  P o l i c i e s )  by D e a le r
D e a le r A verage P e r c e p t io n  
o f  P a y o ff
D e a le r A verage P e r c e p t io n  
o f  P a y o ff
1 3 .0 0 11 3 .8 0
2 2 .0 0 12 3 .0 0
3 2 .8 0 13 3 .40
4 4 .0 0 14 3 .0 0
5 3 .4 0 15 3 .0 0
6 3 .2 0 16 3 .6 0
7 3 .40 17 3 .0 0
8 3 .4 0 18 3 .0 0
9 3 .2 0 19 3 .0 0
10 3 .0 0 20 2 .0 0
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The v a r i a n c e  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  by d e a l e r  
was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .05  l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  ( s e e  
T ab le  5 . 9 ) .  T h is  f i n d i n g  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een 
p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  and r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  can be b e t t e r  u n d e r ­
s to o d  and e x p la in e d  i f  th e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  a r e  a n a ly z e d  a c c o r d in g  
t o  d e a l e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ( e . g . ,  s i z e  o f  f i r m ,  number o f  c a r p e t  
b ra n d s  c a r r i e d ,  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  d e a l e r  s a l e s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  by th e  
c a r p e t  b rand  s t u d i e d ,  e t c . ) .  I n  o t h e r  w ords ,  d e a l e r s  w i th  c e r t a i n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  may have  p e r c e iv e d  t h e i r  p a y o f f  t o  be p o s i t i v e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  w h i le  
o t h e r s  p e r c e iv e d  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  be a  n e g a t i v e  o n e .  O ther 
d e a l e r s  may have p e r c e iv e d  t h e i r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  to  be u n a f f e c t e d  
by any o f  th e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .
T a b le  5 .9
A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  o f  A verage  P a y o f f  
P e r c e p t io n s  by C a rp e t  D e a le r
S o u rce  o f Computed C r i t i c a l  F -V alue S i g n i f i c a n t
V a r ia n c e F-V alue 1?20 ^  a lp h a  = 95Z
C a rp e t 1 .8 5 1 .7 3 Yes
D e a le r
S e v e ra l  a d d i t i o n a l  h y p o th e se s  can be d e r iv e d  from t h i s  
f i n d i n g .  I t  would be a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t e s t  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
among th e  d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  
when th e  d e a l e r s  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  by«
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1 . )  number o f  c a r p e t  b ra n d s  c a r r i e d ;
2 . )  form o f  ow n ersh ip  o f  th e  r e t a i l  b u s in e s s ;
3 . )  number o f  y e a r s  t h e  f i r m  h as  been  in  b u s i n e s s ;
4 . )  l i n e s  o f  m e rc h a n d is e  s o l d ;
5 . )  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t o t a l  s a l e s  a c c o u n te d  f o r  by c a r p e t ;
6 . )  " d e f i n i t i o n "  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s ;  e . g . ,  i n t e r i o r  d e c o r a t o r ,  
f u r n i t u r e  r e t a i l e r  o r  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r ;
7 . )  l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  s a l e s  volum e;
8 . )  m easu re s  o f  p a s t  p e r fo rm a n c e .
A f a c t o r i a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  m igh t i d e n t i f y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r ­
ences  and i n d i c a t e  which k in d s  o f  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s '  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  
a r e  and a r e  n o t  a f f e c t e d  by th e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  The d a t a  
needed t o  t e s t  such  h y p o th e s e s  were n o t  c o l l e c t e d ,  how ever.
R e t a i l e r s '  A t t i t u d e s  Toward E n t e r p r i s e  
Channel R e l a t i o n s h i p s
The t h i r d  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  was r e l a t e d  to  th e  m easu re s  o f  th e
d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard each  o f  tw en ty  d i f f e r e n t  h y p o t h e t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n s .  In  P a r t  I I  o f  t h e  d e a l e r  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  each  r e s p o n d e n t
was ask ed  to  e x p re s s  h i s  f e e l i n g s  a b o u t  th e  s i t u a t i o n s .  Twenty
c o m b in a t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  ( f o u r )  and r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  ( f i v e )
r e p r e s e n t e d  th e  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s .
The h y p o th e s i s  t e s t e d  w asi
There  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  among t h e  m easu re s  
o f  t h e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  c o m b in a t io n s  
o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .
Each d e a l e r  re sponded  t o  s i x  s e v e n - p o in t  s e m a n t ic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
s c a le d  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s .  S c o re s  on each  s c a l e  ranged  from one f o r  
th e  l e a s t  f a v o r a b l e  end o f  t h e  s c a l e  t o  sev en  f o r  t h e  m ost f a v o r a b l e
end o f  th e  s c a l e .  The i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  r e s p o n s e s  a r e  r e p o r t e d  in  
Appendix B. Com posite  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  f o r  each  d e a l e r  were o b ta in e d  
by a v e r a g in g  each  d e a l e r ' s  r e s p o n s e s  t o  each  s i t u a t i o n .  A verage
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c o m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  were o b ta in e d  f o r  each  s i t u a t i o n  by 
a v e r a g in g  a l l  d e a l e r s '  s c o r e s  f o r  each  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  com bina­
t i o n .  T ab le  5 .1 0  p r e s e n t s  a  summary o f  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  com p o si te  
a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s .  The t a b l e  shows th e  s c o r e s  t o  d e c l i n e  w i th  i n ­
c r e a s i n g  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and to  i n c r e a s e  w i th  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f .
T ab le  5 .1 0
A verage D e a le r  Composite A t t i t u d e  S c o re s  (ACS . k ) 
f o r  th e  Twenty P a y o f f  and C o n tro l  ■*’
L eve l C om bina tions
C o n tro l  L e v e l i  R e s a le  P r i c e  P o l ic y
1 2 3 4 5
Row
Means
2 2 .1665 2 .0585 1 .8670 1 .8585 1 .7920 1.9485
P ayof f 3 4 .9665 5.4080 4 .2 6 6 5 3 .8590 3 .4245 4.3849
L e v e ls 4 6 .0410 5 .9495 5 .9255 5 .5585 4 .8 4 9 5 5.6648
5 6 .4495 5.8995 5.7420 5 .6330 5 .5005 5.8449
Column
Means 4 .9058 4 .8288 4.4502 4.2272 3.8916
A tw o - f a c t o r  ( p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l )  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  
i d e n t i f i e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  com posi te  
a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  a c r o s s  d i f f e r e n t  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and d i f f e r e n t  c o n t r o l  
l e v e l s  ( p o l i c i e s ) .  T ab le  5 .11  shows t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  
d e a l e r  co m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  were s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .05  l e v e l  
a c r o s s  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l s ,  b u t  t h e r e  was n o t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t
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i n t e r a c t i o n  betw een th e  two f a c t o r s .  The ab se n c e  o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t  w ith  th e  two s i g n i f i c a n t  main e f f e c t s  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  each  main e f f e c t  h e ld  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  th e  o t h e r  v a r i a t e .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  e f f e c t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  was t h e  same no 
m a t t e r  what th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  L ik e w is e ,  th e  
e f f e c t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  was th e  same no m a t t e r  what 
th e  l e v e l  o f  p a y o f f .
T ab le  5 .11
F a c t o r i a l  A n a ly s is  o f  V a r ia n c e  o f  D e a le r  Composite 
A t t i t u d e  S c o re s  by P a y o f f  L eve l and 
C o n tro l  L eve l ( P o l i c y )
S o u rce  o f  
V a r ia n c e
Computed
F-V alue
C r i t i c a l  F -V alue 
a lp h a  = 95Z
S i g n i f i c a n t
P a y o f f  L evel 122 .00 F3,361  = 2 ,6 0 Yes
C o n tro l  P o l i c y 5 .38 F4 , 361 = 2 ,3 7 Yes
P a y o f f  * C o n tro l 0 .8 5 F1 2 ,361 = 1 ,7 5 No
The f a c t o r i a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  th e  
d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  d id  v a ry  a s  p roposed  in  C h ap te r  3 .  The d e a l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n ,  d e s c r ib e d  c o n c e p tu a l ly  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r ,  was 
based  upon th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  d e a l e r s  p r e f e r  more to  l e s s  p r o f i t s  bu t 
l e s s  to  more i n f l u e n c e  by o t h e r  f i rm s  o v e r  t h e i r  m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e  
d e c i s i o n s .  The f in d i n g s  s u p p o r t  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  and th e  t h i r d  n u l l  
h y p o th e s i s  was r e j e c t e d .
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The E f f e c t  o f  P r o f i t s  on R e t a i l e r s '  A t t i t u d e s
The t h i r d  h y p o th e s i s  was d e s ig n e d  to  d e te rm in e  i f  any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t e d  among th e  d e a l e r s *  c o m p o s i te  a t t i ­
tu d e  s c o r e s .  The f o u r t h  and f i f t h  h y p o th e se s  w ere d e s ig n e d  t o  d e t e r ­
mine th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  th e  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  and 
th e  two in d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s ,  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l .  The f o u r t h  
h y p o th e s i s  d e a l t  w i th  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een d e a l e r  co m p o s i te  
a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  and th e  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( p a y o f f ) .
HQ4 The m easu re s  o f  th e  d e a l e r s *  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  
c o m b in a t io n s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and l e v e l s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  a r e  n o t  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  
t o  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
The f a c t o r i a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  o f  t h e  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  
by p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  d e m o n s t ra te d  t h a t  t h e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  
v a r i e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a c r o s s  th e  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .  The a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  
co m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  f o r  each  o f  t h e  f i v e  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  examined 
in  t h i s  s tu d y  a r e  shown in  T a b le  5 .1 2 .  The a v e ra g e  co m p o s i te  a t t i ­
tu d e  s c o r e s  in c r e a s e d  w i th  each  i n c r e a s e  in  th e  p a y o f f  l e v e l .  
( A t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  ra n g e  from 1 t o  7 . )
To o b t a i n  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s ta n d i n g  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een 
a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  and p a y o f f  l e v e l s ,  t h e  d e a l e r  co m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  
s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  tw en ty  p a y o f f  and p o l i c y  c o m b in a t io n s  were r e g r e s s e d  
a g a i n s t  th e  v a lu e s  a s s ig n e d  to  th e  f i v e  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .  The fo l lo w in g  
l i n e a r  e x p r e s s io n  was g e n e r a t e d i
A t t i t u d e  S co re  = - 0 .0 7  + 1 .2 9 6 9  P a y o f f  L eve l
(0 . 0001 )
R2 = 0 .3849  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F = 0 .0001
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2T his  l i n e a r  e x p r e s s io n  y i e ld e d  an R o f  0 .3 8 4 9  t h a t  was 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  0 .0001  l e v e l .  The b e t a  c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  p a y o f f  
l e v e l s  was +1 .2969  and i t  was a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 .0001  l e v e l .  
Thus, th e  f o u r t h  h y p o th e s i s  was r e j e c t e d  and th e  c o n c lu s io n  was 
drawn t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard th e  p a y o f f - p o l i c y  combi­
n a t i o n s  were p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  to  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
T ab le  5 .12
A verage Com posite A t t i t u d e  S c o re s  a t  
Each P a y o f f  L eve l
P a y o f f
L ev e ls
A verage Com posite 
A t t i t u d e  S c o re s  (ACSj)
1 1 .6755




The r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  f o u r t h  n u l l  h y p o th e s i s  d e m o n s t r a te s  t h a t  
c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  were a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  "econom ic m e n ."  The p o s i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  and p a y o f f  l e v e l s  shows th e  
d e a l e r s  t o  have been f a v o r a b ly  d i s p o s e d  to  p r o f i t s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  T h is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r ' s  t o l e r a n c e  
f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  m igh t be in c r e a s e d  i f  th e  s u p p l i e r  o f f e r e d  th e  
d e a l e r  a d d i t i o n a l  p r o f i t s .
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The E f f e c t  o f  S u p p l i e r  C o n tro l  on 
R e t a i l e r s *  A t t i t u d e s
The a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e a l e r  com p o si te  
a t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  i d e n t i f i e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h o s e  s c o r e s  
a c r o s s  th e  f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The f i f t h  
h y p o th e s i s  was examined to  i d e n t i f y  th e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  upon th e  d e a l e r s '  
com p o si te  a t t i t u d e  m e a su re s .
HQ5 The m easu res  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  tow ard  tw en ty  
c o m b in a t io n s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  and r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  a r e  n o t  n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  
to  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .
T ab le  5 .13  shows t h a t  t h e  a v e ra g e  co m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  s c o re  
f o r  a l l  d e a l e r s  d e c r e a s e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a t  s u c c e s s i v e l y  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  
o f  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l .  ( A t t i t u d e  s c o r e s  ra n g e  from 1 t o  7 . )
T ab le  5 .1 3
A verage Com posite A t t i t u d e  S c o re s  a t  
Each L eve l o f  S u p p l i e r  C o n tro l
C o n tro l  Level 
(R e s a le  P r i c e  P o l i c y )
S c a l e  V alue 
Vk
A verage Com posite 
A t t i t u d e  S c o re  (ACS^)
1 0 .0 0 0 0 4.9058
2 1 .5600 4 .8288
3 1 .6865 4 .4502
4 3.2465 4 .2272
5 4 .8915 3 .8916
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The means in  T ab le  5 .1 3  im ply  t h a t  t h e  co m p o s i te  a t t i t u d e  
s c o re s  were n e g a t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  A l i n e a r  r e g r e s s i o n  o f  th e  d e a l e r  co m p o s i te  s c o r e s  
a c r o s s  th e  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a l u e s  (V^) f o r  t h e  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s  s u p p o r t s  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  a n e g a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The 
f o l lo w in g  e q u a t io n  was g e n e ra te d *
A t t i t u d e  S co re  = 4 .9 5 2 5  -  0 .2 1 5 9  ( R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l
CO.0021) S c a le  V alue)
2
R = 0 .0236  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F = 0 .0021
2
A lthough  th e  R computed f o r  th e  l i n e a r  e x p r e s s io n  was 
e x t re m e ly  low, th e  e x p r e s s io n  was s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  a
0 .0021  l e v e l .  A ls o ,  t h e  b e t a  c o e f f i c i e n t  computed f o r  t h e  d e p en d e n t  
v a r i a b l e  ( r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s )  was n e g a t i v e  ( - 0 .2 1 5 9 )  and 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  a 0 .0021  l e v e l .  T h e r e f o re ,  th e  f i f t h  
h y p o th e s i s  was r e j e c t e d .
The r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i f t h  h y p o th e s i s  im p l ie s  t h a t  th e  c a r p e t  
r e t a i l e r s  were n e g a t i v e l y  d i s p o s e d  tow ard  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  in f l u e n c e  
by th e  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r  o v e r  t h e  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  d e c i s i o n .  T h is  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s '  r e s i s t a n c e  to  c o n t r o l  by t h e i r  s u p p l i e r  
in c r e a s e d  as  th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  i n c r e a s e d .
A verage R e t a i l e r  T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n
The r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  f o u r t h  and f i f t h  h y p o th e s e s  l e d  t o  th e  
c o n c lu s io n s  t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s  w ere f a v o r a b l y  d i s p o s e d  tow ard i n c r e a s i n g  
l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  and u n f a v o r a b ly  d i s p o s e d  tow ard  i n c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  
r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  c a r p e t .  The 
s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  was t e s t e d  t o  d e te rm in e  th e  ap p ro x im a te  shape  o f
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t h e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n .  In  o t h e r  w ords , t h e  o b j e c t i v e  was to  
a s s e s s  b e t t e r  t h e  p a y o f f  and c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
2Hgg A q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  o f  t h e  form y = a  + bx + cx
does  n o t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  d e a l e r s '  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  b e t t e r  th a n  a s t r a i g h t  l i n e  e q u a t io n  
o f  th e  form y = a  + bx .
The c o n c e p tu a l  model p r e s e n t e d  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r  s u g g e s te d
t h a t  th e  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  f o r  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  r e t a i l e r  e x h i b i t e d  a
c o n s t a n t  and p o s i t i v e  s lo p e  th ro u g h o u t  scxne r a n g e  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l .
At a r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ,  how ever, th e  s lo p e
was shown to  i n c r e a s e  and th e  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  became v e r t i c a l .
To t e s t  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  i t  was f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  o b t a in
m easu re s  o f  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t h a t  each  d e a l e r
would t o l e r a t e  a t  each p a y o f f  l e v e l .  The m a t r ix  c h e c k o f f  p ro c e d u re
d e s c r ib e d  in  C h ap te r  4 was used  to  d e te rm in e  th e  maximum c o n t r o l  l e v e l
20t o l e r a t e d  by each  d e a l e r  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  p a y o f f .  A m a t r ix  l i k e  
th e  one shown in  T ab le  5 .1 4  was c o n s t r u c t e d  f o r  each  o f  t h e  tw en ty  
d e a l e r s  ( s e e  Appendix D).
The maximum r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l  t o l e r a t e d  by d e a l e r  18 a t  
P a y o f f  L e v e ls  2 ,  3, 4 and 5 was P o l i c y  L e v e ls  2 ,  3, 4 and 5, r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y .  A summary o f  th e  maximum r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  t o l e r a t e d  
by each  d e a l e r  a t  each l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  i s  d e p i c te d  
in  T ab le  5 .1 5 .
The g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  
i s  s u g g e s te d  by T ab le  5 .1 6 .  I t  l i s t s  th e  a v e ra g e  maximum r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  a t  p a y o f f  l e v e l s  2
^ S u p r a ,  p. 139.
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Table 5 .14
Maximum R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  M a tr ix  f o r  D e a le r  18
V alue o f  
I n d i c a t o r
P a y o ff
Level
( j )
R e l a t i v e C o n tro l  L e v e ls Maximum
R e l a t i v e
S co re  
CS1 8 , 1 ,1
1 2 3 4 5
v O I 1 L- L O X
Level
T o le r a te d
1 .5 0 2 2 .1 7 5 .67 1 .5 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 2
3 6 .8 3 7 .00 4 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 3
4 7 .0 0 7 .0 0 6 .1 7 4 .6 7 1 .0 0 4
5 7 .0 0 5 .00 5 .17 2 .67 2 .6 7 5
T ab le  5 .16
A verage Maximum R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L eve l 
T o le r a te d  a t  Each P a y o f f  L eve l
P a y o f f  L evel A verage Maximum R e l a t i v e  
C o n tro l  L eve l T o l e r a te d






Maximum R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L eve l T o le r a te d  by 
Each D e a le r  a t  Each P a y o f f  L eve l




ID PAY MC. .
J
ID PAY MC. . 
J
1 2 1 6 2 1 11 2 1 16 2 1
3 3 3 5 3 5 3 5
4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5
5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
2 2 3 7 2 1 12 2 1 17 2 1
3 3 3 4 3 2 3 5
4 3 4 5 4 5 4 5
5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 2 3 8 2 1 13 2 5 18 2 2
3 5 3 3 3 5 3 3
4 5 4 3 4 5 4 4
5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5
4 2 1 9 2 1 14 2 5 19 2 5
3 4 3 5 3 5 3 5
4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 2 1 10 2 5 15 2 1 20 2 1
3 2 3 5 3 5 3 2
4 5 4 5 4 5 4 3
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2
ID = D e a le r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  number
bPAY = D e a le r  p e r c e iv e d  p a y o f f  l e v e l
Q
MC. . = Maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  
J
by d e a l e r  i  a t  p a y o f f  l e v e l  j
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through 5.
The a v e ra g e s  c i t e d  in  T ab le  5 .1 6  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  d e a l e r  t o l e r ­
ance  f o r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  was p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  i n ­
c r e a s i n g  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .  T h is  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  
c o n c e p tu a l  model p r e s e n te d  in  C h a p te r  3 . The a v e ra g e  maximum 
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  v a lu e s  f o r  each  p a y o f f  l e v e l  a r e  p l o t t e d  in  F ig u re  
5 .2 .  This  g r a p h ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  l e a s t  a p p ro x im a te s  t h e  g e n e r a l  
n a t u r e  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n .  (The d e p en d e n t  
v a r i a b l e  i s  on th e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  and th e  in d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  
on th e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s . )
P e rc e iv e d
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The A verage T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n
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To o b t a i n  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  and 
t o l e r a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  maximum r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  l e v e l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  (V. f o r  each  MC. . )  f o r  each p r i c e  p o l i c y
K 1 ,  J
were r e g r e s s e d  a g a i n s t  th e  p a y o f f  l e v e l  v a l u e s .  A l i n e a r  and a
q u a d r a t i c  e x p r e s s io n  w ere used  i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  a n a l y s i s .  The
f o l lo w in g  two t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s  w ere g e n e r a t e d .
( 1 . )  Maximum C o n tro l  _ n  Q£ ,  , .
L ev e l  T o l e r a te d  '  - ° - 0200 ( J ;S o o l>
R = 0 .3411  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F = 0 .0001
( 2 . )  Maximum C o n tro l  _ * , QO
Tmrol Trairav-ai-raH “ 6 .2 7  + 4 .8 8  ( P a y o f f )  -  ( 0 .5 5 )  ( P a y o f f )
L ev e l  T o le r a te d  (0 .0 0 0 1 )  (0 .0 0 1 4 )
R^ = 0 .4286  P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  F = 0 .0001
The second e q u a t io n ,  a q u a d r a t i c  o r  p a r a b o l i c  e x p r e s s io n ,
2
produced  a h ig h e r  R (0 .4 2 8 6 )  and th e  e q u a t io n  was s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
t h e  0 .0001  l e v e l .  A ls o ,  b o th  o f  th e  b e t a  c o e f f i c i e n t s  were s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  (b^ = 4 .8 8  a t  th e  0 .0001  l e v e l  and b2 = - 0 .5 5  a t  th e  0 .0014  
l e v e l ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  th e  s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  was r e j e c t e d .
R e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  s i x t h  h y p o th e s i s  im p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  concep ­
t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  in  th e  t h i r d  c h a p t e r  
was a f a i r  e s t i m a t e  o f  th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s * ' a v e ra g e  t o l e r a n c e  fu n c ­
t i o n .  T h e i r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  was p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  
t o  i n c r e a s i n g  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .  However, a t  h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ,  d e a l e r  r e s i s t a n c e  in c r e a s e d  a t  an i n c r e a s i n g  r a t e .  
Thus, t h e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  was b e t t e r  d e s c r ib e d  w ith  a 
q u a d r a t i c  e x p r e s s io n  th a n  w i th  a l i n e a r  e x p r e s s io n .
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P a y o f f  and T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n s !  G en e ra l  
I m p l i c a t io n s  f o r  th e  Channel Group
The a n a l y s i s  o f  d a t a  c o l l e c t e d  from th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  l e d  
to  th e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  f o u r  n u l l  h y p o th e se s  which d e a l t  w ith  d e a l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  (Hq^ Hq^ Hq ,. and Hq^ ) .  However, 
th e  f i r s t  two h y p o th e s e s ,  which d e a l t  w i th  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n ,  
were n o t  r e j e c t e d .  The m a jo r  c o n c lu s io n s  drawn from t h i s  s tu d y  o f  
r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  were d e r iv e d  from th e  s im u l ta n e o u s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s .
The d e a l e r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  p a y o f f  a t  each  o f  th e  f i v e  l e v e l s  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  were n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  The a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  
p e r c e p t i o n s  (APP^ f o r  k = 1 - 5 )  were a l l  a p p ro x im a te ly  eq u a l  t o  3 . 0 .  
Thus, th e  tw en ty  d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  d id  n o t ,  on th e  a v e r a g e ,  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o f i t s  would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  i f  th e  
c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r  adop ted  any o f  th e  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  T h is  
s u g g e s t s  an a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  h o r i z o n t a l  a t  
p a y o f f  l e v e l  3 ( i . e .  no change in  d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s ) .
The a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  was d e s c r i b e d  by a 
q u a d r a t i c  e x p r e s s i o n .  The a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  m e asu re s  o f  d e a l e r s '  
a t t i t u d e s  tow ard tw en ty  h y p o t h e t i c a l  ch an n e l  s i t u a t i o n s  s u p p o r te d  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  betw een d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  and d e a l e r  p a y o f f  
p e r c e p t i o n s  which was c o n c e p tu a l i z e d  in  C h a p te r  3 .  The q u a d r a t i c  
e x p r e s s io n  computed to  r e p r e s e n t  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n  
i s «
Maximum C o n tro l  _ . 2
Level T o le r a te d  ‘  ‘ 6 -27 + ' , ' 88 '  ° - 55 ( P a y o f f )
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S in c e  th e  a v e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  c o n s t a n t  
( P a y o f f  = 3 ) ,  th e  s im u l ta n e o u s  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  two e q u a t io n s  to  
i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  i n t e r s e c t i o n  was s im p le .  The two e q u a t io n s  i n t e r s e c t  
a t  a  p o i n t  which r e p r e s e n t s  3 .4 2  on th e  h o r i z o n t a l  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
a x i s  and 3 .0 0  on th e  v e r t i c a l  p a y o f f  a x i s .  T h is  i n t e r s e c t i o n  i s  
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F ig u re  5 .3
C a rp e t  D e a l e r s '  A verage P a y o f f  
and T o le ra n c e  F u n c t io n s
The i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s  
e s t i m a t e s  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t h a t  th e  c a r p e t  
s u p p l i e r  cou ld  a c h ie v e  o v e r  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  th e  c a r p e t  brand  
s t u d i e d .  The maximum l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  t h a t  i s  a t t a i n a b l e  i s  g r e a t e r
th a n  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  r e p r e s e n t e d  by C o n tro l  L eve l 4 i
O r ig in a l  W ho lesa le  S u p p ly ,  I n c .  s e t s  a ra n g e  o f  
30 to  60 p e r c e n t  markup o v e r  t h e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s  pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  w i th i n  
which a l l  Brand X d e a l e r s  must s e t  t h e i r  r e t a i l  
p r i c e .
However, th e  s u p p l i e r  c o u ld  n o t  ad o p t  a r e s a l e  p r i c e  m ain­
te n a n c e  p o l i c y  (C o n t ro l  L eve l 5) w i th o u t  e n c o u n te r in g  ex trem e  r e s i s ­
t a n c e  from th e  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s .  F ig u re  5 .3  shows t h a t  th e  d e a l e r s  
would n o t  t o l e r a t e  a r e s a l e  p r i c e  m a in te n a n c e  program  even i f  t h e i r  
n e t  p r o f i t s  were in c r e a s e d  15 t o  25 p e r c e n t  (P a y o f f  L eve l 5 ) .
The tw en ty  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  w ere ,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  v e ry  
t o l e r a n t  o f  s u p p l i e r  p r i c e  c o n t r o l .  T h is  f a c t  may be e x p la in e d  by 
th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  m a n u f a c t u r e r - d i s t r i b u t o r - w h o l e s a l e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
in  th e  n a t u r e  i n d u s t r y .  Most c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  a r e  v e ry  d ep en d e n t 
upon th e  l o c a l  d i s t r i b u t o r  ( s u p p l i e r ) .  The most c r u c i a l  m a rk e t in g  
s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e  f o r  th e  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r  i s  h i s  a s s o r tm e n t  o f  
c a r p e t  s t y l e s  as  w e l l  a s  b r a n d s .  Most d e a l e r s  a r e  i n c a p a b le  o f  
s e l e c t i n g  th e  new c a r p e t  s t y l e s  which p re m ise  th e  g r e a t e s t  consumer 
demand.
Almost a l l  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  a b d i c a t e  t h i s  m a jo r  p r o d u c t  
s e l e c t i o n  d e c i s i o n  to  th e  l o c a l  o r  r e g i o n a l  in d e p e n d e n t  d i s t r i b u t o r .  
Huge r e g i o n a l  "M ark e ts"  a r e  co n d u c ted  s e m i - a n n u a l ly .  At th e s e  t r a d e  
shows, th e  c a r p e t  m a n u fa c tu re r s  d i s p l a y  t h e i r  new c a r p e t  s t y l e s  and 
in d e p e n d e n t  c a r p e t  d i s t r i b u t o r s  s e l e c t  c a r p e t  s t y l e s  f o r  th e  r e t a i l e r s .  
T h is  p a t t e r n  o f  b e h a v io r  i s  s t a n d a r d i z e d  in  th e  c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y .  The 
s t r o n g  r o l e - t a s k  norms r e l a t e d  to  th e  p ro d u c t  a s s o r tm e n t  d e c i s i o n  
m ight a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e t a i l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  
p r i c e  c o n t r o l  by th e  d i s t r i b u t o r  ( s u p p l i e r ) .
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A nother  f a c t o r  which m igh t e x p l a in  th e  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e t a i l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  i s  th e  g e n e r a l  s t a t e  o f  th e  
economy o f  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s .  The y e a r s  o f  1971 to  1974 have been 
marked by wage and p r i c e  c o n t r o l s  by th e  E x e c u t iv e  Branch o f  th e  
U n ited  S t a t e s  Government. C u r re n t  s h o r t a g e s  o f  many raw m a t e r i a l s  
( i n c l u d i n g  s y n t h e t i c  and n a t u r a l  f i b e r s ) ,  ram pant i n f l a t i o n ,  and an 
u n c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s  a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  
to  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  among many sm a ll  bu s in essm en . These 
f a c t o r s  m igh t have s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  th e  m easures  o f  d e a l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  r e s a l e  p r i c e  d e c i s i o n s .
Some o f  th e  s m a l l ,  in d e p e n d e n t  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  e x p re s s e d  a 
f e e l i n g  o f  com ple te  b ew ild e rm en t ab o u t th e  s t a t e  o f  th e  economy.
They seemed e a g e r  to  t u r n  o v e r  t h e i r  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  a s  w e ll  as  promo­
t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  to  a d i s t r i b u t o r  o r  anyone e l s e  who prom ised  to  
improve t h e i r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  O ther  r e t a i l e r s ,  how ever, m a in ta in e d  
an unw avering  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  any c o n t r o l  o f  t h e i r  b u s in e s s  d e c i s i o n s  
by any o u t s i d e  agency ,  s u p p l i e r  o r  governm ent.
I f  th e  c a r p e t  d i s t r i b u t o r  who s u p p l i e s  th e  tw enty  c a r p e t  
d e a l e r s  su rv ey ed  wanted t o  ad o p t  a more r e s t r i c t i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c y  to  s t a b i l i z e  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  o f  th e  c a r p e t  Lrand s t u d i e d ,  
s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  a t  h i s  d i s p o s a l .  He cou ld  remind th e  d e a l e r s  
t h a t  he a l r e a d y  q u i t e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  s e l e c t s  th e  p ro d u c t  s t y l e s  t h a t  
th e y  c a r r y .  Then, he m igh t e x p l a in  t h a t  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  would 
n o t  a f f e c t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  ( a v e ra g e  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  were t h a t  d e a l e r  
p r o f i t s  would be unchanged a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ) ;  
b u t  th e  p o l i c y  would p r e v e n t  low overhead  r e t a i l e r s  from u n d e r c u t t i n g  
most d e a l e r s '  " lo w e s t  p o s s i b l e  p r i c e . "  T h is  s t r a t e g y  cou ld  in v o lv e
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th e  use  o f  r a t i o n a l  a p p e a l s ,  t h e  development o f  new r o l e - t a s k  norms, 
a n d /o r  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  new s o c i a l i z a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  t o  i n c r e a s e  
d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .
A r e s a l e  p r i c e  main tenance  p o l i c y  might a l s o  be a c c e p t a b l e  t o  
t h e  r e t a i l e r s  i f  th e  s u p p l i e r  were w i l l i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e t a i l e r s '  
p a y o f f  a t  th e  h ig h e r  l e v e l s  o f  c o n t r o l .  This s t r a t e g y  might  i n v o lv e  
improving the  r e t a i l e r s '  and th e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  p rom ot ion a l  programs 
and e s t a b l i s h i n g  a s t r o n g e r  consumer brand  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  th e  branded 
c a r p e t .  A more s e l e c t i v e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p o l i c y  t h a t  would e l i m i n a t e  
d e a l e r s  u n w i l l i n g  t o  m a in ta in  a minimum markup might a l s o  be u t i l i z e d  
t o  s h i f t  each d e a l e r ' s  p a y o f f  f u n c t i o n  upward. This  would r e q u i r e  a 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  th e  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  consumer f r a n c h i s e ,  however.
The a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  th e  methodology used in  t h i s  s tudy  i s  not  
l i m i t e d  to  th e  s tu dy  o f  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .  Indeed , the  
methodology deve loped  to  measure p a y o f f  p e r c e p t i o n s  and r e t a i l e r  
t o l e r a n c e  f o r  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  can be used t o  d e te rm in e  t h e  p e rc e iv ed  
impact on d e a l e r  p r o f i t s  and a t t i t u d e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  over  any m ark e t ing  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e .  For example, 
s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s  r e g a r d i n g  r e t a i l e r  c o o p e r a t i v e  
a d v e r t i s i n g  programs,  d e a l e r  s a l e s  promotion  programs and even 
p ro d u c t  a s s o r tm e n t  d e c i s i o n s  could  e a s i l y  be i n v e s t i g a t e d .
For s u p p l i e r s  se ek ing  to  de ve lop  new d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel  
networks  or  to  modify t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  c h a n n e ls ,  t h i s  s tudy  has i m p l i ­
c a t i o n s  f o r  middleman s e l e c t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s .  The d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  
t h e  k in ds  o f  middlemen who would b e n e f i t  from and t o l e r a t e  th e  
s u p p l i e r ' s  d e s i r e d  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  over  r e s e l l e r  m ark e t in g  v a r i a b l e s  
would p ro v id e  s p e c i f i c  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  middlemen.
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I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  M arke t ing  Theory
Quentin  L. Coons in  1963 i s s u e d  a c h a l l e n g e  t o  th e  economic
21
t h e o r i s t s  to  i n t e g r a t e  m a rk e t in g  thou gh t  and economic t h e o r y .  This 
s tu d y  c o n t r i b u t e s  in  a small  way t o  m ee t ing  Coons'  c h a l l e n g e .  The 
c a r p e t  i n d u s t r y  e x h i b i t s  a low l e v e l  o f  s e l l e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  a t  th e  
m an u fa c tu r i n g  l e v e l  and a h igh  l e v e l  o f  r e t a i l e r  c o m p e t i t i o n .  Economic 
p r i c e  t h e o r y  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  ove r  p r i c i n g  o r  any o t h e r  
m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  e n f o r c e  upon t h e  maverick 
f i rm  in  such an i n d u s t r y .
This  s tudy  s u g g e s t s  t h a t ,  on th e  a v e r a g e ,  th e  r e t a i l  d e a l e r s  
surveyed  might w i l l i n g l y  accede  to  a r e l a t i v e l y  h igh  l e v e l  o f  whole­
s a l e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  on a r e l a t i v e l y  well-known, n a t i o n a l  brand 
o f  c a r p e t .  Whether o r  no t  t h e  d e a l e r s  can be encouraged  to  c o o p e ra te  
t o  e l i m i n a t e  p r i c e  c u t t i n g  i s  dependen t  upon i n c r e a s e d  p ro d uc t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and a s t r e n g t h e n e d  m a n u f a c t u r e r ' s  consumer f r a n c h i s e .  
S t e r n ' s  r e s e a r c h  of  th e  b i l a t e r a l l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  f u r n i t u r e
in d u s t r y  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  low c o n c e n t r a t i o n  in  an i n d u s t r y  does no t
22
always p r o h i b i t  th e  development  o f  a l o c u s  o f  channel  c o n t r o l .  
A d d i t i o n a l  s t u d i e s  a r e  needed t o  d e te r m in e  th e  n a t u r e  o f  any r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p  t h a t  may e x i s t  between m a n u fa c tu re r  and d i s t r i b u t o r  a t t i ­
tud es  toward the  e x e r c i s e  o f  g ove rn ing  i n f l u e n c e  and t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  economic m a rk e ts .  For example,  do c e r t a i n  k inds  
o f  f i rm s  in  low c o n c e n t r a t i o n  i n d u s t r i e s  e x h i b i t  a h igh  t o l e r a n c e  f o r
21
Quentin  L. Coons, " M a r k e t in g ' s  C ha l lenge  t o  th e  Econom is t , "  
Jo u r n a l  o f  M a rk e t in g , Vol .  27 ( J u l y ,  1963),  pp.  11-15 .
22Supra, pp. 15-16 .
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s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  w h i le  o t h e r s  e x h i b i t  a low l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  
t o l e r a n c e ?  A lso ,  what k in d s  o f  middlemen in  h ig h  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  more o r  l e s s  t o l e r a n t  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l ?
This  s t u d y  s u g g e s ts  a l s o  t h a t  r e t a i l e r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  th e  
e f f e c t  o f  v a r i o u s  s u p p l i e r  p o l i c i e s  upon r e t a i l e r  p r o f i t s  d i f f e r  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  A d d i t i o n a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  a r e  w arran te d  t o  de te rm in e  
i f  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  o f  d e a l e r s  have s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  p e r c e p t i o n s  
o f  r e t a i l  p r o f i t s  a t  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  m ark e t ing  
v a r i a b l e s .
I t  has been d em o n s t ra ted  in  t h i s  s t ud y  ( s u b j e c t  to  f u t u r e  
v a l i d a t i o n )  t h a t  i t  i s  f e a s i b l e  t o  de ve lop  a methodology c o n s i s t i n g  
o f  e s t a b l i s h e d  b e h a v i o r a l  s c i e n c e  r e s e a r c h  te c h n iq u e s  t o  examine a 
b e h a v i o r a l  d imens ion  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l s .  A t t i t u d e  measurement 
te c h n iq u e s  seem a p p l i c a b l e  to  e x p l a i n  and p r e d i c t  channel member 
b e h a v io r .
This  e m p i r i c a l  exa m ina t ion  o f  th e  c o n t r o l ,  t o l e r a n c e  and
per form ance  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in a d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  th e
d e v e lo p in g  body o f  m ark e t in g  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  channel  b e h a v io r a l
phenomena. Rosenberg has  e m p i r i c a l l y  examined channel  c o n f l i c t ;
E l -A ns ary ,  Walker and Wilk inson have i n v e s t i g a t e d  channel  power; and
S c h u l t z  has  examined th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between ba se s  o f  power and 
23
channel  c o n f l i c t .
As the  b e h a v i o r a l  d imens ions  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  channe ls  a r e  
b e t t e r  u n d e r s to o d ,  i t  w i l l  become i n c r e a s i n g l y  im p o r t a n t  f o r  th e  
m ar k e t in g  t h e o r i s t  t o  r e l a t e  h i s  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s  and u n d e r s t a n d in g
Supra,  p.  1 .  Refer e s p e c i a l l y  to  fo o t n o t e  2.
195
o f  channe l power, c o n t r o l ,  t o l e r a n c e ,  pe rfo rm ance  and c o n f l i c t .  Even
though th e  m a r k e t e r ' s  t o o l s  f o r  m easuring  th e s e  phenomena a r e  c rud e ,
com prehensive i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  in  o p e r a t in g  channe l system s a r e  needed
so t h a t  channel th e o ry  developm ent can c o n t in u e .
K endall A. Adams and L ou is  P. B uck lin  p r e v io u s ly  co n cep tu -
2 ̂
a l i z e d  th e  channel c o n t r o l /p e r f o rm a n c e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Adams found 
t h a t  t h e r e  was a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r e t a i l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  toward 
w h o le s a le r  c o n t r o l  o f  r e t a i l e r  m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e s  in  v o lu n ta ry  
r e t a i l e r  c o o p e r a t iv e s  and th e  r e t a i l e r s *  p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  impact o f  
th o se  c o n t r o l s  upon t h e i r  p r o f i t s .  Adams used i n d i f f e r e n c e  and income 
p o s s i b i l i t y  cu rv es  to  c o n c e p tu a l i z e  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  However, th e  
methodology used in  h i s  s tu d y  d id  n o t e n a b le  him to  e m p i r i c a l ly
g e n e ra te  th e  i n d i f f e r e n c e  and income p o s s i b i l i t y  c u rv es  o f  h i s
25 . . . .
model. A s ta n d a r d iz e d  methodology f o r  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e
com parisons o f  r e s u l t s  from d i f f e r e n t  s t u d i e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l .
B u c k l in 's  c o n c e p tu a l i z a t i o n  o f  d i s t r i b u t o r  p e r c e p t io n s  o f
p a y o f f  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and d i s t r i b u t o r  t o l e r a n c e
f o r  c o n t r o l  a t  v a r io u s  l e v e l s  o f  p a y o f f  evoked t h i s  s tu d y .  B u c k l in 's
c o n t r o l  mod°l was m od if ied  in  t h i s  s tu d y  to  r e c o g n iz e  th e  i n t e r a c t i v e
n a tu r e  o f  channel c o n t ro l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  E m p ir ica l  ev id en ce  was
g e n e ra te d  t h a t  s u p p o r ts  th e  b a s i c  model o f  th e  c o n t r o l / t o l e r a n c e /
p a y o f f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between a s u p p l i e r  and h i s  d i s t r i b u t o r s .
2kAdams, "The A cceptance  and Use o f  S p e c ia l  S e rv ic e s  by 
S e le c te d  Superm arket Owner-Managers in  M ich ig an ;"  and B u c k lin ,  "A 
Theory o f  Channel C o n t r o l . "
^ S u p r a ,  pp. 71-72
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A number o f  m ark e t in g  s c h o la r s  d u r in g  th e  1 9 5 0 's  and 1 9 6 0 's  
devo ted  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  channe l
as  s o c i a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  w ith  b e h a v io ra l  d im e n s io n s .  The e a r l y  1 9 7 0 's 
have been c h a r a c te r i z e d  by e m p i r i c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  o f  b e h a v io ra l  
phenomena such a s  power and c o n f l i c t  in  m a rk e t in g  c h a n n e ls .
T his  s tu d y  sought to  c o n t r i b u t e  to  th e  m a rk e t in g  s c h o la r  and 
p r a c t i t i o n e r  a b e t t e r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  n a tu r e  o f  c o n t r o l  in  d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls .  In t h i s  f i n a l  c h a p te r ,  th e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  scope 
and methodology o f  th e  s tu d y  a r e  rev iew ed . A lso , th e  c o n c e p tu a l  
model o f  channel c o n t r o l  upon which th e  s tu d y  was based i s  summarized 
The d i s s e r t a t i o n  i s  te rm in a te d  w ith  a f i n a l  c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  
s tu d y  and i t s  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  f u t u r e  channe l r e s e a r c h .
Summary o f  th e  Study O b je c t iv e s  and Scope
The s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  werei
1 .  to  d eve lop  a c o n c e p tu a l  model which e x p la in s  th e  n a tu r e  
o f  c o n t r o l  ov er  m ark e t in g  v a r i a b l e s  between a s u p p l i e r  
and h i s  d i s t r i b u t o r s  in  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e l;
2 .  to  deve lop  a methodology f o r  e m p i r i c a l ly  exam ining th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h y p o th e s iz e d  in  th e  proposed model o f  
channel c o n t r o l ;
3. to  app ly  th e  methodology to  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel group t o t
a .  examine th e  methodology
b. v e r i f y  th e  middleman p o r t io n  o f  th e  c o n c e p tu a l  model.
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The r e s e a r c h  was conducted  in  a c a r p e t  and ru g  supp ly  channel 
in  so u th  L o u is ia n a .  R e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  in  th e  g e o g ra p h ic  scope o f  
th e  s tu d y  who were se rved  by a m ajo r d i s t r i b u t o r  o f  a w e ll  known 
n a t i o n a l  brand o f  c a r p e t  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  channel group su rv ey ed .  A 
p e r s o n a l ly  a d m in is te r e d ,  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  was used to  
o b ta in  d e s i r e d  in fo rm a t io n  from th e  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s .  Responses were 
o b ta in e d  from th e  r e t a i l  s t o r e  manager in  most c a s e s .  The manager 
o f  th e  c a r p e t  d e p a r tm en t  was in te rv ie w e d  in  th e  l im i t e d  number o f  
ca se s  in  which c a r p e t  d e p a r tm e n ts  were m a in ta in e d .
Development o f  th e  Model o f  Channel C on tro l
C hap ter  2 o f  t h i s  s tu d y  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a rev iew  o f  b e h a v io ra l  
s c ie n c e  l i t e r a t u r e  r e l a t e d  to  th e  c o n cep ts  o f  power, c o n t r o l ,  p e r f o r ­
mance and s a t i s f a c t i o n .  S p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  was g iv en  to  a t te m p ts  to  
measure power and c o n t r o l  in  d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e ls  and s i n g l e  o r g a n i ­
z a t io n s  .
A model o f  th e  key i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among th e  c o n cep ts  o f  
power, c o n t r o l ,  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  p erfo rm ance  and t o l e r a n c e  was developed  
to  gu ide  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  re v ie w . In a d i s t r i b u t i o n  c h a n n e l ,  th e  l e v e l  
o f  c o n t r o l  ach iev ed  by one f i rm  ov er  s p e c i f i c  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a n o th e r  
f i rm  i s  de te rm in ed  by th e  f o r m e r 's  power o r  p o t e n t i a l  t o  e x e r t  
in f lu e n c e  as  w e ll  as  i t s  d e s i r e  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  l a t t e r .  A lso , th e  
l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  ach ieved  i s  dependen t upon th e  c o n t r o l l e d  f i r m 's  
t o l e r a n c e  o r  w i l l i n g  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  f i r m 's  in f lu e n c e .  
The l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  ach ieved  in  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel a f f e c t s  n o t  
on ly  th e  l e v e l  o f  perfo rm ance  o f  th e  channel members, b u t  i t  a l s o
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a f f e c t s  t h e i r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  channe l r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip s .  A d d i t io n a l ly ,  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  key e x e c u t iv e s  o f  th e  
o r g a n iz a t io n s  a f f e c t s  t h e i r  perfo rm ance  as w e ll  a s  t h e i r  t o l e r a n c e  
f o r  c o n t r o l  by th e  c o n t r o l l i n g  f i r m .
A c o n cep tu a l  model o f  channe l c o n t r o l  was p r e s e n te d  in  th e  
t h i r d  c h a p te r .  The model i s  based upon th e  l i t e r a t u r e  rev iew ed in  
th e  second c h a p te r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th e  works o f  Arnold S. Tannenbaum, 
K endall A. Adams and Louis  P. B u c k l in .  The model i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
a m o d i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  model deve loped  by B uck lin  f o r  h i s  th e o ry  o f  
channel c o n t r o l . 1 The m od if ied  v e r s io n ,  however, s u g g e s t s  t h a t i
1 . c o n t r o l  in  e n t e r p r i s e  m a rk e t in g  c h an n e ls  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  
a mutual and n o t  a u n i l a t e r a l  p ro c e s s )  i . e .  th e  l e v e l  o f  
c o n t r o l  ach iev ed  i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f  an i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  th e  
e f f o r t s  o f  channe l members to  a c h ie v e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
o v er  each o th e r  and t o  m a in ta in  t h e i r  i n d iv i d u a l  autonomy)
2 . no one channe l l e v e l  can be s in g le d  o u t  a s  most a p p r o p r i a t e  
to  c o n t r o l  th e  o th e r  channe l l e v e l s  i n  a l l  s i t u a t i o n s )  
r a t h e r ,  a co n tin g e n c y  th e o ry  o f  channe l c o n t r o l  i s  
s u g g e s te d )
3. f o r  bo th  c o n c e p tu a l  and m e th o d o lo g ic a l  r e a s o n s ,  power 
and c o n t r o l  in  e n t e r p r i s e  m ark e t in g  c h a n n e ls  must be 
viewed as i s s u e  s p e c i f i c .
The model o f  channel c o n t r o l  i s  d y a d ic .  I t  d e p i c t s  a p a y o ff  
and a to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n  f o r  a middleman and a s u p p l i e r .  The p a y o ff  
f u n c t io n s  d e p i c t  th e  channel members' p e r c e p t io n s  o f  th e  p r o f i t s  t h a t  
would a c c ru e  to  them a t  each o f  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  middleman- 
s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  over a m ark e t in g  v a r i a b l e ;  e . g . ,  r e s a l e  
p r i c i n g .  The t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  d e p i c t  th e  channel members'
1B u ck lin , "A Theory o f  Channel C o n tro l."
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f e e l i n g s  o f  burden and s a c r i f i c e  in c u r re d  from a c c ed in g  to  a n o t h e r ' s  
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  ov er  a m ark e t in g  v a r i a b l e .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  th e  
to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  d e p i c t  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  by 
a n o th e r  f i rm  in  th e  channel to  which each channe l member w i l l i n g l y  
accedes  a t  each l e v e l  o f  economic p a y o f f .  The i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  each 
member's p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  d e f in e s  th e  maximum l e v e l  o f  
r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  t h a t  can p o s s ib ly  be ach ieved  by th e  o th e r  f i rm .
Methodology o f  th e  Study
The methodology o f  t h i s  s tu d y  was r e p o r te d  in  C hap ter 4.
This e f f o r t  was c l a s s i f i e d  as  a f i e l d  s tu d y  as opposed to  e i t h e r  a 
l a b o r a to r y  o r  f i e l d  ex p e r im en t .  Because e m p ir ic a l  r e s e a r c h  d e a l in g  
w ith  channel c o n t r o l  i s  l i m i t e d ,  an a t t i t u d e  o f  e x p lo r a t io n  as w ell 
as h y p o th e s is  t e s t i n g  was m a in ta in e d  th ro u g h o u t  th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
S e v e ra l  su g g e s t io n s  f o r  f u tu r e  channel c o n t r o l  r e s e a r c h  which emerged 
d u r in g  th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  a r e  o f f e r e d  below.
A p e r s o n a l ly  a d m in is te re d  s t r u c t u r e d - d i r e c t  q u e s t io n n a i r e  
was used to  c o l l e c t  d a t a  from th e  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  t h a t  was s u i t a b l e  
f o r  th e  e s t im a t io n  o f  t h e i r  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t i o n s .  A 
sem an tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  fo rm at u s in g  s i x  b ip o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  was used 
to  o b ta in  m easures o f  d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  toward h y p o th e t i c a l  channel 
s i t u a t i o n s .  One and tw o - f a c to r  a n a ly s i s  o f  v a r ia n c e  and sim ple  
l i n e a r  and q u a d r a t i c  r e g r e s s io n  a n a ly s i s  was used to  a n a ly z e  th e  
d a t a .  An o r i g i n a l  p ro ced u re  was used to  d e te rm in e  th e  maximum le v e l  
o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t h a t  each d e a l e r  would t o l e r a t e  a t  
each l e v e l  o f  d e a l e r  p a y o f f .
T h u r s to n e 's  law o f  com para tive  judgement was used to  deve lop
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i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  f o r  each o f  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  which 
r e p r e s e n te d  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .  The i s s u e  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  was r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l l y  branded c a r p e t  l i n e .
S ix  hy p o th eses  were t e s t e d  to  examine th e  fo l lo w in g  q u e s t io n s .
1 . Did th e  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  th in k  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  
would be a f f e c t e d  i f  th e  c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r  adop ted  a d i f f e r e n t  r e s a l e  
p r i c e  p o l i c y  which would have g iv en  th e  s u p p l i e r  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  
c o n t r o l  o ver  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  c a rp e t?
2 . How d id  th e  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  t h in k  t h e i r  p r o f i t s
would be a f f e c t e d  i f  th e  s u p p l i e r  adopted  d i f f e r e n t  r e s a l e  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s ?
3 . Were th e  d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  toward t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  
channel r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a f f e c t e d  by d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  
s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  and by d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  d e a l e r  p r o f i t s ?
4 . How d id  proposed  in c r e a s e s  in  d e a l e r  p r o f i t s  a f f e c t  th e  
d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  toward t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  channel r e l a t i o n s h i p s ?
5. How d id  proposed i n c r e a s e s  in  th e  s u p p l i e r ' s  r e l a t i v e
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  r e t a i l  p r i c e  d e c i s i o n  a f f e c t  th e  d e a l e r s '
a t t i t u d e s  toward t h e i r  e n t e r p r i s e  channel r e l a t i o n s h i p s ?
6. What was th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  
maximum r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  by th e  d e a l e r s  and 
d e a l e r s '  p r o f i t s ?
The a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  d a ta  and th e  f in d in g s  o f  th e  s tu d y  were 
r e p o r te d  in  th e  f i f t h  c h a p te r .  Those f in d in g s  a r e  summarized in  th e  
fo l lo w in g  s e c t i o n .
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Review o f  th e  F ind in gs
1. The r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  d id  n o t ,  on th e  a v e ra g e ,  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  i f  th e  
s u p p l i e r  adopted  any o f  th e  fo u r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  which r e ­
f l e c t e d  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  th an  th e  p r e s e n t  p o l i c y .  
P o t e n t i a l  e x p la n a t io n s  f o r  t h i s  f in d in g  in c lu d e !  ( a . )  some d e a le r s  
d id  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  s u p p l i e r  p r i c e  c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s  could  be 
e n fo rc e d ;  ( b . )  some f e l t  t h a t  th e y  could  m a in ta in  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  
p r o f i t  l e v e l  by v a ry in g  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  i n s t a l l a t i o n  s e r v i c e ;
( c . )  some b e l ie v e d  t h a t  consumer brand p r e f e r e n c e  was so weak t h a t  
they  could  s e l l  o th e r  b rands w ith  g r e a t e r  p r i c i n g  freedom i f  n e c e s s a ry  
to  m a in ta in  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  s a l e s  volume and p r o f i t  l e v e l s ;  and ( d . )  
some d e a l e r s  would be u n a f f e c te d  by th e  a d o p t io n  o f  any o f  th e  p o te n ­
t i a l  p o l i c i e s  s in c e  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  p r i c i n g  p r a c t i c e s  were w i th in  a l l
o f  th e  p o l i c i e s '  g u id e l i n e s .
2 . N e i th e r  a l i n e a r  n o r  a q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t io n  form d id  an 
a c c e p ta b le  job  o f  e x p la in in g  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  av e ra g e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  
f u n c t io n .  Simple l i n e a r  and c u r v i l i n e a r  r e g r e s s i o n s  o f  th e  d e a l e r s '  
p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  a g a in s t  th e  f i v e  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  y ie ld e d  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p la n a t io n s  o f  th e  v a r i a t i o n  in  th e  d a t a .
F u r th e r  a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  d e a l e r  p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  showed 
t h a t  t h e r e  were s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  among th e  in d iv id u a l  d e a l e r ' s  
av e rag e  p a y o ff  p e r c e p t io n s .  This su g g es te d  t h a t  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  
d e a l e r s  had p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  
p e r c e p t io n s  o f  o th e r  c l a s s e s  o f  d e a l e r s .
3. The d e a l e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  toward tw enty h y p o th e t i c a l  channel
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s i t u a t i o n s  were found to  be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  by bo th  th e  l e v e l  
o f  d e a l e r  p r o f i t s  and th e  l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  
c o n t r o l  which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  th e  s i t u a t i o n s .  This f i n d i n g ,  in  g e n e r a l ,  
s u p p o r t s  th e  proposed  c o n c e p tu a l  model o f  channe l c o n t r o l  which p o s i t s  
t h a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m a rk e t in g  v a r i a b l e s  ach iev ed  in  a 
channe l r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between channel 
member's d e s i r e s  f o r  p r o f i t s  and f o r  independence .
4. The c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  surveyed  were found to  be "economic 
men" to  some d e g re e .  T h e ir  a t t i t u d e s  toward many a l t e r n a t i v e  channel 
s i t u a t i o n s  were p o s i t i v e l y  a f f e c t e d  by i n c r e a s e s  in  t h e i r  n e t  p r o f i t s  
a t  a l l  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  d e c i ­
s io n .
The c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  were a l s o  found to  be n e g a t i v e l y  d isp o se d  
toward g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  
c a r p e t .  Thus, th e  d e a l e r s '  d e s i r e  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  n e t  p r o f i t s  was 
c o u n te rb a la n c e d  by an a v e r s io n  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
5. D ea le r  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o f  c a r p e t  p r i c i n g  
was found to  in c r e a s e  a t  an in c r e a s in g  r a t e .  This f a c t  was r e f l e c t e d  
in  th e  c u r v i l i n e a r  av e rage  d e a l e r  t o l e r a n c e  fu n c t io n  t h a t  was computed. 
The f i n d in g  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s '  r e s i s t a n c e  to  s u p p l i e r  
demands f o r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  beyond some l i m i t  becomes a b s o lu t e .
That i s ,  no m a t te r  what th e  s u p p l i e r  o f f e r s  th e  d e a l e r s  in  term s o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o f i t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  th e  d e a l e r s  w i l l  n o t  a c q u ie s c e  to  
th e  c o n t r o l  demands above some l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l .
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A R e t r o s p e c t iv e  A p p ra is a l  o f  th e  Study
Some p o t e n t i a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  were c o n s id e re d  in  
C hap ter 4 . The c o n c lu s io n  was reach ed  a t  t h a t  p o in t  t h a t  t h e r e  were 
no s e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  s tu d y .  I t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  in  c o n c lu d in g  
t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  to  c r i t i c a l l y  examine th e  s tu d y  in  r e t r o s p e c t .
I t  i s  obvious t h a t  th e  methodology o f  t h i s  s tu d y  y i e l d s  on ly  
a p i c t u r e  o f  th e  channe l c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  a p o in t  in  t im e .
Much l i k e  th e  m icro-econom ic p r i c e  th e o ry  m odels , th e  s tu d y  r e p r e s e n t s  
a s t a t i c  a n a ly s i s  o f  a dynamic s i t u a t i o n .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  s tu d y  
was conducted  d u r in g  a p e r io d  o f  ram pant i n f l a t i o n ,  s e r i o u s  raw 
m a te r i a l  and f i n i s h e d  goods s h o r ta g e s  and, in d e e d ,  p o l i t i c a l  t u r b u -  
la n c e  th ro u g h o u t  th e  U nited  S t a t e s  and th e  world  must be c o n s id e re d  
to  have a f f e c t e d  th e  d e a l e r s '  r e s p o n s e s .
However, t h i s  f a c t  does n o t  e f f a c e  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  co n c ep tu a l  
model o r  th e  methodology f o r  d e c is io n - m a k e r s .  Repeated  m easures over  
tim e o f  a s i n g l e  channel group would i d e n t i f y  any changes in  channel 
members' p a y o ff  p e r c e p t io n s  and t o l e r a n c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  by o th e r  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n s .  The r e s e a r c h e r ' s  t a s k  w ith  r e p e a te d  m easures  would be to  
e x p la in  why th e  changes o c c u r re d .
Second, th e  a n a ly s i s  o f  m easures o f  channe l members' p a y o f f  
p e r c e p t io n s  and to l e r a n c e s  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  shou ld  c o n s id e r  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n s  examined. In  o th e r  
words, ave rage  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  f o r  a l a r g e  group o f  
middlemen may co n cea l  more th an  th ey  expose . T his  problem , a l s o ,  
may be overcome by ve ry  s im ply  c o l l e c t i n g  d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rm a t io n  
about th e  middlemen surveyed and a n a ly z in g  th e  v a r i a t i o n s  in  th e
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p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  m easures a c c o rd in g  to  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  th e  
m iddlem en 's  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
F i n a l l y ,  th e  proposed methodology does n o t  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  
d e te r m in a t io n  o f  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o r  t r a d e - o f f  e f f e c t  o f  s e v e r a l  
m ark e t in g  s t r a t e g y  v a r i a b l e s .  While i t  i s  h e ld  t h a t  m easures o f  
channe l c o n t r o l  must be i s s u e  s p e c i f i c  r a t h e r  th an  g lo b a l  t o  be 
m ean ingfu l to  t h e o r i s t s  and d e c is io n -m a k e rs ,  i t  must a l s o  be re c o g ­
n ize d  t h a t  m iddlem en 's  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f o r  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  
over  th e  r e t a i l  prom otion  mix i s  p ro b ab ly  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  by 
th e  e x te n t  to  which th e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l s  th e  r e t a i l e r ' s  p ro d u c t  
mix d e c i s i o n s .  The measures o b ta in e d  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  r e l a t e d  to  
changes in  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  r e s a l e  p r i c i n g  w ith  a l l  o th e r  
f a c t o r s  h e ld  c o n s t a n t .
The f in d in g s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  and th e  c r i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  p r e ­
se n te d  above c o n ta in  s e v e r a l  im p l i c a t io n s  f o r  f u t u r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n
channel r e s e a r c h .  Some o f  th e s e  im p l ic a t io n s  a r e  p re s e n te d  below 
w ith  an assessm en t  o f  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  to  th e  growing 
body o f  knowledge o f  channel b e h a v io ra l  phenomena.
Im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  F u tu re  Channel R esearch
This s tu d y  was an i n i t i a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  a c o n c e p tu a l i z a t io n  
o f  channel c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The f in d in g s  and r e t r o s p e c t i v e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  s tu d y  su g g e s t  s e v e r a l  im p l ic a t io n s  f o r  f u t u r e  channel 
r e s e a r c h .
1 . The methodology o f  th e  s tu d y  can be s i m p l i f i e d  c o n s id e r ­
a b ly .  This would make i t  much e a s i e r  f o r  th e  r e s e a r c h e r  to  in c r e a s e
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th e  s i z e  o f  th e  channe l group s tu d ie d  as w e l l  as  m inim ize th e  time 
r e q u i r e d  to  in te r v ie w  r e s p o n d e n ts .
F i r s t ,  th e  number o f  b ip o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  used in  a sem an tic  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  fo rm at to  measure d e a l e r  a t t i t u d e s  toward a l t e r n a t i v e  
e n t e r p r i s e  channel r e l a t i o n s h i p s  can be re d u c e d .  The s p l i t - h a l v e s  
r e l i a b i l i t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  c a l c u l a t e d  to  t e s t  f o r  th e  r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  
th e  a t t i t u d e  measurements d em o n s tra ted  redundancy in  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  
I t  i s  su g g es te d  t h a t  f u tu r e  s t u d i e s  u s in g  a sem an tic  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
fo rm at l i m i t  th e  number o f  b i p o l a r  a d j e c t i v e s  to  one , two o r  t h r e e .
Second, th e  number o f  p a i r e d  com parisons o f  s u p p l i e r  mar­
k e t i n g  p o l i c i e s  ( e . g . ,  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s )  made by th e  re sp o n d e n ts  
to  g e n e r a te  i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  v a lu e s  can be reduced to  
m inim ize e x p e r im e n ta l  l a b o r .  When approx im ate  rank  o r d e r s  o f  th e  
p o l i c i e s  a r e  known, p r o p o r t io n s  need be o b ta in e d  o n ly  f o r  th o se  
p a i r s  o f  p o l i c i e s  which a r e  c lo s e  t o g e th e r  on th e  p re c o n c e iv e d  s c a l e .  
A lso , i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  u se  e x p e r im e n ta l  methods o th e r  than  p a i re d  
com parisons to  o b ta in  d a ta  to  compute i n t e r v a l  s c a l e  v a lu e s  w ith  th e  
law o f  co m para tive  judgem ent. One such a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  to  have 
re sp o n d e n ts  rank th e  p o l i c i e s  in  o rd e r  o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l .  These and s e v e r a l  o th e r  methods to  m inimize th e  e x p e r i ­
m enta l l a b o r  a s s o c ia t e d  w ith  th e  law o f  com p ara tiv e  judgement a r e
2
d e s c r ib e d  by T orgerson .
2 . With a methodology t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  th e  su g g e s t io n s
2
T orgerson , Theory and Methods o f  S c a l i n g , pp. 191-194.
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p re s e n te d  above, i t  would be f e a s i b l e  to  examine more th an  a s in g le
i s s u e .  Based upon Sim on 's  methodology and i t s  m o d i f i c a t io n s  d is c u s s e d  
3
in  C hapter  3 , '  i t  would be p o s s ib l e  t o t  ( a . )  g e n e r a te  a l i s t  o f  
r e l e v a n t  m ark e t in g  v a r i a b l e s ;  ( b . )  w eigh t th e  i s s u e s  in  term s o f  
t h e i r  p e rc e iv e d  and a t t r i b u t e d  im portance  th r o u g h e j t  e n t e r p r i s e  
c h a n n e ls ;  and ( c . )  measure p a y o f f  p e r c e p t io n s  and a t t i t u d e s  and 
g e n e ra te  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  f o r  in d iv id u a l  i s s u e s  and f o r  
a l l  o f  th e  i s s u e s  deemed r e l e v a n t  to  th e  channe l num bers.
The problems a s s o c ia te d  w ith  d e v e lo p in g  a g g re g a te  m easures o f  
c o n t r o l  have been re c o g n iz ed  h e re  and in  o th e r  p l a c e s .  Even t h i s  
su g g e s t io n  does n o t  accoun t f o r  th e  i n t e r a c t i o n  among channel members' 
p a y o ff  p e r c e p t io n s  and c o n t r o l  t o l e r a n c e s  f o r  s e v e r a l  i s s u e s .  How­
e v e r ,  t h i s  i s  a t  l e a s t  one s t e p  toward th e  ievelopm ent o f  m ethodolo­
g ie s  t h a t  w i l l  y i e ld  v a l i d  and r e l i a b l e  m easu res .
3. Two s p e c i f i c  s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  emerged from 
t h i s  s tu d y .  F i r s t ,  a d d i t i o n a l  exam in a tio n s  a r e  needed to  g e n e ra te  
i s s u e  s p e c i f i c  and g lo b a l  p a y o f f  and to l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
c l a s s e s  o f  middlemen in  d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  o f  i n d u s t r i e s .  Such s t u d i e s  
would c o n t r i b u t e  to  a more com ple te  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  channel b eh av io r  
than  i s  p ro v id ed  by th e  economic m arket s t r u c t u r e  th e o ry .  While 
a d d i t i o n a l  s t u d i e s  t e s t i n g  th e  model o f  channe l c o n t r o l  proposed 
h e r e in  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  to  th e  developm ent o f  a th e o ry  o f  channel 
c o n t r o l ,  they  w i l l  a l s o  p ro v id e  su b s ta n c e  f o r  an i n t e g r a t i v e  model
^Supra, pp. 107-109 .
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and th e o ry  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  channe l b e h a v io r .
Second, r e p e a te d  m easures o f  p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  fu n c t io n s  
ov er  tim e w ith  s u p p l i e r  a n d /o r  middleman s t r a t e g i e s  d e s ig n e d  to  s h i f t  
o r  a l t e r  th e  channel p a y o f f  and t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s  s e r v in g  as  
e x p e r im e n ta l  t r e a tm e n ts  a r e  needed . Such exp er im en ts  w i l l  su g g e s t  
th e  most e f f e c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  to  a f f e c t  channel members' p a y o f f  and 
t o l e r a n c e  f u n c t io n s .  S tu d ie s  a r e  a l s o  needed to  d e te rm in e  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  m arket supp ly  and demand c o n d i t io n s  upon channel members' p a y o f f  
p e r c e p t io n s  under a l t e r n a t i v e  l e v e l s  o f  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  and t o l e r ­
ances  f o r  o t h e r - c o n t r o l  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p a y o f f  l e v e l s .
4 . E l-A nsary , Rosenberg , S c h u l tz ,  Walker and W ilk inson  have 
examined d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel b e h a v io ra l  phenomena in  th e  f i e l d  as 
w ell  as in  th e  l a b o r a to r y .  They have concerned  them se lv es  p r im a r i l y  
w ith  th e  s tudy  o f  power so u rc e s  and m easures o f  power and c o n f l i c t  
c a u ses  and m easures o f  c o n f l i c t .  T his  s tu d y  has focused  upon th e  
channel c o n t r o l - t o l e r a n c e - s a t i s f a c t i o n - p e r f o r m a n c e  complex. I t  
seems a p p r o p r i a t e  now f o r  m a rk e te rs  to  p ropose  and t e s t  c o n c e p tu a l  
models which i n t e g r a t e  th e  f in d in g s  o f  th e s e  s e p a r a t e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  
I t  i s  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  u n re a so n a b le  to  p ropose  a t h e o r e t i c a l  model o f  
channel member beh av io r  t h a t  would be s u i t a b l e  f o r  com prehensive 
r e s e a r c h  exam ina tio n .
In c o n c lu s io n ,  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  o f f e r s  a c o n c e p tu a l  model 
o f  channel c o n t r o l ,  a methodology s u i t a b l e  f o r  th e  e m p i r ic a l  examina­
t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  in  o p e r a t in g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  ch a n n e ls  and 
f in d in g s  t h a t  su g g e s t  f u t u r e  d i r e c t i o n s  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  channel 
r e s e a r c h .  I t  i s  hoped t h a t  t h i s  s tu d y  w i l l  s e rv e  as a c o n t r i b u t i o n
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t h a t  w i l l  be i n t e g r a t e d  w ith  o th e r  s t u d i e s  o f  channe l b e h a v io r a l  
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Each d e a l e r  in te rv ie w e d  r e c e iv e d  a copy o f  th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  
which a p p e a rs  on th e  fo l lo w in g  p a g es .  The a c tu a l  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  
however, was bound in  a pam phlet w ith  e ig h t  and o n e - h a l f  by f i v e  
and o n e - h a l f  d im ensions  ( o n e - h a l f  p a g e ) .  For r e p r o d u c t io n  p u rp o se s ,  
th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  i s  p r e s e n te d  h e re  w ith  two a c tu a l  q u e s t io n n a i r e  
pages p e r  p ag e . A lso , th e  names o f  th e  c a r p e t  w h o le s a le r  and th e  
c a r p e t  brand s tu d ie d  a r e  d i s g u i s e d .
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I n t r o d u c t i o n . The pu rpose  o f  t h i s  su rv ey  i s  to  d e te rm in e  th e  n a tu r e  
o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  e x i s t s  between th e  a b i l i t y  o f  rug  and c a rp e t  
d e a l e r s  to  s e t  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  on c a r p e t  and d e a l e r  p r o f i t s .  With 
knowledge o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  r e t a i l  c a r p e t  d e a l e r s  can b e t t e r  
d e s ig n  t h e i r  m ark e ting  s t r a t e g y  to  in c r e a s e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s .
P a r t  I o f  th e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a sk s  you to  e v a lu a te  s e v e r a l  
p o s s ib l e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  one o f  your s u p p l i e r s  m igh t ado p t to  govern 
r e t a i l  p r i c i n g  o f  c a r p e t .  P a r t  I I  a sks  you to  e x p re s s  your f e e l i n g s  
abou t tw en ty -one  p o s s ib l e  s i t u a t i o n s .  Each s i t u a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  a 
com bina tion  o f  a change in  th e  n e t  p r o f i t s  t h a t  you would make ( i . e .  
s a l e s  minus c o s t  o f  goods so ld  and s e l l i n g  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  ex­
p e n se s )  and a c a r p e t  s u p p l i e r ' s  p o l i c y  r e g a r d in g  th e  way you s e t  
th e  p r i c e  on c a r p e t  t h a t  you s e l l  t o  your c u s to m e rs .  P a r t  I I I  o f  
th e  q u e s t io n n a i r e  i s  composed o f  f i v e  q u e s t io n s  which ask  what you 
th in k  would happen to  your n e t  p r o f i t s  i f  your s u p p l i e r  adopted  
v a r io u s  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s .
T his su rvey  i s  b e ing  conducted  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  
re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  th e  d e g re e  o f  d o c to r  o f  p h i lo so p h y  in  m ark e t in g  a t  
L o u is ia n a  S t a t e  U n iv e r s i ty .  Answers to  a l l  q u e s t io n s  w i l l  be 
s t r i c t l y  c o n f i d e n t i a l . R e s u l t s  o f  th e  su rvey  w i l l  ap pea r  in  summary 
form in  th e  r e s e a r c h e r ' s  d o c to r a l  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  b u t  i r  no c a se  w i l l  
any o f  your re sp o n s e s  be i d e n t i f i a b l e .
P a r t  I .  Ten p a i r s  o f  p o l i c i e s  which could  be adop ted  by th e  d i s t r i ­
b u to r  o f  Brand X c a r p e t s  a r e  p re s e n te d  below. Each s ta te m e n t  p r e ­
se n te d  r e p r e s e n t s  a r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  t h a t  O r ig in a l  W holesale  
S upply , In c .  could  ad op t to  govern  th e  p r i c i n g  p r a c t i c e s  o f  a l l  
r e t a i l e r s  who c a r r y  Brand X c a r p e t s .  A r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  i s  a 
s ta te m e n t  which t e l l s  a l l  r e t a i l e r s ,  l i k e  y o u r s e l f ,  how to  s e t  th e  
p r i c e  t h a t  you charge  your custom ers  f o r  Brand X c a r p e t .  I f  one o f  
th e  fo l lo w in g  p o l i c i e s  was a d o p te d ,  i t  would a p p ly  to  a l l  Brand X 
d e a l e r s  — no t j u s t  you.
For each p a i r  o f  p o l i c i e s ,  i n d i c a t e  by p l a c in g  an X in  ihe  
a p p r o p r i a t e  c i r c l e  which p o l i c y  you th in k  would g iv e  O r ig in a l  g r e a t e r  
c o n t r o l  over  a l l  c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s ' a b i l i t y  to  s e t  th e  p r i c e  on th e  
Brand X c a r p e t  t h a t  they  s e l l .  For example, two p o l i c i e s  t h a t  m ight 
be adopted  by C a rd in a l  a r e i
O l .  O r ig in a l  d o e s n ' t  c a re  what p r i c e  Brand X r e t a i l e r s  charge  t h e i r  cu s to m ers .
0 2. O r ig in a l  r e q u i r e s  a l l  Brand X c a r p e t  r e t a i l e r s  to  charge  a l l  o f  t h e i r  custom ers  th e  m a n u f a c tu r e r 's  sugg es ted  r e t a i l  p r i c e  f o r  a l l  Brand X p r o d u c t s .
You would most p ro b ab ly  p la c e  an X in  th e  second c i r c l e .  The 
second p o l i c y  r e p r e s e n t s  g r e a t e r  c o n t r o l  by O r ig in a l  o ver  a l l  o f  the  
Brand X d e a l e r s .
O rig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  o f f e r s  a su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  
p r i c e  b u t you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  
su g g e s t io n  in  s e t t i n g  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  u rg e s  you to  s e t  your 
r e t a i l  p r i c e  w i th in  a ra n g e  o f  2£ t ô 80 p e r c e n t  markup 
over th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  
bu t you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  ra n g e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  s e t s  a ra n g e  o f  30 _to 60 
p e r c e n t  markup o ver  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t  w i th in  which you must s e t  your r e t a i l  
p r i c e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supply , I n c .  o f f e r s  no sug ges ted  
r e t a i l  p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  charge  your custom ers  
any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supply , In c .  u rg e s  you to  s e t  your 
r e t a i l  p r i c e  w i th in  a ran g e  o f  2£ £o 80 p e r c e n t  markup 
over th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t , 
bu t you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supply , I n c .  has a p o l i c y  t h a t  you 
and a l l  d e a l e r s  must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X 
c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you 
pay f o r  th o se  p ro d u c ts .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  S upply , In c .  s e t s  a ran g e  o f  30 jto 6£ 
p e r c e n t  markup ov er  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t  w i th in  which you must s e t  your r e t a i l  
p r i c e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  o f f e r s  a su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  
p r i c e , but you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  
s u g g e s t io n  in  s e t t i n g  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .
O rig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  o f f e r s  a su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  
p r i c e  b u t  you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  
s u g g e s t io n  in  s e t t i n g  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supply , In c .  o f f e r s  no su g g es te d  
r e t a i l  p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  charge  your cus tom ers  
any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supp ly , In c .  o f f e r s  a su g g es ted  
r e t a i l  p r i c e  bu t you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down 
from t h a t  s u g g e s t io n  in  s e t t i n g  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  
on Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Supply , I n c .  has a p o l i c y  t h a t  
you and a l l  d e a l e r s  must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on 
Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above th e  d e l iv e r e d  
c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  th o se  p r o d u c ts .
O rig in a l  W holesale  S upp ly , In c .  u rg e s  you to  s e t  your 
r e t a i l  p r i c e  w i th in  a ran g e  o f  2£  jto 80 p e r c e n t  markup 
over th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  
bu t you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Su pp ly , In c .  s e t s  a range  o f  30 to  60 
p e rc e n t  markup over  th e  d e l iv e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay fo r  
Brand X c a r p e t  w i th in  which you must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Sup p ly , In c .  o f f e r s  n£  su g g e s te d  
r e t a i l  p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  cha rge  your custom ers  
any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  Brand X c a r p e t .
O r ig in a l  W holesale  Sup p ly , In c .  has  a p o l i c y  t h a t  you 
and a l l  d e a l e r s  must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X 
c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you 
pay f o r  th o se  p r o d u c t s .
O r ig in a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  has  a p o l i c y  t h a t  you 
and a l l  d e a l e r s  must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X 
c a r p e t  a t  41 p e r c e n t  above th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you 
pay f o r  th o s e  p r o d u c t s .
O r ig in a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  In c .  s e t s  a range  o f  30 to  
60 p e r c e n t  markup ov er  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay 
f o r  Brand X c a r n e t  w i th i n  which you must s e t  your 
r e t a i l  p r i c e .
O r i g in a l  Wholesa le  S up ply ,  In c .  o f f e r s  no su g g e s te d  
r e t a i l  p r i c e  and you a r e  f r e e  to  charge  your customers  
any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  Brand X c a r p e t .
O r i g in a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  In c .  u rg e s  you t o  s e t  your 
r e t a i l  p r i c e  w i t h i n  a ra nge  o f  2£ t o  j}0 p e r c e n t  markup 
ov . th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  
bu t you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up or  down from t h a t  ra n g e .
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P a r t  I I .  The purpose  o f  t h i s  p a r t  o f  th e  s tu dy  i s  t o  measure th e  
meanings o f  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  t o  v a r i o u s  p eo p le  by ha v in g  them judge  
them a g a i n s t  a s e r i e s  o f  d e s c r i p t i v e  s c a l e s .  In answ er ing  th e s e  
q u e s t i o n s ,  p l e a s e  make your  judgements on t h e  b a s i s  o f  what th e s e  
t h i n g s  mean t o  you. On each page o f  t h i s  b o o k le t  you w i l l  f i n d  a 
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  to  be judged and benea th  i t  a  s e t  o f  s c a l e s .  
You a r e  to  r a t e  the  s i t u a t i o n  on each o f  th e s e  s c a l e s  in  o r d e r .
Here i s  how you a r e  to  use  t h e s e  s c a l e s t
I f  you f e e l  t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  a t  th e  top o f  th e  page i s  v e ry
c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  one end o f  t h e  s c a l e ,  you should  p l a c e  your
check-mark as  f o l l o w s «
f a i r  X t _______ » j _________ t _i _____i _ u n f a i r
o r
f a i r  : : i i : i X u n f a i r
I f  you f e e l  t h a t  the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  one 
o r  th e  o t h e r  end o f  the  s c a l e  ( b u t  no t  e x t r e m e ly ) ,  you should  
p l a c e  your check-mark „s f o l l o w s :
good ____: X :______:______i ______: ______i ____ bad
or
good ____:____ «_____ i ______t  t X i ____ bad
I f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  seems only  s l i g h t l y  r e l a t e d  to  one s i d e  as 
opposed to  th e  o t h e r  s i d e  (b u t  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  n e u t r a l ) ,  then  
you should  check as  f o l l o w s :
awful  i_____ i X i____i_____i_i  n ic e
o r
awful i : « i X i « n i c e
The d i r e c t i o n  toward which you check,  o f  c o u r s e ,  depends upon which 
o f  th e  two ends o f  th e  s c a l e  seems most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  you’ r e  jud g in g .
I f  you c o n s i d e r  th e  concept  t o  be n e u t r a l  on t h e  s c a l e ,  bo th  s i d e s  
o f  th e  s c a l e  e q u a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  o r  i f  th e  s c a l e  
i s  co m ple te ly  i r r e l e v a n t ,  u n r e l a t e d  t o  th e  s i t u a t i o n ,  then  you should 
p l a c e  your check-mark in  th e  middle  spa ce .
v a l u a b l e  « : « X i i « w o r t h l e s s
NOTE: (1)  P la c e  your check-marks in  t h e  middle  o f  th e  s p a c e s ,  no t
on th e  b o u n d a r ie s :
This  Not This
 : X :_____:___ :____X___ :
(2)  Be su re  t o  check every  s c a l e  f o r  every  s i t u a t i o n  — do 
not  omit any.
(3)  Never pu t  more than  one check-mark on a s i n g l e  s c a l e .
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Sometimes you may f e e l  t h a t  y o u 'v e  answered th e  same q u e s t i o n  
b e f o r e .  This  w i l l  n o t  be th e  c a s e ,  so do n o t  look back and f o r t h  
th rough th e  i t e m s .  Do n o t  t r y  t o  remember how you checked s i m i l a r  
i t em s  e a r l i e r .  Make a s e p a r a t e  and indep en den t  judgement f o r  each 
s i t u a t i o n .  Work a t  a f a i r l y  h ig h  sp eed .  Do n o t  worry o r  p u z z le  
o ve r  i n d i v i d u a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  I t  i s  your f i r s t  i m p r e s s io n s ,  your  
immediate f e e l i n g s  about  th e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h a t  a r e  im p o r ta n t .  On 
th e  o t h e r  hand,  p l e a s e  do n o t  be c a r e l e s s ,  becaus e  your  t r u e  impres ­
s i o n s  a r e  most im p o r ta n t .
IMPORTANT: Some s i t u a t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  below might  seem to
you to  be im prob ab le .  For example,  you might  n o t  th in k  t h a t  your 
p r o f i t s  would i n c r e a s e  i f  O r ig i n a l  Wholesale  Supply ,  I n c .  adop ted  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c y  t o  govern a l l  Brand X r e t a i l e r s .  
However, j u s t  assume t h a t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  d id  happen and then  e x p r e s s  
your  f e e l i n g s  about  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n .
O r i g i n a l  Wholesale  Supply ,  In c .  has a p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  
must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above the  
d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  th o s e  p r o d u c t s .  A lso ,  your n e t  
p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  15 t o  25 p e r c e n t  ov er  your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  





F a i r
Sad




U n fa i r
Happy
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  u r g e s  you t o  s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
w i t h i n  a range  o f  20 t £  80 p e r c e n t  markup ov e r  t h e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  b u t  you may sometimes d e v i a t e  
up o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .  A lso ,  your n e t  p r o f i t s  d e c r e a s e  5 to  
15 p e r c e n t  from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U np leasan t t t i i  » t P l e a s a n t
Good t S 1 s I i Bad
V alu ab le : i  t i : s W orth less
Awful i  i  t i  < i Nice
F a i r t t t t : i U n fa i r
Sad : : i i : t Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  In c .  u r g e s  you t o  s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
w i t h i n  a ra n g e  o f  20 t £  8£ p e r c e n t  markup over  t h e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  b u t  you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up 
o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .  A lso ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  remain  a bo u t  what 
they  a r e  now.
U np leasant  ____ i   i    t   t   i   t______ P l e a s a n t
Good   :   «   :   i   «   t_____ Bad
V alu ab le  ____ «   i   :   »   i   t_____ W or th less
Awful   «   «   J   »   «   «_____ Nice
F a i r    i   i   *   «   »   i ____ U n fa i r
Sad   i   i   i   i   i   i ____ Happy
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O r ig i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  In c .  ha s  a p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  
must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above 
th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s .  A lso ,  your  n e t  
p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  5 t o  15 p e r c e n t  ov er  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t
p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t  ____ :   «   i   i   i   t ____ P l e a s a n t
Good   t   i   i   i   :   :_____ Bad
V alu ab le  ____ t   t   i   i   i   t_____ W or th le ss
Awful   i   :   t   :   s   i_____ Nice
F a i r    :   i   i   i   }   i   U n fa i r
Sad   j   :   :   i   :   i_____ Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  has  a p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  
must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above the  
d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s .  Also ,  your  n e t  





F a i r
Sad




U nfa i r
Happy
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  has  a p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  
must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above 
t h e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  t h o s e  p r o d u c t s .  A lso ,  your  n e t  
p r o f i t s  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  
p r o f i t s .
U np leasant
Good




P l e a s a n t
Bad
W orth les s
Nice
U n f a i r
Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  s e t s  a ran g e  o f  30 t o  60 p e r c e n t  
markup ov er  t h e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  
w i t h i n  which you must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e .  A lso ,  you r  n e t  p r o f i t s  
i n c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  ov er  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
Unp leasant
Good
V a lu ab le
Awful
F a i r
Sad
P l e a s a n t
Bad
W or th le ss
Nice
U n fa i r
Happy
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesale  Supply ,  In c .  s e t s  a ran ge  o f  30 to  60 p e r c e n t  
markup over  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  
w i t h i n  which you must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e .  Also ,  your  n e t  
p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t  over  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  
p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t
Good








U n fa i r
Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesale Supply,  In c .  s e t s  a range  o f  30 to  60 p e r c e n t  
markup over  the  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  
w i t h in  which you must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e .  Also ,  your  n e t  
p r o f i t s  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  
p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t •• t i i P l e a s a n t
Good : : i i Bad
V a lu ab le > i i i Wor th less
Awful •• • : : Nice
F a i r : t : ____ i U n fa i r
Sad : : : : Happy
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesale  Supply ,  I n c .  s e t s  a ra n g e  o f  30 t o  60 p e r c e n t  
markup over  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  
w i th i n  which you must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e .  Also ,  your  n e t  
p r o f i t s  remain about  what the y  a r e  now.
U nplea san t
Good
V alu ab le
Awful
F a i r
Sad




U n fa i r
Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  o f f e r s  a su g g e s t e d  r e t a i l  p r i c e , but  
you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  s u g g e s t i o n  in  s e t t i n g  
your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .  A lso ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  
15 t o  25 p e r c e n t  ov er  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t i i i « i  : P l e a s a n t
Good : i t : ____ i ____ i ____ Bad
V alu ab le : : t i  « » Wor th less
Awful : i  i « « i Nice
F a i r i i i i i  : U nfa i r
Sad t i t i « ___ « Happy
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply,  I n c .  o f f e r s  no su g g es ted  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a r e  f r e e  t o  charge  your  cus tomers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .  Also ,  your n e t  p r o f i t s  remain  about  what they  a r e  
now.




F a i r
Sad
I : t : i P le a s a n t
: : : i i Bad
: : i i  i Worth less
t : t : i Nice
t : i : i U n fa i r
•• t i t s Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply,  I n c .  o f f e r s  no su g g e s t e d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a r e  f r e e  t o  charge  your customers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .  Also ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  a r e  d e c r e a s e d  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  
from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .




F a i r
Sad




U nfa i r
Happy
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O r ig in a l  Wholesale Supply ,  In c .  o f f e r s  a su g ges te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e , 
bu t  you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  s u g g e s t i o n  in  
s e t t i n g  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .  A lso ,  you r  n e t  
p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  over  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  
p r o f i t s .
Unp leasant  : : : i i P l e a s a n t
Good : : : t t Bad
V alu ab le  : : : : : W or th less
Awful i : i i : Nice
F a i r  t i t : > U n fa i r
Sad : : : : i Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesale Supply,  In c .  o f f e r s  a su g g es te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e , bu t  
you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  s u g g e s t i o n  i n  s e t t i n g  
your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .  A lso ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s
remain about  what the y  a re  now.
U nplea san t  ____ j   j  i  i    i    :_____ P l e a s a n t
Good   i   :  i   i   t   i_____ Bad
V aluable  ____ i   «  i   i    i   i_____ W or th less
Awful   i   i   i  t   :   i_____ Nice
F a i r    t   i  i   i   i   «   U nfa i r
Saci   i   t  t  i   i   i  ____ Happy
235
O r i g i n a l  Wholesale  Supply,  I n c .  o f f e r s  no su gges te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a r e  f r e e  to  charge  your cus tom ers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .  Also ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t  
over  your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t : t : I i P le a s a n t
Good : t : i : Bad
V aluable i i i  : i W orth less
Awful t : t i  : Nice
F a i r 1 s i > : U n fa i r
Sad : : : : i Happy
O r ig i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  o f f e r s  no s u g g es te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a r e  f r e e  t o  cha rge  your cus tom ers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .  Also ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  a r e  d e c r e a se d  by 15 to  25 
p e r c e n t  from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .




F a i r
Sad




U nfa i r
Happy
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O r ig i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply , I n c .  o f f e r s  n£  su g g es te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a r e  f r e e  to  charge  your  cus tomers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .  A lso ,  your n e t  p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t  





F a i r
Sad




U n fa i r
Happy
O r i g i n a l  Wholesale  Supply,  In c .  o f f e r s  i  su g g e s te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e , bu t 
you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  s u g g e s t i o n  in  s e t t i n g  
your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .  A lso ,  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  d e c r e a s e  
5 to  15 p e r c e n t  from your p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U nplea san t t t i : P l e a s a n t
Good : i i  t ____ Bad
V aluable : i > i W orth less
Awful i t : t Nice
F a i r i •• t t Unfa i r
Sad i » : i Happy
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O r ig i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  In c .  u rg e s  you to  s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
w i th i n  a ran g e  o f  2£ jto jiO p e r c e n t  markup over  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  bu t  you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up 
o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .  A lso ,  your n e t  p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e  5 t o  15 
p e r c e n t  over  your  p r e s e n t  l e v e l  o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
U np leasan t i : : t < P l e a s a n t
Good : i t i : Bad
V alu ab le i : i t t Worth less
Awful : i : i : Nice
F a i r i : : i : U n fa i r
Sad : : : i : Happy
O r ig in a l  Wholesa le  Supply ,  I n c .  u rg e s  you t o  s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  
w i t h i n  a ra n g e  o f  t £  8() p e r c e n t  markup ov er  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  bu t  you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up
or  down from 
p e r c e n t  over
t h a t
your
ra n g e .
p r e s e n t
Also ,
l e v e l
your n e t  p r o f i t s  
o f  n e t  p r o f i t s .
i n c r e a s e  15 to
U np leasant i t : t i P l e a s a n t
Good : i i t t Bad
V aluable i s i  » t Worth less
Awful — t t _____ i  _____  t _____  i Nice
F a i r i : i  t t U n fa i r
Sad t : 1 s t Happy
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P a r t  I I I .  F ive  r e s a l e  p r i c e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  could  be adopted  by 
O r i g in a l  Wholesa le  Supply , I n c .  t o  govern  th e  r e t a i l  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  
p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e i r  customers  on Brand X c a r p e t s  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  below. 
Simply p l a c e  an X in  th e  b lank t h a t  r e p r e s e n t s  what you th in k  the  
e f f e c t  on your p r o f i t s  would be i f  O r i g i n a l  adopted  each p o l i c y  to  
govern th e  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  p r a c t i c e s  o f  a l l  Brand X c a r p e t  d e a l e r s .
O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply , In c .  o f f e r s  n£  su gg es ted  r e t a i l  p r i c e  and 
you a re  f r e e  to  charge  your customers  any p r i c e  t h a t  you d e s i r e  f o r  
Brand X c a r p e t .
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l d e c r e a s e 15 to  25 p e r c e n t
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l d e c r e a s e 5 to  15 p e r c e n t
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l remain  about  what they  a r e  now
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l i n c r e a s e 5 t o  15 p e r c e n t
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l i n c r e a s e 15 to  25 p e r c e n t
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply,  In c .  o f f e r s  a su gg es te d  r e t a i l  p r i c e , bu t 
you may f r e e l y  d e v i a t e  up o r  down from t h a t  s u g g e s t i o n  in  s e t t i n g  
your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t .
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l d e c r e a s e 15 t o  25 p e r c e n t
your ne t p r o f i t s w i l l d e c r e a s e 5 to  15 p e r c e n t
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l remain  about  what they  a r e  now
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l i n c r e a s e 5 to  15 p e r c e n t
your n e t p r o f i t s w i l l in c r e a s e 15 to  25 p e r c e n t
O r ig i n a l  Wholesa le  Supply , In c .  u rg e s  you t o  s e t  yr>u r  r e t a i l  p r i c e  
w i th i n  a range  o f  2£ t £  80 p e r c e n t  markup ov er  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  
t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t ,  bu t  you may sometimes d e v i a t e  up 
o r  down from t h a t  r a n g e .
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  15 t o  25 p e r c e n t
  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  remain  about  what they  a r e  now
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  your net p r o f i t s  w i l l  in c r e a se  15 to  25 percent
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O r i g i n a l  Wholesale Supply , In c .  s e t  a range  o f  3K) jto 60 p e r c e n t  
markup over  th e  d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  Brand X c a r p e t  
w i t h in  which you must s e t  your  r e t a i l  p r i c e .
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  15 t o  25 p e r c e n t
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  your  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  remain about  what they  a r e  now
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  5 t o  15 p e r c e n t
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  15 t o  25 p e r c e n t
O r ig in a l  Wholesale Supply ,  In c .  has a p o l i c y  t h a t  you and a l l  d e a l e r s  
must s e t  your r e t a i l  p r i c e  on Brand X c a r p e t  a t  40 p e r c e n t  above the  
d e l i v e r e d  c o s t  t h a t  you pay f o r  tho se  p r o d u c t s .
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  5 to  15 p e r c e n t
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  remain  about  what they  a r e  now
  your n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i i . c r e a s e  5 co 15 p e r c e n t
your net p r o f i t s  w i l l  in c r e a se  15 to  25 percent
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APPENDIX B
MEASURES OF DEALERS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD 
ALTERNATIVE CHANNEL SITUATIONS
Q u e s t i o n n a i r e !  P a r t  I I
N o ta t i o n  used in  the  t a b l e  on th e  f o l l o w i n g  p ages i
1. B i p o l a r  A d je c t i v e s
1 = U n p l e a s a n t / P l e a s a n t  4 = Awful/Nice
2 = Bad/Good 5 = U n f a i r / F a i r
3 = W o r th le s s /V a lu a b le  6 = Sad/Happy
2. S .  ^ = D e a le r  A t t i t u d e  Score Toward D ea le r  Payoff  Level  and
’ S u p p l i e r  R e sa le  P r i c e  P o l i c y  Combinat ions where: 
j = Payoff  Leve ls  1 to  5
k = Co nt ro l  Le ve ls  ( P r i c e  P o l i c i e s )  1 t o  5
P o la r  Term A : : : i ! : P o la r  Term B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
where t
1 = Very A
2 = Quite A
3 = S l i g h t l y  A
4 = N e i t h e r  A nor  B o r  E qu a l ly  A and B
5 = S l i g h t l y  B
6 = Q ui te  B
7 = Very B
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M easures o f  D ealer A tti tu d e s  toward D ealer 
Payoff Level and S u p p lie r  P esa le  






























































1 l 1 1 1 1 4 4 6 1 1 5 7 5 5 1 7 1 5 5 1
1 1 1 1 1 4 ft 6 1 1 5 7 5 5 1 7 1 5 3 1
3 1 1 1 1 4 4 6 1 1 3 7 5 5 1 7 1 5 5 1
4 1 1 1 1 4 4 6 1 1 5 7 5 5 } 7 1 5 5 \
5 1 1 1 1 4 4 6 1 1 5 7 5 5 1 7 1 5 5 1
6 1 1 1 1 4 4 6 1 1 3 7 5 5 7 \ 5 5 1
2 1 4 1 3 7 7 4 4 2 3 5 3 4 1 4 5 5 5 4
2 4 5 2 3 7 7 3 4 2 5 3 5 4 1 4 5 5 3 3
3 4 3 3 7 7 1 4 4 6 3 6 4 1 4 3 5 5 3
4 4 4 7 7 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 1 4 5 5 5 4
5 4 3 7 7 3 4 5 5 6 5 4 1 4 5 5 5 5
6 4 4 2 4 7 7 3 4 4 5 3 5 4 1 4 3
CJ 3 3
3 1 1 1 4 2 4 3 4 3 4 7 4 7 4 7 7 6 4 4 4
2 1 1 1 3 1 4 4 4 6 4 7 6 5 4 1 7 4 4 7 6
3 4 2 —71
r—r-
2 5 7 5 4 5 7 5 4 5 2 7 3 5 5 5
4 2 5 2 1 2 4 4 3 1 7 6 7 5 5 6 4 5 1 2
5 7 5 1 7 2 2 2 1 7 2 5 1 7 2 4 5 4
6 1 4 4 1 1 3 1 1 3 7 G 7 7 7 7 4 2 7 7
4 1 1 1 1 1 4 7 7 3 1 7 7 4 7 7 7 7 7 / 7
2 1 1 1 1 3 7 7 3 1 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
3 1 1 } 1 4 5 7 3 1 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
4 1 1 1 1 4 7 7 3 1 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
3 1 1 1 1 rJ 7 3 1 7 7 6 7 5 7 ' / -
6 1 1 1 1 4 7 7 4 1 7 / 6 7 7 7 / 7 4 ;
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 7 6 6 7 7 6 b 2 6 6
2 1 1 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 7 6 G 4 5 6 6 1 2 6 6
3 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 5 3 6 4 5 6 6 | 2 0 6
4 1 1 1 1 6 3 1 1 6 6. 7 G 5 6 6 2 1 6 6
5 1 1 1 1 6 3 1 1 1 0 5 6 7 6 6 2 6 7
66 1 1 1 1 r, 5 1 1 6 4 6 7 7 4 6 3 b
6 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 7
2 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4
*» 4 4 4 4 > 4 4 4 4 7
3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 7
4 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4
4
7 4 4 4 4 7
5 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 7
0 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 7
' 7"" 1 1 1 1 7 4 4 7 ) 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 T/
2 1 1 1 1 7 4 4 7 1 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7
3 1 1 1 1 7 4 4 7 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7
4 1 1 7 1 7 4 4 7 1 7 7 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7
5 1 1 1 1 7 7 4 7 1 7 7 7 7 1 7 7 7 7 7
b 1 1 1 1 7 7 4 7 1 7 / 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
■ S 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 4 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 ] 1
2 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 7 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 1 I
3 1 1 1 1 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 J 1 7 7 7 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 ; 1
3 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 7 7 1 3 7 7 7 i 1
C 1 1 1 1 - y
7 7
6 ~ 4
1 1 / 1 7 1 1 7 7 7 i ]
9 1 1 1 1 1 4 G 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
2 1 1 1 1 G <> 4 4 b 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
3 1 1 1 1 G G 4 G 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
4 1 1 1 G G 4 4 7 ; 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
3 1 1 1 1 G G ( , 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 / 7
6 1 1 1 1 G 6 4 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 ! 7
10 ” 1 1 3 1 3 2 3 3 5 7 1 3 2 7 3 1 ft 7
2 1 1 3 5 3 7 4 ? 5 3 rJ 7 .3 3 ft 7
3 1 1 3 5 3 4 I 7 5 2 ft rJ 5 6 3 3 /, 4 7
4 1 3 3 6 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 ft 6 3 3 ft 7
3 1 3 3 5 7 ) 3 f. 7 2 3 5 7 3 2 3 6 7





§ 2  O <
M easures o f  D ea ler A tt l tu d  
P ayoff Level and Sup 











s toward D ealer 
l e r  R esale  



















6 1 1 5 1 1 1 3 IL H 2 1
2 4 4
APPENDIX C
DEALERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF PAYOFF FOR EACH 
SUPPLIER RESALE PRICE POLICY (PPi> k >
Q u e s t io n n a i r e i  P a r t  I I I
PP. . = P e rc e iv e d  p a y o f f  o f  each  d e a l e r  ( i )  a t  each  l e v e l  o f  s u p p l i e r  
c o n t r o l  (k )
P a y o ff  Level 1 = d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t
P a y o f f  Level 2 = d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  d e c r e a s e  5 t o  15 p e r c e n t
P a y o f f  L eve l 3 = d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  rem a in  what th e y  a r e  now
P a y o f f  L eve l 4 = d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  5 t o  15 p e r c e n t
P a y o f f  L eve l 5 = d e a l e r  n e t  p r o f i t s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  15 to  25 p e r c e n t
PFi , k
Dea ler  ( i ) ^ i , l - - P P i f 2 ' “ ^ , 3 *T'i ,4 “  P F \ t5
1 3 4 3 4 1
2 3 1 1 2 3
3 5 3 2 2 2
4 3 3 4 5 5
5 3 3 3 4 4
6 3 3 3 3 4
7 3 3 3 4 4
8 3 3 3 4 4
9 3 3 3 3 4
10 1 2 3 4 5
11 3 4 4 4 4
12 3 3 3 3 3
13 3 3 3 4 4
14 3 3 3 4 2
15 ~J 3 3 3 3
16 3 3 4 4 4
17 3 3 4 3 2
18 3 3 3 2 4
19 3 3 3 4 2
20 3 3 2 1 1
2 4 5
APPENDIX D
MAXIMUM RELATIVE CONTROL LEVEL TOLERATED BY EACH 
DEALER AT EACH LEVEL OF CHANGE IN ANNUAL 
NET DEALER PROFITS
N o ta t io n  used in  th e  t a b l e  on th e  f o l l o w in g  p a g e s » 
i = d e a l e r  1, 2, 3, . 2 0  
j = p a y o ff  l e v e l s  1, 2, 3,  4,  5
k = r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  l e v e l s  1, 2,  3, 4 f 5 ( r e s a l e  
p r i c e  p o l i c i e s )
CS^ . k = compos ite  a t t i t u d e  s c o re  f o r  d e a l e r  i toward 
p a y o f f  l e v e l  j and p o l i c y  k
MĈ  . = maximum l e v e l  o f  r e l a t i v e  s u p p l i e r  c o n t r o l  t o l e r a t e d  
1 ’ "' by d e a l e r  i a t  p a y o f f  l e v e l  j
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D e a le r
( i )
V alue o f
I n d i c a t o r
Score
CS. , , i , l , l
P a y o ff
Level
( j )
R e l a t i v e C o n tro l  L e v e ls
Maximum
R e l a t i v e
C o n tro l
uev e l
T o le r a te d
1 2 3 4 5 CMCi .
1 1 .0 0 2 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1
3 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 6 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 3
r  4 5 .0 0 7 .00 5 .00 5 .0 0 1 . 0 0 4
5 7 .0 0 1 .0 0 5 .0 0 5 .0 0 1 .0 0 4
2 4 .0 0 2 4 .1 7 5.67 4 .0 0 3 .8 3 1 .0 0 3
3 7 .00 7 .00 3 .0 0 4 .0 0 3 .5 0 3
.... 4 4 .8 3 4 .8 3 4 .8 3 4 .0 0 1 .0 0 3
5 5 .0 0 5 .00 5 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4
3 2 .67 2 3 .33 3 .33 3 .00 1 .3 3 1 .1 7 3
3 3 .8 3 3 .8 3 3 .1 7 3 .1 7 3 .0 0 5
4 7 .00 4 .8 3 5 .83 4 .8 3 3 .83 5
5 6 .8 3 3 .83 4 .0 0 3 .67 4 .6 7 5
4 1 .0 0 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .6 0 l'.fflF 1
3 4 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 3 .0 0 1 . 0 0 4
4 7 .0 0 7 .00 6 .0 0 7 .0 0 7 .0 0 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 6 .8 3 7 .00 5
5 1 .0 0 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1
3 5 .67 2 .8 3 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 2
4 5 .8 3 5 .33 6 .17 6 .5 0 6 .0 0 "5
5 6 .0 0 6 .0 0 2 .1 7 6 .6 0 6 .1 7 " " "5
6 1 .0 0 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 l
3 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 7 .00 5
4 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 7 .00 5
5 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 7 .0 0 5
7 2 .0 0 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1
3 7 .00 5 .33 4 .0 0 7 .00 1 .0 0 4
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 4 .5 0 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
8 1 .0 0 2 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1
3 7 .00 7 .00 6 .8 3 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 3
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 3
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 . J
9 1 .0 0 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1
3 6 .0 0 6 .00 6 .0 0 6 .0 0 4 .17 5
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 6 .8 3 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 5
10 1 .00 2 4 .0 0 2 .67 3 .0 0 4 .1 7 3.33 5
3 2 .6 7 4 .5 0 3.17 6 .17 5 .83 5
4 3 .8 3 3 .5 0 3 .67 4 .5 0 6 .5 0 5













V alue o f
I n d i c a t o r
S co re
CS. . . 
i , l , l
P a y o f f
L evel
( j )
R e l a t i v e  C o n tro l  L e v e ls
Maximum
R e l a t i v e
C o n tro l
L eve l
T o le r a te d
(M C i, j )1 2 3 4 5
1 .00 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .00 1 . 0 0 1
3 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 1 .8 3 4 .0 0 5 .33 5
4 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1
3 7 .00 7 .00 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 2
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 5
2 .0 0 2 3 .0 0 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 5
3 3 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .00 5
4 1 . 0 0 1 .0 0 2 .0 0 7 .00 4 .3 3 5
5 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
1 .5 0 2 2 .8 3 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .5 0 2 .0 0 5
3 4 .0 0 4 .2 0 4 .3 3 4 .5 0 3 .5 0 5
4 6 .5 0 6 .5 0 7 .00 6 .0 0 2 .8 3 5
5 7 .0 0 7 .00 6 .5 0 7 .00 5 .17 5
1 .00 2 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 1
3 4 .0 0 7 .00 4 .0 0 7 .00 4 .0 0 5
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
5 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
3.17 2 4 .3 3 2 .3 3 2 .6 7 2 .6 7 1 .5 0 1
3 4 .5 0 5 .5 0 6 .1 7 5.17 4 .3 3 5
4 6 .8 3 6 .5 0 6 .6 7 5 .50 5 .83 5
5 6 .3 3 6 .8 3 6 .5 0 6 .3 3 6 .3 3 5
1 .00 2 1 .0 6 1 .6 6 1 .0 0 1 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 1
y 4 .0 6 4 .0 0 5 .5 0 4 .0 0 6 .0 0 5
4 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
5 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .0 0 5
1 .5 0  ' 2 2 .1 7 5 .67 1 .5 0 1 .0 0 1 .0 0 2
3 6 .8 3 7 .00 4 .0 0 1 .00 1 .0 0 3
4 7 .00 7 .00 6 .1 7 4 .67 1 . 0 0 4
5 7 .0 0 5 .00 5 .17 2 .67 2 .6 7 5
1.0(5 ' 2 2 .8 3 1 .5 0 1 .5 0 1 .67 3 .67 5
3 4 .8 3 6 .5 0 5 .0 0 5 .0 0 4 .8 3 5
4 7 .00 6 .5 0 7 .0 0 7 .00 7 .00 5
5 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 7 .00 5
4 .67 2 5 .66 3 .5 0 2 .1 7 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 1
3 6 .0 0 5 .0 0 2 .5 0 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 2
4 6 .0 0 6 .00 5 .17 2 .0 0 3 .5 0 3
5 6 .0 0 5 .00 2 .3 3 2 .5 0 2 .0 0 2
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